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ABSTRACT
The central question of this thesis is whether education policy frameworks are sufficient
to transform the higher education system in South Africa. I hold that higher education
policy initiatives promulgated in statutory documents such as the White Paper 3 on
Higher Education Transformation of 1997 and the Higher Education Act of 1997 are not
sufficient to guide educational transformation in universities. My main claim is that as
higher education role players we also need to pursue practices driven from "inside"
(Gutman 1998: 34) whereby we can develop the "strength of will" to contribute towards
initiating equal access and development and, enhancing accountability and quality at our
universities.
I hold that in order to practice higher education transformation from "inside" (Gutman
1998: 34), one can justifiably pursue a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that it
involves a form of "doing action" with some worthwhile, rational end in mind. It has to
do with engaging in reflexive and democratic action attuned to social experience, more
specifically higher education, where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon,
transformed and deepened. To deepen our understanding of our actions involves asking
questions about "what we have not thought to think" (Lather 1991: 156). I argue that
philosophy of education, more specifically conceptual analysis, is an indispensable means
by which we can develop such a deeper, clearer, more informed and better reasoned
understanding about the current shifts in higher education transformation in post-
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apartheid South Africa. Simultaneously, I use conceptual analysis to show why and how
the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can become a "satisfying sense of personal
meaning, purpose, and commitment" (Soltis 1998: 196) to guide our activities as
educators in the higher education realm.
The general principle, which shapes a reflexive democratic praxis, is rationality.
Rationality is shaped by logically necessary conditions such as "educational discourse",
"reflexive action" and "ethical activity to promote the moral good" in the forms of truth-
telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense
of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence and people. My contention is that
appealing to moral notions of rationality is where the strength of a reflexive democratic
praxis lies. In this sense I further elucidate rationality which I argue can create spaces for
achieving democratic education which, in tum, holds much promise for shaping teaching
and learning through distance education, research and community service in the context
of higher education transformation in South Africa.
I use "touchstones" which evolve out of rationality, namely access, relevance and
dialogism, to show how the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards
shaping higher education transformation in South Africa. I provide an overview of the
South African higher education policy framework, in particular its concern with issues of
equality, development, accountability and quality, which can be linked to and guided by
"touchstones" of a reflexive democratic praxis.
IV
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vA reflexive democratic praxis implies a shift towards socially distributed knowledge
production which in turn shapes higher education transformation. By reflecting on
instances related to the institution where I work, I argue that a more nuanced
understanding of higher education has the potential to initiate equal access and
,
development on the one hand, and to enhance accountability and quality on the other
hand. I conclude with the idea that a reflexive democratic praxis can provide higher
education practitioners with a conceptual frame to organise their discourses in such a way
as to contribute towards transforming their activities and that of their institutions. In this
way they might contribute towards addressing the demands of equality, development,
accountability and quality in South African higher education.
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of education, conceptual analysis, reflexivity, democracy,
praxis, higher education, transformation and South Africa.
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ABSTRAK
Die sentrale kwessie wat hierdie proefskrif aanspreek, is die vraag of die raamwerke vir
onderwysbeleid genoegsaam is vir die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika.
Ek is van mening dat die proklamasie van inisiatiewe ten opsigte van die beleid vir hoër
onderwys in statutêre dokumente soos die Witskrif 3 oor die Transformasie van Hoër
Onderwys (1997) en die Wet vir Hoër Onderwys (1997) nie genoegsaam is om
transformasie aan universiteite te rig nie. My hoofstandpunt is dat ons, die rolspelers in
hoër onderwys, ook aandag moet gee aan praktyke wat "van binne uit" gedryf word
(Gutman 1998: 34). Op so 'n manier kan ons die "wilskrag" ontwikkel wat sal bydra tot
die inisiering van gelyke toelating en ontwikkeling en die versterking van
verantwoordelikheid en kwaliteit aan ons universiteite.
Ek is van mening dat dit geregverdig is om die transformasie van hoër onderwys "van
binne uit" te bewerkstellig deur 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk omdat dit 'n soort
aksie verg wat 'n betekenisvolle rasionele doel het. Dit gaan oor refleksiewe en
demokratiese aksies wat afgestem is op sosiale ondervinding, veralop die hoër onderwys,
waar verskillende moontlikhede oorweeg kan word, daaroor gereflekteer kan word en dit
dan getransformeer en verdiep kan word. Ter wille van die verdieping van ons begrip van
ons aksies moet vrae gevra word oor "what we have not thought to think" (Lather 1991:
156). My argument is dat die filosofie van die opvoeding, meer spesifiek 'n konseptuele
analise, 'n onontbeerlike manier is om 'n dieper, duideliker, meer informatiewe en beter
beredeneerde begrip te ontwikkel van die huidige klemverskuiwings in die transformasie
VI
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van die hoër onderwys in 'n post-apartheid Suid-Afrika. Daarmee saam gebruik ek
konseptuele analise om aan te toon waarom en hoe die idee van 'n refleksiewe
demokratiese praktyk 'n "satisfying sense of personal mearung, purpose, and
commitment" (Soltis 1998: 196) kan word om ons aktiwiteite as opvoedkundiges in die
hoër onderwys te kan rig.
Die algemene beginsel wat aan 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk sy vorm gee is 'n
rasionaliteit. Rasionaliteit word gevorm deur logies-noodsaaklike beginsels, bv
"opvoedkundige diskoers", "refleksiewe aksie" en "etiese aktiwiteite wat goeie moraliteit
bevorder" soos dit aangetref word in die praat van die waarheid, opregtheid, vryheid van
denke, helderheid, nie-arbitrêrheid, onpartydigheid, 'n sin vir relevansie, konstantheid en
respek vir bewysstukke en mense. My standpunt is dat die sterkte van 'n refleksiewe
demokratiese beleid daarin geleë is dat dit aanspraak maak op morele kwessies van
rasionaliteit. Ek verklaar rasionaliteit in hierdie sin verder deur te beweer dat dit die plek
is om demokratiese onderwys te verwerklik, wat op sy beurt groot beloftes inhou vir
onderrig en leer deur middel van afstandsonderwys, navorsing en gemeenskapsdiens in
die konteks van die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika.
Ek gebruik kwaliteitsaanduiders wat ontwikkel uit rasionaliteit, naamlik toeganklikheid,
relevansie en samevattings om aan te toon hoe die idee van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese
praktyk kan bydra tot die vorming van die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-
Afrika. Ek verskaf 'n oorsig oor die raamwerk vir die Suid-Afrikaanse beleid oor hoër
onderwys, In die besonder oor aspekte soos gelykheid, ontwikkeling en
vn
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verantwoordbaarheid, wat gekoppel kan word aan en geng kan word deur die
kwaliteitsaanduiders van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk.
'n Refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk impliseer 'n klemverskuiwing in die rigting van
sosiaal-verspreide kennisproduksie wat vorm gee aan die transformasie van hoër
onderwys. Deur te reflekteer oor gebeure wat verband hou met die inrigting waar ek
werk, argumenteer ek dat 'n fyner genuanseerde omskrywing van hoër onderwys die
potensiaal het om aan die een kant gelyke toeganklikheid en ontwikkeling te inisieer en
aan die ander kant om verantwoordbaarheid en kwaliteit te versterk. Ek sluit af met die
gedagte dat 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk die praktisyns van hoër onderwys van 'n
konseptuele raamwerk kan voorsien wat hul diskussies op so 'n manier salorganiseer dat
dit sal bydra tot die transformasie van hulle aktiwiteite en die van die inrigtings waarby
hulle betrokke is. Op so 'n manier kan 'n bydrae gelewer word tot die aanspreek van die
eise van gelykheid, ontwikkeling en verantwoordbaarheid en kwaliteit van hoër onderwys
in Suid-Afrika.
SLEUTELBEGRIPPE: Filosofie van die opvoeding. konseptuele analise, refleksiwiteit,
demokrasie, praktyk, hoër onderwys, transformasie en Suid-Afrika.
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CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
To be a university academic at the present time in post-apartheid South Africa should
be both disturbing and challenging. Globally (including South Africa) there is a shift
towards problem-solving or applied as opposed to disciplinary research (ways of
experiencing and constructing knowledge) as a result of a growing demand for social
relevance and accountability (Muller 1999: 10). In view of this emergent shift in
knowledge production or formation (research), universities are increasingly being
challenged in terms of their responsiveness and relevance to societal needs (Subotzky
1999: 17). Given the extent of world-wide moral, economic and social problems, there
is increasing pressure on universities to bridge the gap between higher education and
society and "to become active partners with parents, teachers, principals, community
advocates, business leaders, community agencies, and general citizenry" (Braskamp
& Wergin 1998: 62).
Moreover, international trends suggest that the merits of the research and teaching
university relative to its considerable public costs is continuously under scrutiny in
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and Canada. This is so
primarily as a result of a decline in economic growth, which forces governments to
reduce their subsidies to public universities. In the face of these disturbing crises, a
need for a different conceptual model for higher education has emerged where
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2universities excel in community service (in the form of providing integrated teaching
and research-based services grounded in knowledge production in the context of its
application), rather than a model in which universities focus exclusively on
conventional academic research and teaching (Cummings 1998: 1, 3). The challenge
that universities need to supplement teaching and research with community service
whereby academics through teaching and research can provide applied knowledge to
assist communities in the solution of social problems is obvious enough. In this way,
universities and communities become jointly responsible for social change (Braskamp
& Wergin 1998: 87).
1.2 RATIONALE OF STUDY
My dissertation is an attempt to clarify what it means for higher education institutions,
more specifically universities, to organise their practices in meeting the demands
posed by changing local, national and global educational contexts. Several education
policy documents have been promulgated over the past decade by the government,
which require more clarity before implementation. This dissertation is an attempt to
address this issue.
To say that my research investigation is an answer to the current waves of challenge,
which characterise the higher education sector in South Africa, would be to
underestimate the weightiness associated with educational transformation.
Instead, my contention is that higher educational policy frameworks are not sufficient
to guide transformation in universities. We also need to pursue practices driven from
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3"inside" (Gutman 1998: 34) that would make us accountable towards seeing that our
higher education system initiates equal access and development and enhances quality.
I argue that one such practice is the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis. Why?
Praxis involves more that just doing something. In the Aristotelian sense it is a form
of "doing action" with some worthwhile, rational end in mind. It has to do with
engaging in action attuned to social experience where possibilities may be
contemplated, reflected upon, transformed and deepened. To deepen our
understanding of our actions involves asking questions about "what we have not
thought to think" (Lather 1991: 156). In this way our praxis is intertwined with the
notion of reflexivity, which Lather (1998: 497) refers to "as a move towards an
experience of the promise that is unforeseeable from the perspective of our present
conceptual frameworks". Likewise transforming our understanding and ways of
experiencing action is shaped by our representation in participatory human practices;
our social experiences are shaped by these adjuncts of democracy (Walker 1998: 22;
Jarvis 1998: 95).
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY
The Higher Education Act of 1997 emphasises the establishment of a single co-
ordinated higher education system that responds to the needs of the South African
society and communities served by institutions. In line with this, I contend that
teaching and research universities in South Africa also need to expand their
community service orientation in order to prepare and develop academics for the
needs of effective provision in higher education.
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The concept of community service that will be developed later on in this thesis is
grounded in the emerging mode of knowledge production called "Mode 2", that is,
knowledge which is socially accountable, reflexive, transdisciplinary and problem-
oriented. Knowledge produced in the context of its application gives rise to a concept
of community service that does not undermine the merits of research and teaching.
Rather, community service integrates with teaching and research through "the
delivery, installation, and maintenance of knowledge-based applications to clients"
within and outside the university (Cummings 1998: 1). In other words, the thesis
holds the position that teaching and research universities should carefully "go service"
and also become "Mode 2" knowledge producing agencies without harming their
positions as teaching and research universities with sound "Mode 1" disciplinary
bases (refer to section 4.4.1). Instead, I contend that community service should be
viewed as a potential engine for the effective preparation and continuing development
of academics for their various roles in higher education, unlike conventional notions
which depict service as voluntary charitable work (Henning 1998: 44) and merely
"part of good citizenship" (Gordon 1997: 75). In a different way, I shall argue that
teaching and research universities in South Africa should "become more responsive to
social problems and to function as a forum for the expression and negotiation of
social discourse" (Subotzky 1999: 16-17).
It is one thing to find the current higher education situation challenging but quite
another to have the equipment which is required to cope with it. It is my conviction
that philosophy of education is an indispensable part of the equipment which
university academics require to form a clearer, more informed and better reasoned
opinion about the current shifts in higher education transformation in post-apartheid
4
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5South Africa. This presupposes a particular view of philosophy of education. Hence, I
shall give a brief description of my understanding of philosophy of education.
Soltis (1998: 196) sketches contemporary philosophy of education in a compelling
manner according to three dimensions: the personal, the public and the professional.
To have a personal philosophy of education is to possess a set of personal beliefs
about what can be considered good, right and worthwhile to do in education. The
individual who practices philosophy of education achieves a "satisfying sense of
personal meaning, purpose, and commitment to guide his or her activities as an
educator" (1998: 196). Practising philosophy of education in a personal manner
requires one to be thoughtful and self-directed. Different from an understanding of
philosophy of education along the personal dimension of guiding individual practice,
is philosophy of education in a public dimension. Philosophy of education in the
public dimension aims to guide and direct the practice of "the many", which may
include educators, academics, intellectuals, politicians, journalists or philosophers.
Soltis (1998: 197) explains philosophy of education according to the public dimension
as follows:
Public philosophy of education is everybody's business and ought to be. The
point of being philosophical about education in the public dimension is to
articulate public aspirations and educational values, give sense and purpose to
the cooperative public enterprise of education, and provide the opportunity for
thoughtful participation in the direction of education by all who care seriously
about it.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6Although such a public dimension of philosophy of education offers space for
debates, critiques and thoughtful policy making, it is not substantive enough to
examine contemporary philosophical perspectives on conceptions of teaching and
learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher
education transformation. This is so primarily because a public dimension of
philosophy of education focuses more on proposing and articulating "public
aspirations and educational values". Why is such a view of philosophy of education
insufficient to treat perspectives on higher education transformation?
I shall respond to this question by referring to the government's proposals for the
implementation of a new outcomes based education system (aBE). Outcomes based
education (aBE) with its emphasis on specifying outcomes seems to objectify goals,
learners and knowledge itself. aBE's aim to produce measurable outcomes testifies
its focus towards objectification which regards the world as an object detached from
the self-understandings of people (Taylor 1985: 5). According to objectification,
Gallagher (1992: 174) argues that people consider themselves as disengaged from ties
to nature, society and history, preoccupied with exercising power and control over
their environment, nature and others. In this way, specifying outcomes can be
associated with control and the manipulation of learners.
But how can outcomes such as those related to empowenng learners to think
creatively, enabling learners to critically evaluate information, and facilitating learners
to construct their own meanings of education, all be linked to control that is perceived
to be pernicious for education? In a different way, why is control deemed so harmful
for aBE? Jardine (in Pinar & Reynolds 1992: 118) posits that objectification, in this
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7instance specifying outcomes, exhibits "the desire for finality, the desire for control,
the relentless lust to render the world as a harmless picture for our indifferent and
disinterested perusal". My emphasis is on the link Jardine (Pinar & Reynolds 1992:
118) establishes between the "desire for fmality" and the "desire for control".
Specifying outcomes has the inherent objective to address the current crises in South
African education, characterised by, among other things, "major inequalities, high
drop-out and failure rates ... (and) examination orientedness with a major emphasis
on learning by rote ... " (Steyn & Wilkinson 1998: 203). Following objectification,
these difficulties currently encountered in education are perceived to be problems that
can be fixed or at least ameliorated, hence, the "desire for finality" through the
specification of outcomes. Of course, as an example, learners through the agency of
educators can develop critical attitudes and abilities to construct meanings, which
would contribute to improving the current system of education.
However, specifying outcomes will not necessarily help educators predict, control,
manage, overcome, or eliminate educational problems. This is so for the reason that
outcomes are value-laden and cannot be controlled completely in terms of
objectification which draws on a "measurable", dispassionate observation of facts as
they are independent of metaphysical value-judgements. Demonstrating
understanding, thinking critically about patterns of social development, constructing
meaning: practices such as these could be learner experiences, not objects in a
classroom educators observe and control. More significantly, the belief that education
is something we can control through specifying outcomes is to disengage learners and
educators from the social practice which makes education what it is.
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8Moreover, control can be multifold. Control is associated with one's urge to manage,
regulate and order. It may also be rooted in fear of the unknown, that is, control is
considered a shield as one encounters the strange (Gadamer 1992: 233). In this sense,
specifying outcomes seems to be in line with controlling education in a post-
Apartheid South Africa as educators strive to "coin a new vision of empowered
citizens of the future" (Steyn & Wilkinson 1998). In contrast, control also stands for
the capacity to remain open to the possibility that one's position may be misdirected:
It is truly a tremendous task which faces every human moment. His prejudices
- his being saturated with wishes, drives, hopes, and interests - must be held
under control to such an extent that the other is not made invisible or does not
remain invisible. It is not easy to acknowledge that the other could be right,
that oneself and one's own interests could be wrong (Gadamer 1992: 233).
Controlling education in an OBE frame through specified outcomes, and at the same
time acknowledging that specifying outcomes should be open to critical examination
and criticism, compels one to acknowledge that these outcomes cannot be final and
fixed, and that possibilities for new and different outcomes do exist. If controlling an
education system, in the sense referred to here, means that such a system should
remain "open" to possibilities and challenges, then such an education system should
make it possible or should establish conditions to explore alternatives. However,
specifying outcomes that emphasise the development of say, critical, problem-solving
and communicative learners, is precisely the condition that would curtail the
establishment of such a form of control which would further prohibit learners to
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become critical, interactive problem-solvers. Being open does not just happen; it
represents
an ongoing choice, a conscious willed decision nourished by hope and desire
. .. being open both requires and sustains agency, realized in persons who
intend, enjoin, judge, direct, and take responsibility for their actions. Each of
us must choose to "open up" another or be open in her place. The decision to
be open thus is a life-orientation, requiring a form of control we call self-
discipline (Kerdeman 1988: 263).
Outcomes that are there are specifications which have already been decided or
"opened up" for learners and educators who now have to sustain their implementation.
In a different way, the choice has already been made for learners to be critical without
their having developed the self-discipline to be critical. Kerdeman (1998: 264) claims
"the primary purpose of education is to foster the self-discipline that is necessary for
understanding how to be open and present".
What I want to illustrate with such an analysis of aBE is that the concept cannot just
be the domain of the public, that is, what the government proposes education to be. It
has to be subjected to more analysing, reflecting and evaluating in seeking a clearer
understanding of what aBE means. Consequently a public dimension of philosophy
of education has its merits but it is not substantive enough in seeking a clearer
understanding of educational matters. It is in this sense that I agree with Soltis (1998:
199) that personal and public dimensions of philosophy of education should be
integrated with "professional space". When engaged in professional philosophising,
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
·.. make the educational enterprise as rationally self-reflective as possible by
providing philosophically rigorous examinations, critiques, justifications,
analyses and syntheses of aspects of the educators' conceptual and normative
domain ... (Professional philosophers of education) are philosophical scholar-
teachers who do technical philosophical work demanding rigour, precision,
and adherence to their own professional canons of scholarship just as
sociologists, historians, psychologists, and other academics do in their writing
and teaching.
philosophers of education are firstly concerned about the logical soundness of
arguments, explaining the meaning of concepts, constructing reasonable arguments
and providing ways to think about educational matters before devising "ways to do or
solve them". Soltis (1998: 199) explains that being professionally philosophical is to
In essence, philosophy of education as an overlapping three-dimensional (personal,
public and professional) approach to educational tasks and problems is more intent on
"providing illumination, understanding, and perspective for educators to think with,
than on providing programmes and policies (like OBE) for educators to act on" (1998:
199). This is not a denial of philosophy of education's concern with action. But rather,
before action can be taken one first requires clarity about educational thought and
practice.
1.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE
In this thesis my research methodology is grounded in philosophy of education as the
10
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"three-dimensional personal, public and professional space" which draws on
reflective activity and is concerned with questions about the analysis of concepts and
grounds of knowledge, belief and practice (actions and activities). It is specifically
interested in using conceptual analysis in gaining clarity about how educational
matters are and what should be done in the realm of education (Hirst & Peters 1998a:
37). Such an understanding of philosophy of education is concerned with what is
distinct about education and what ought to be done "to arrive at clearer answers to
questions about what should be put on the curriculum, about teaching methods, and
about how children should be treated" (1998a: 37). Of importance to this thesis is the
point about conceptual analysis being an investigative tool of philosophy of
education.
*- In this chapter I intend to develop the conceptual framework in terms of which I shall,
in later chapters, attempt to analyse what reflexive democratic praxis related to higher
education transformation in South Africa means. Why? The South African
government's policies on higher education give clear signs of being consistent with
international trends in favour of the market economy and the demand for greater
social accountability from public institutions (Department of Education 1997a). These
new orientations are reflected in signals to the universities to be prepared for a future
leveling out of public support, and these have catalysed universities to submit their
strategic institutional plans to the National Ministry of Education.
Most of the universities in South Africa have experienced challenges to their claims
on government revenues. Subsidy cuts have created serious financial problems for
higher education in South Africa (Jackson 1994: 7). Several teaching and research
11
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universities, faced with "subsidy cuts, have avoided more drastic curtailment of their
programmes by drawing more effectively on contractual research and teaching, and
donor support" (Donaldson 1994: 5). This mounting financial crisis in higher
education brings into question the role of the teaching and research university as the
South African higher education system is being transformed. Change in the higher
education sector occurs in many different ways to redress the legacies of the apartheid
education system and to respond to various political, economic and social pressures of
the new South Africa.
Unlike the traditional disciplinary teaching and research university, where the
research problem originates with the problematics of the discipline, the problem for
problem-solving research arises in a context of application. This means that
knowledge is increasingly produced through addressing the political and social
problems in South Africa directly. Such problem-oriented research is often financed
by the private sector and less and less by traditional statutory councils (Muller 1999:
10). These fiscal limits encountered by universities invariably affect the role
academics need to assume if they intend contributing effectively towards establishing
a new higher education system that can also be socially accountable and relevant.
Many external influences which impact the role academics should fulfill are:
• the newly proposed National Qualifications Framework (NQF) which emphasises
competencies and closer links between education, training and the recognition of
prior learning;
• the Higher Education Act's (1997) demand that new, flexible and appropriate
curricula be developed which integrate knowledge with skills and that standards
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be defmed in terms of learning outcomes and appropriate assessment procedures;
• the Ministry of Education and the South African Qualifications Authority's
(SAQA) priority to link one level of learning to another and enable successful
learners to progress to higher levels without restriction from any starting point
within the higher education system; and
• a new accreditation system for higher education to be promoted and developed by
various role players in collaboration with prospective Education and Training
Quality Assurers (ETQAs) (Lategan 1998: 62).
I contend that an increased demand on universities to change akin to external
variables should have the effect whereby academics develop better skills to deal
effectively with the teaching and research processes. I shall argue in this thesis that
university academics ought to develop a reflexive democratic praxis. I contend that
such a practice would contribute towards ensuring that the exclusivity of the
traditional academic and disciplinary based teaching and research university does not
remain isolated from the social problems of the broader South African society,
irrespective of reduced state subsidies for universities. In addition, as I shall argue in
the thesis, for academics to pursue a reflexive democratic praxis the achievement of
equal access, development, accountability and quality in higher education may not
necessarily be unattainable.
1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
Before I explore the characteristic features of conceptual analysis, I shall first offer a
brief historical account of this philosophic activity concerned with educational
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thought and practice. Throughout the history of Western philosophy (from Plato down
to Dewey and Whitehead), philosophical consideration of the nature, content and
processes of education has received attention. It was in the 20th century that
philosophical issues in a sustained systematic tradition began to be seen as central to
educational policy and practice (Hirst &White 1998: vi). The work of John Dewey in
the United States directed philosophy of education to a study which involved the
development of experimental schooling inspired by epistemological (from a point of
view of knowledge), ethical and political philosophy. However for several diverse
reasons, institutional, sociological and political, the serious study of education from a
philosophical position failed to emerge (1998: ii). At the beginning of the 1960s in the
United Kingdom, under the leadership of R.S. Peters, an already distinguished
analytical philosopher, philosophy of education in the analytic tradition was launched.
The analytic tradition of philosophy of education can best be understood with
reference to its evolution within academic philosophy.
In the 1900s, reviving the empiricist tradition based on the work of Locke, Berkley
and Hume, two Cambridge philosophers, Moore and Russell, asserted the importance
of analysis as a philosophical method (1998: 2). By this they meant that concepts or
ideas had to be explained by breaking them down into more basic concepts and
showing their relationship with other concepts. Wittgenstein, who later joined Moore
and Russell at Cambridge, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) extended
analysis to the notion that to know the meaning of a concept is to know a language
that mirrors or pictures in propositional form the structure of the world. Wittgenstein's
ideas had a profound influence on philosophers of the "Vienna Circle" (the logical
positivists), several of who asserted that the meaning of any proposition is through
14
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analysis and by way of technical verification. In the 1930s Wittgenstein himself
rejected this view of meaning as a mirror of reality propounded in the Traetatus by
replacing it with the idea that meanings, propositions and other forms of discourse are
to be found in rules (general principles or constitutive meanings) which govern their
use in public as opposed to private activities. Van der Merwe (1992: 27-28) aptly
summarises this shift in Wittgensteinian thought as follows:
According to Wittgenstein's later analysis of the dialectic of "language
games" and "forms of life", our linguistic endeavours to understand and
communicate the content of our experiences of the world are not arbitrary
interpretations of "realities" we construct and deconstruct by means of our
discourse. Rather, what is implied, is that:
1. The representational or descriptive use of language is part of a specific
"language game", for example the "language game" of a specific scientific
practice;
2. The "objects" or "facts" of experience referred to by linguistic expressions
in such a "language game" are experienced as part of a specific "form of
life" which is mediated by, and therefore related solely, to that "language
game";
3. The knowledge and truth claims made in such a "language game" cannot
be universalised, but are relative to the "form of life" pertaining to that
language game ... (my italics).
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In 1953 Wittgenstein published his Philosophical Investigations, which, with the
influence of his students at Oxford, caused a major revolution in philosophy whereby
the impetus shifted to employ analytic methods in philosophy of education.
Philosophy of education began to take root as "a clearly demarcated area of work" in
the early 1960s (Hirst & White 1998:vi). Influenced by the work of Hardie (1942),
O'Conner (1957), Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949) and Hare's (1952) The Language of
Morals, telling contributions in the field of analytic philosophy of education were
made. These include the work by Scheffler (1960) in his book The Language of
Education and Peters (1966) (Chair of Philosophy of Education at the University of
London Institute of Education and who later collaborated with Popper, Mace,
Oakeshott, Hamlyn and Phillips-Griffiths) in his influential major book Ethics and
Education. Peters (1966) concerned himself with four areas of philosophical activity:
• the analysis of concepts specific to education, an area that can be seen as
falling under philosophical psychology and social philosophy;
• the application of ethics and social philosophy to assumptions about desirable
content and procedures of education;
• examination of the conceptual schemes and assumptions used by educational
psychologists about educational processes; and
• examination of the philosophical character of the content and organisation of
the curriculum and related questions about learning (in Hirst & White 1998:
vi).
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Peters (1966) saw conceptual analysis as a tool of philosophy of education concerned
with making pronouncements on a wide range of educational issues, of which some
major themes include the nature of education, teaching and learning, curriculum
content, moral education, educational research and education policy. Before the rise
of analytic philosophy of education in the late 1950s, it was fashionable for those
involved in educational studies to deduce educational claims from philosophical
premises (Evers 1998: 120). Brubacher (1955: 10) explains this phenomenon in terms
of the association of educational positions with particular philosophical "isms" such
as the following:
• Empiricism - the name for a family of theories of epistemology that generally
accept the premise that knowledge begins with sense experience. Empiricists
such as Hume (1711-1776), the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and
contemporary empiricists like Quine are deeply concerned with the activity of
how to construct concepts and theories (that is, explanations and predictions)
out of brute data (Schwandt 1997: 37).
• Essentialism - a metaphysical doctrine that holds that objects have essences,
that is, identifying or characterising properties that constitute their real, true
nature (1997: 40).
• Realism - the doctrine that there are real objects that exist independently of our
knowledge of their existence (1997: 133).
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• Idealism - this philosophical doctrine stands in opposition to realism and holds
that the world (reality and real objects) does not exist independently of human
minds (1997: 67).
• Pragmatism - a philosophical outlook which comprises a set of ideas that are
often appealed to in defending qualitative inquiry as a viable option in the
social sciences. These ideas include: (1) anti-foundationalism, (2) a thorough
going fallibilism in which one realises that although one should begin any
inquiry with prejudgments and can never call everything into question at once,
there is no belief that further interpretation should not happen, (3) the social
character of the self and the need to cultivate a critical community of inquiry
and, (4) the view that there can be no escape from the plurality of perspectives
(1997: 123-124).
For example, education associated with empmcism might have pronounced an
educational position: "All knowledge produced in good schools is to be universally
applied", from which various deductions were made. However, none of these
approaches to philosophy of education, in the words of Hirst and White (1998: i):
'" proved effective in delineating philosophy's distinctive role in the
determination of contemporary educational practice. They inevitably seemed
too piecemeal, even idiosyncratic, too abstract and historical in emphasis to
engage with important practical issues in a significant way.
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After this approach to philosophy of education was vehemently criticised for its
pronouncement of universal truth claims based on isolated "isms" it was replaced by a
new philosophical tool which construed philosophy of education as an activity or
practice. As has been mentioned earlier, this view of philosophy of education as
analysis or analytical practice was developed by Peters and Hirst, and other
philosophers of education in the 1960s and beyond at the University of London
Institute of Education. Through the medium of the Philosophy of Education Society
established at the London Institute of Education and the journals Education Theory
and Studies in Philosophy and Education the analytic tradition took root in the United
States, Australasia, and Canada (1998: ix).
Despite the criticism waged against conceptual analysis as the production of a
comprehensive set of conceptual truths about education, such an approach to
philosophy of education remains an important philosophical activity to understand the
use of terms and clarifying what these terms stand for. Critics of analytic philosophy
of education such as Evers (1998: 128) propose, for example, that critical theory
needs to be used "to identify sources of social domination, oppression, and justice
and to promote the kind of individual and collective reflective practices necessary for
human emancipation". I agree with Evers' position that critical educational theory
does provide educational practice a reflective and emancipatory (to transform to a
more humane position) activity.
However, Evers and other post-analytic scholars seem to ignore what they refer to as
post-analytic traditions, which first require clarity about their meanings. In this way,
critics of conceptual analysis invariably draw on a necessary condition (although not
19
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My use of conceptual analysis grounded in the post-1960 ideas of philosophers of
education at the University of London Institute of Education is adequately described
by Broad (1958: 67) as an "area of philosophical study (searching for) the general
principles, in accordance with which people do in fact think and behave in their every
day life". It is within such a tradition of conceptual analysis by understanding, in a
Wittgensteinian sense (1953), how a term is used and by locating it within the social
context that gives it meaning for a particular people, at a particular time and place,
without looking for essences or atoms of meaning.
sufficient condition) of conceptual analysis; to understand the meaning of a concept or
practice before using it to transform an educational issue. One first needs to know
what critical educational theory means before one understands its use in practice. No
wonder recent papers in the field of philosophy of education use an analysis of
concepts to gain clarity about educational matters. Barrow (1991) analyses "critical
thinking", Gaden (1990) analyses "responsibility", and McLaughlin (1990) analyses
"belief', to mention a few examples. Moreover, critics of conceptual analysis often
seem to wage their criticism against what Moore (1903: 8-10) and Russell (1918: 193)
refer to as identifying meanings which were themselves incapable of any further
analysis, that is, the search for essences or absolutes of meaning. In this kind of
"reductive analysis" the search is for units of meanings with less emphasis laid on
clarity and on the nature of human beings' understanding, what they do and think.
This kind of reductive analysis already criticised by Popper (1945: 19) as a "source of
vagueness, ambiguity and confusion", is not what I shall use in this thesis. In fact,
accepting atoms of meaning was itself rejected by Ayer (1933: 2) as "a sense
metaphysical conception".
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·. . had become a robust discipline with its own momentum, constantly
drawing life and energy from developments in academic philosophy and from
demands for ever more rationally constructed educational theory and practice.
lts achievement over twenty years had been remarkable ... the very nature of
education, its purposes and their justification had been analytically mapped
and examined as never before ... Analytical work was leading to a new
consideration of long-standing issues in the whole history of philosophy, as in
the work of MacIntyre (1981) and Taylor (1985) (Hirst & White 1998: x).
Furthermore, from 1960 analytic philosophy of education developed equally in the
United States through the influence of the work Dewey and later Quine. By 1980
analytic philosophy of education
Similarly the work of Rawls (1972) and Rorty (1980) significantly impacted the
analytic tradition of philosophy of education. By the late 1990 work in the analytic
tradition had strong links with other traditions, notably those of Marxism, critical
theory, existentialism and postmodern thought. It is with this continuing analytic
tradition in mind that I shall use conceptual analysis to distinguish and clarify the use
of terms such as "reflexivity", "democracy", "praxis", "rationality", and several others
related to education in general and higher education transformation in South Africa in
particular.
The first part of this chapter sets out to explain why conceptual analysis can enable us
(1) to reflect on and get a clearer understanding of concepts, as well as guiding our
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practices as educators towards (2) looking for "logically necessary conditions" for the
use of concepts. Secondly, I shall argue that concepts can only be understood in
relation to other concepts. To conclude this chapter, I shall elucidate what it means to
provide a justification for the use of concepts. In doing so, I shall argue that
conceptual analysis can help us to pin-point more clearly what is implicit in our moral
consciousness.
1.6 GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE USE OF CONCEPTS
In this section, using the work of Hirst and Peters (1998: 33) I shall explain that
conceptual analysis is an appropriate philosophical activity to make sense of what it
means to have an understanding of a reflexive democratic praxis. In addition, I shall
draw on some of the propositions of Fay (1975) and Taylor (1985) with regard to the
notion of constitutive meanings or rules and their link with practices.
To begin with, to have an understanding of a concept in the words of Hirst and Peters
(1998: 30) "covers both the experience of grasping a principle and the ability to
discriminate and use words correctly". In the first instance, to grasp a principle means
to have an understanding of what makes a concept what it is, that is, its constitutive
meaning or rule (Taylor 1985: 137). Supposedly the word "dialogue" is constituted by
some "general principle" that it must be a social activity which is engaged in by
people and which is shaped by the material, intellectual and spiritual conditions in
which they live. Such an understanding is different from one that explains dialogue in
terms of a general empirical condition only such as when one observes people talk to
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'business of living' (1998: 31).
each other. People can talk to each other without even engaging rationally in
conversation. In this sense, merely for people to be in each other's presence is not a
sufficient condition for dialogue to take place. What constitutes dialogue is not simply
that empirical conditions prevail whereby one sees people in conversation. Rather,
what makes dialogue what it is, is the "general principle" or constitutive rule which
guides and shapes rational social engagement on the part of human beings.
What are the premises in Hirst and Peters' (1998: 31) explanation of conceptual
analysis to help us in our understanding of concepts? In response to this question,
consider the following example: One can study "education" by describing CD-ROM
curricula programmes, "on-line" computer communication networks for learners,
video-confereneing rooms, multi-media learning programmes, and so on - observable,
empirical conditions that can make the study of "education" happen. But before one
can do so, one needs to know, in the first place, what "education" is, otherwise one
might by mistake embark upon a study of "technology". And the "general principle"
that distinguishes "education" from "technology" and other educational resources is
what Hirst and Peters (1998: 31) describe as searching for "logically necessary
(
conditions" for the use of a concept. According to them searching for logically
necessary conditions depends on how human beings conceive activities:
A necessary condition of calling something a game is, surely, that it must be
an activity which is indulged in non-seriously. Now 'non-seriously' does not
mean that the player lacks involvement in it or that he (she) does not give his
attention to it. Rather, it means that he can conceive it as not being part of the
23
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In terms of this view, to get a clearer understanding of the term "game" means not to
base one's understanding on an observable quality of the sort of what makes a thing a
computer. Hence, to have a "general principle" of a concept game, firstly involves
searching for logically necessary conditions for using the word "game". Likewise, one
cannot get clarity about the concept education without searching for logically
necessary conditions that constitute its general principle. For example, the use of the
word "education" is shaped by a logically necessary condition that human beings
engage in a transaction. In this human transaction new comers (for example, learners)
are initiated into an inherited tradition of human activities, aspirations, sentiments,
images, opinions, beliefs, modes of understanding, customs and practices, that is,
"states of mind" (Oakeshott 1998: 284-287). In this instance, a logically necessary
condition which guides the use of the word "education" is that human beings are
initiated into an inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief. To
be initiated into an inherited tradition of knowledge, what Oakeshott (1998: 287)
refers to as "world of meanings and understandings", is to engage with such
knowledge. This implies that one not only does certain things but also understands
and learns to understand what one is doing.
What I want to illustrate with this explanation of education is that the concept can be
analysed in terms of searching for logically necessary conditions which guide its
general principle. In the same way, in chapter two, I shall argue that in order to gain a
clearer understanding of reflexive democratic praxis, one needs to search for logically
necessary conditions which may constitute the general principle of such a practice. It
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Education is not acquiring a stock of ready-made ideas, images, sentiments,
beliefs etc.; it is learning to look, to listen, to think, to feel, to imagine, to
believe, to understand, to choose and to wish.
is in terms of the general principle that we select and organise our practices in a
particular way. Different general principles would guide practices differently.
In addition the general principle of education challenges the very idea that inherited
meanings and understandings are transmitted to "newcomers" who uncritically accept
and apply such knowledge. For this reason Oakeshott (1998: 287) articulates the
general principle which ought to shape an understanding of education as follows:
This general principle of the concept education explains that human beings ought to
engage not to do "this or that", but to learn how to think, understand, imagine and
enact themselves in relation to "wished-for outcomes". To expound on this, I shall
distinguish between two types of principles. Some principles regulate behaviour, for
example, "Don't play golf'. Human beings can still play golf whether or not this
principle exists; but some principles (like the principle of the concept education)
constitute forms of action which would not be possible without the existence of
principles. The principle of golf constitutes the possibility of an action which can be
called "scoring a birdie". Without the principle, this action would not be available.
The general principle (constitutive rule) opens up new possibilities; possibilities of
understanding the actions of others (think of understanding roulette), including actions
one has never seen before, and possibilities of actions never before performed (no one
has ever hit a golfbalI in exactly the same way as before).
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Regarding the general principle of the concept education, human beings not only do
certain things but also understand and learn to understand what they are doing. They
are engaged in a transaction in a specific way. They can still refuse to challenge
inherited meanings and understandings whether or not the regulatory principle exists.
But without the general principle (constitutive rule) of education, an action such as to
critically accept and apply knowledge, is not possible. Hence, it is the general
principle or rule of education which constitutes the understanding of new forms of
action for new comers to learn how to think, understand and imagine themselves.
Now, implicit in the actions of human beings is the general principle of education.
This principle does not regulate their actions, but rather, it is the general principle or
constitutive rule which enables new actions and can be used to explain them.
Thus far, I have discussed the links between searching for logically necessary
conditions which constitute the general principle of the concept education. I now need
to expound on this notion of use. "Education" implies an action, but it is not an action
caused by the use of the term "education", for that would imply that a regulatory
principle is in operation. It is rather a kind of principle, which in the words of Fay
(1975: 71), is "employed to describe behaviour which is done with a purpose ... ".
However, not all actions involve bodily movements and, following Fay (1975: 72),
"no physical movement is ever a necessary condition for an action". He claims rather
that actions are necessarily linked to the meaning of bodily movements being
performed (1975: 72).
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Thus, if one considers that human beings perform the act of education, it follows from
this that the very act of education is constituted by its meaning (general principle), and
not the bodily movements of human beings. In this regard, Fay (1975: 72) argues that
one has to look at the reasons or logically necessary conditions why a particular act is
performed. But then, offering reasons to explain actions requires a reference to a
wider web of general principles which frame actions, what Fay (1975: 74) refers to as
practices. In other words, an understanding of actions refers to reasons or logically
necessary conditions, which in turn refer to general principles. It is in this way that he
claims: "Constitutive meanings (general principles) underlie social practices in the
same way that practices underlie actions" (1975: 74). Practices involve the possibility
of giving reasons or searching for logically necessary conditions why certain actions
are performed, that is, looking at the general principles which constitute certain
actions.
What follows from the above is that there exists a link between the general principle
of a concept and its practices. In a different way, searching for reasons or logically
necessary conditions involves getting to know the use of the general principle in
relation to its practices. A link between practices and general principles is articulated
by Taylor (1989: 204), who interprets practices as follows:
By 'practice', I mean something extremely vague and general: more or less
any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain
pattern of dos and don'ts (general principles) ...
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Thus far, I pointed out the link between general principles and their practices. I now
need to show the various ways in which general principles can interweave with their
practices. A discussion of these ways is central to my thesis, for the reason that
searching for logically necessary conditions of a reflexive democratic praxis in a
particular context gives rise (as I shall show in later chapters) to a particular general
principle which shapes practices in particular ways. Thus, the question is: How do
general principles interweave with their practices? Drawing on the ideas of Taylor
(1989: 205), I want to note various ways.
Firstly, "the dominant ideas (concepts might) distort the practice and that perhaps as a
consequence the practice itself is corrupt ... which may demand rectification" (Taylor
1989: 205). To elucidate how the general principle of a concept might "distort" its
practices, it is worthwhile considering the notion of critical understanding. This
concept is driven by the emancipatory interest; that is, its purpose is to contribute to
change in people's understanding of themselves and their practices and thus free them
from constraints of society. In this way the general principle of critical understanding
strives to engender self-reflective enquiry and learning (that is, practices) amongst
individuals to bring about the clear articulation of arguments in an atmosphere of
openness to overcome ideological distortions generated within social relations and
institutions (Carr & Kemmis 1986: 162). The general principle of a critical approach
to learning aims to generate critical action in others and gives rise to conditions to
replace one distorted set of practices with another less distorted set of practices (1986:
197).
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Secondly, "the whole practice and its rationale (might) come to seem repugnant, and
there can be a demand for what is self-consciously seen as a transfer of allegiance to a
new practice ... " (Taylor 1989: 205). For example educators, who find the belief that
education involves the control of learner experiences in a classroom repugnant, might
transfer their allegiance to the practice of understanding, thinking critically about
patterns of social development and constructing meaning.
Thirdly, Taylor claims that "ideas and practices may come to be out of true with each
other, because one or the other fails to reproduce itself properly ... (and that) some of
the original rationale may be lost ... just through drift or through the challenge of new
insight; or the practice may alter as it is adequately handed down" (1989: 205).
Taylor's view regarding the "original rationale" which may become "lost" through
"drift or through the challenge of some new insight" can be explained with reference
to the relationship between the concepts intersubjectivity and education. Literally
intersubjectivity "means occurring between or among (or accessible to) two or more
separate subjects or conscious minds" (Schwandt 1997: 29). Intersubjectivity implies
that education is not a one-way process in which knowledge is transferred from
educator to learner. Instead, education according to intersubjectivity is considered a
"co-constructive process" (Taylor 1985: 137) in which both learners and educators
play an active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced. Education in
an intersubjective frame requires by necessity a personal relationship in terms of
which learners and educators engage in purposeful social cooperation. Following
intersubjectivity, education cannot be a uni-directional process of transferring ready-
made outcomes or knowledge constructs to learners. Intersubjectivity, in a Taylorian
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sense is a "new insight" that challenges the rationale or general principle that
education can be uni-directional.
Intersubjectivity as a "new insight" has the effect whereby learners and educators are
actively engaged in producing outcomes through purposeful social co-operation in the
classroom. The crucial issue for intersubjectivity is that meaning is the outcome of
social co-operation. For education this means that the collective activities of learners
and educators constitute the meaning of what is learned. It is not the case that
educators offer meaning through specifying outcomes and learners receive it.
Learners and educators are co-partners in the making of the outcome. In this way,
intersubjectivity alters the practice of education from being uni-directional to that of
social co-operation.
Fourthly, "there can be a perfectly stable arrangement of mutual reinforcement, where
the idea (concept) seems to articulate the underlying rationale (general principle) of
the dos and don'ts in an adequate and undistorted fashion; and then the idea can
strengthen the pattern (practice) and keep it alive, while the experience of the pattern
can constantly regenerate the idea" (Taylor 1989: 205). One may find that the general
principle which guides the concept of constructivism is that knowledge of the world is
the result of our constructing, and not as a result of our discovery of how the world
really is (Von Glaserfeld in Held 1990: 180). A logically necessary condition which
constitutes such a general principle is that "knowledge is viewed beginning from the
leamer's activity and is mentally constructed and closely related to the action and
experience ofa learner" (Jegedi 1991: 6).
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In a different way, constructivism links strongly with the idea of learner autonomy
referred to by Jegedi as "the action and experience of a learner". Another logically
necessary condition which constitutes the general principle of constructivism lays
claim to a social dimension in the sense that meaning is constructed in a social context
and is communicated dialogically through "socially negotiated understandings"
(Ernest in Steffe & Gale 1995: 480). The general principle of constructivism
constituted by logically necessary conditions such as dialogue and learner autonomy,
strengthens and articulates constructivist practices that reinforce the idea of learner-
centredness. I consider this particular way in which the general principle of a concept
reinforces its practices as central to my thesis. In later chapters it is shown that the
general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis can articulate and strengthen
practices such as teaching and learning through distance education, research and
community service in the context of higher education transformation. But now, I need
to look in further detail at practices, in particular whether practices can be seen as
independent of the historical context in which they occur.
Earlier I have argued that the general principle of a concept makes the concept what it
is. It is the general principle which manifests itself in practices. But practices (using
Taylor's idea of diachronic causation) occur in particular social and historical
contexts. Of course, one does not have to know the history of a practice in order to
enact it. So, every time educators practised constructivism correctly, they used a
general principle regardless of whether they knew the historical context in which
constructivism arose. But does this necessarily mean that educators practised
constructivism in exactly the same way? The answer is no, for the reason that the use
of the general principle of constructivism for educators in the 1970s is related to
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subjective, individual constructions of knowledge, whereas in the 1990s constructivist
meanings were considered as socially negotiated and determined (Jegedi 1991: 7). In
other words, the general principle of constructivism played a different role; it
explained the practices of human beings differently in different historical contexts.
This makes sense, for the very meaning of a general principle is not to constrain
action (that is, only certain actions constitute "constructivism") and to be able to
understand new actions (by seeing them as instances of a particular general principle).
So, clarifying why "constructivism" was practised in a particular way requires an
understanding of the historical context which shaped that practice. It is with such an
understanding in mind of the historical context in which practices develop that it is
explained in later chapters how a reflexive democratic praxis relates to higher
education transformation in South Africa.
To sum up, I have shown that a concept can be analysed in terms of searching for
logically necessary conditions which guide its general principle or constitutive rule.
The general principle (that which makes a concept what it is) does not regulate human
actions, but rather, enables new actions which can be used to explain and reconstitute
practices. In addition, to understand why a concept is used as it is used, one has to
know the historical context which has shaped the general principle of a concept and
its relational practices. Next, the second aspect of conceptual analysis is explored,
which makes the claim that concepts can only be understood in relation to other
concepts.
1.7 RELATIONAL CONCEPTS AND THEIR USE
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Understanding a concept only with relevance to its general principle might be
concerned with a distinct characteristic of a concept in a "loose sense" (Hirst & Peters
1998: 33). To search for logically necessary conditions that constitute concepts also
involves reflecting on "their relation to other words and their use in different types of
sentences" (1998: 33). In a different way, concepts can only be understood in relation
to other concepts and the manner in which these different concepts are used. We
would probably say that a person understands the concept education if she could relate
the word education appropriately to the use of concepts such as teaching, learning and
society. "Education" has to be understood in relation to a whole set of concepts
subsumed under "education".
Thus if one attempts to analyse a concept by searching for logically necessary
conditions or characteristics of a concept, one usually proceeds "by taking cases
within their denotation and trying out suggestions about defining characteristics"
(1998: 32). In order to get clearer about "distance education" one considers different
cases such as "distance education is a family of instructional methods in which
communication between the educator and learner must be facilitated by print,
electronic, mechanical or other devices" (Moore 1973: 664), "distance education
covers various forms of study at all levels which are not under the continuous,
immediate supervision of tutors present with their students in lecture rooms"
(Holmberg 1977: 9), "distance education is a method of imparting knowledge, skills
and attitudes by the extensive use of technical media" (Peters 1993: 206), and so on.
In this way one gradually makes explicit the links between concepts. One would for
instance, only understand what "distance education" means if one has an
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understanding of other concepts related to "distance education". In is in this sense that
Hirst and Peters (1998: 33) claim the following:
If, therefore, we are trying to analyse a concept it is important to realise that
this cannot be done adequately by just examining the use of words in a self-
contained way. We have to study carefully their relation to other words
(concepts) and their use in different types of sentences (contexts). An
understanding of their use in sentences does not come just by the study of
grammar; it is also necessary to understand the different sorts of purposes
(general principles) that lie behind the use of sentences. And this requires
reflection on different purposes, both linguistic and non-linguistic, that human
beings share in social life.
In essence, getting to know the meaning of a concept, that is, seeing through it
requires an examination of the use of a concept in relation to other concepts that
govern its use. In the succeeding chapters I shall examine concepts such as reflexivity,
democratic education and praxis in relation to other concepts which govern their use.
This brings me to a discussion of conceptual analysis as a philosophical inquiry
concerned with reflecting on the justification of the use of concepts.
1.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF CONCEPTS
Reflecting on the justification of the use of a concept is more than just making explicit
logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. It seems difficult
to conceive how educators could be interested in philosophical questions such as
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"How do we know that we ought to educate learners?" unless they are also interested
in the moral question of whether or not they ought to educate learners. This implies
that reflecting on the justification for using a concept such as education, for instance,
is to search for justification, that is, to question and query the point of education.
Peters (1998a: 226) summarises this "non-instrumentalist" justification for the use of
the word "education" as follows:
To search for justification ... (for the use of the word "education" involves
asking the question): 'What is the point of it all? (This) is to ask for features
internal to it, which constitute reasons for pursuing it (education).
To ask the Socratic question "What is the point of it all?" implies that those who
engage in philosophical inquiry are not satisfied with "unexamined" issues. Driven by
the passions such as curiosity and imagination educators wonder about what is "out
there" in relation to the worth and relevance of education. But asking questions about
the "worthwhileness" of education is closely tied to the notion of the "good life" as
Peters and Hirst would wish education to be. For Hirst, (1998a: 393) the practices of
education connected to the individual's wants, capacities and achievements for the
future development of the "good life" are likely to involve the following:
• Varied basic practices necessary for any individual to be rationally viable in their
everyday physical, personal and social contexts.
• Practices from that much wider range of optional practices available for the
construction of each individual's rational life such as the rational pursuit of
theoretical and academic knowledge.
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• Practices involving critical reflection on theoretical knowledge to produce persons
who are "practically wise".
What can be deduced from the above depiction of the "good life" is that virtue is not
strictly used in the moral sense, but rather "as an enduring excellence of character
with respect to any given human activity" (Evers 1998: 108). For Evers, the notion of
virtue
. .. is likewise to be explicated by reference to whatever capacities and
dispositions are required as means to the achievement of a good life or are
partly constitutive of it (1998: 108).
Hirst's argument for attaining the "good life" is premised on the idea that people have
to engage in and pursue practices. In this sense, the criticism of some post-analytic
scholars that philosophy of education has been conducted in isolation from human
beings is unjustified.
Like post-analytic philosophy of education, conceptual analysis of the concept
education cannot be done without "a Human Person and Human Virtues" (Evers
1998: 108). Put differently, reflecting on the justification for using the concept
education cannot be done without any understanding of practices. The link between
practices and the "good life" is also accentuated by MacIntyre (1981: 175) for whom
practices aimed at achieving the "successful" or "good life" comprise internal, shared
goods:
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Bya 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that
form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-
tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football
with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Brick-laying is not a
practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are
the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the
historian, and so are painting and music. In the ancient and medieval worlds
the creation and sustaining of human communities - of households, cities,
nations - is generally taken to be a practice in the sense in which I have
defined it.
The question arises: How can MacIntyre's theory of the "good life" and its connection
with practices shape our understanding and justification for using the concept
education? According to MacIntyre (1981: 175) human practices contain internal,
shared goods which make humans produce "excellence" appropriate to their "socially
established" cooperative activities such as building cities, nations, communities,
civilisations, and so on. For human practices to sustain the excellence of what is
produced they need goods internal to their practices, that is, virtues. These virtues or
internal goods include the courage, honesty, wisdom, judgement, integrity, constancy
and patience to sustain the excellence and "cooperativeness necessary for working on
a common task" (White & White 1998: 352-353). Moreover, using MacIntyre's
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(1981: 175) account of internal, shared goods, White and White (1998: 353) argue
that the "good life" is inextricably linked to the concept of tradition:
In seeking the good and exercising the virtues one does not do so as a solitary
individual but as a bearer of a particular social identity, as someone's daughter
or father, as a member of such and such a work-group, as a citizen of such and
such a city or nation. It is as a role-holder that I engage in practices; and what
helps to hold my life together in a unity is my progression into and out of
succession of such roles. These roles and practices, institutions and
communities in which they appear have a historical dimension: behind them
lie traditions of thought and action which must be sustained and cherished ...
Since it is a lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage and lack of the
relevant intellectual virtues which corrupt traditions and the practices,
institutions and communities which currently embody them, we see, finally a
third way in which virtues enter into the good life - not only as a feature of
practices and of the unity of individual lives, but also as that which sustains
the tradition within which alone these things can exist.
If I relate the above account of the "good life" to education, then one of the central
goods intrinsic to the practices of education is to engage as "a bearer of a social
identity" in the virtues and traditions of thought and action which embody education.
It is not sufficient to "know about" the extrinsic goods of education which include
promotion and tenure of teaching staff, curriculum development, learners and
examinations if we are to acquire the moral virtues of courage, honesty, wisdom,
judgement, integrity, constancy and patience which engaging in education promotes.
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1.9SUMMARY
We have to engage in educative activities through participation, observation and
imagination, that is, to become immersed in the practices of education.
What follows from the above is that justifying the use of a concept, in this instance
education, is to search for logically necessary conditions which not only concern the
extrinsic ends of education but also concern characteristics connected to its intrinsic
good. In a different way, to justify the use of a concept involves searching for
logically necessary conditions that can ensure the "good life". Goods intrinsic to the
practices of education and which organise logically necessary conditions that
constitute the general principle of the concept are linked to human practices aimed at
achieving the "good life". In the next chapter I shall argue that the general principle of
a reflexive democratic praxis is linked closely to achieving the "good life".
I have shown that philosophy of education through conceptual analysis can assist one
to get a clearer, more informed and better reasoned opinion about concepts, a practice
necessary to gain clarity about the current shifts in higher education transformation in
post-apartheid South Africa. I have developed the argument that conceptual analysis
involves searching for logically necessary conditions or characteristics, which
constitute the general principle of a concept. In other words, the applicability of a
concept must be based on the satisfaction of certain logically necessary conditions
(Richman 1965: 66; Hacker 1972: 258). To know the general principle of a concept is
to understand its meaning in order to gain clarity as to how its practices are organised.
Clarity is used in a Popperian (1963: 28) sense whereby "there can be no point in
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trying to be more precise than what our problems demands". In a different way, to
gain clarity is not to search for a set of universal context-free presuppositions, but
rather for the general principle which is context-dependent.
Also, different general principles in particular social and historical contexts guide
practices differently. In addition, to understand why a concept is used as it is practised
requires an examination of the use of a concept in relation to other concepts that
govern its use. Likewise, justifying the use of a concept involves searching for
logically necessary conditions that can ensure the "good life" - those internal, shared
goods which make humans produce "excellence" appropriate to their practices. I
acknowledge the claims of critics that evidence for the decline of analytic philosophy
of education "continues to pile up" (Evers 1979: 1). However, my contention is that
these critics reject a mix of reductive and conceptual analysis which would, for
example, attempt to analyse a concept like education on its own and not in relation to
the practices of people (Peters 1973; Haack 1976; Golding 1981).
1.10 PROGRAMME OF STUDY
In terms of conceptual analysis acknowledging the importance of the social context
developed thus far, I shall now attempt to uncover the general principle of a reflexive
democratic praxis, which as will be argued later on, can create possibilities for
rational discourse related to higher education transformation in South Africa.
As with this chapter, throughout the thesis I use conceptual analysis to clarify the
meanings of concepts. In Chapter Two I identify and clarify meanings of praxis by
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searching for logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. In
doing so, I elucidate on logically necessary conditions such as "educational
discourse", "reflexive action" and "ethical activity to promote the moral good" which
constitute rationality, the general principle of praxis. Thereafter, I argue that
rationality effects truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-
arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence
and people. My contention is that appealing to meanings of rationality is where the
strength of praxis lies.
In Chapter Three I argue that forms of rationality can create spaces for achieving
democratic education which, in turn, holds much promise for shaping teaching and
learning through distance education, research and community service in the context of
higher education transformation in South Africa.
In Chapter Four I use "touchstones" of rationality to show how the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis can be used to make sense of and to shape higher
education transformation in South Africa. An overview of the South African higher
education policy framework is provided, in particular its concern with issues of
equality, development, accountability and quality which can be linked to
"touchstones" of a reflexive democratic praxis. Then, I attempt to show how notions
of equal access, relevance and dialogism (as "touchstones" of a reflexive democratic
praxis) can contribute towards initiating equality and development and enhancing
accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South Africa.
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In Chapter Five I address the question as to how a reflexive democratic praxis in
terms of the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production can shape teaching and
learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher
education transformation. It is my contention that a more nuanced understanding of
higher education has the potential to initiate equal access and development on the one
hand, and to enhance accountability and quality on the other hand.
In Chapter Six I identify instances related to community service and distance
education with particular emphasis on the University of Stellenbosch Faculty of
Education. This is intended to give further clarity to the idea of a reflexive democratic
praxis which hold much promise for initiating equal access and development and
enhancing accountability and quality as far as university community service and
distance education initiatives are concerned. I conclude with the idea that a reflexive
democratic praxis can provide higher education practitioners with a conceptual frame
to organise their discourses in such a way as to contribute towards transforming their
activities and that of their institutions. In this way they might achieve more toward
this worthwhile end: to contribute towards addressing the demands of equality,
development, accountability and quality in South African higher education.
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CHAPTER2
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF PRAXIS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I wish to identify and spell out meanings of praxis by searching for
logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. Firstly, I shall
elucidate on logically necessary conditions such as "educational discourse", "reflexive
action" and "ethical activity to promote the moral good" which constitute rationality,
the general principle of praxis. Secondly, I shall argue that rationality effects truth-
telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a
sense of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence and people. Appealing to
meanings of rationality iswhere the strength of praxis lies.
The first issue is what constitutes praxis. In Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of
Terms, Schwandt (1997: 124) explains "praxis" as a term used for a particular form of
human activity that means something different from our common usage of the word
"practice". He claims that this particular form of human activity is not instrumental, in
the sense that it does not bring about specific products that requires a kind of technical
know-how or expertise (1997: 124). To understand this difference between praxis and
practice, one needs to consider praxis in its historical context. In my reading of
Aristotle's (1955: 4) Nichomachean Ethics, the history of the concept clearly reveals
that it is a practice of "doing something", that is, engaging in morally committed
actions such as education and other ethical, political and social discourses. In an
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Aristotelian sense praxis is a discourse concerned with the "bios praktikos" - a
practice committed to right living through the pursuit of the human good (Aristotle
1955: 4). More specifically praxis is an educational discourse (a logically necessary
condition) concerned with how to promote "intrinsically worthwhile ends" (Peters
1966: 54). Praxis is different from "poiesis" or "making action", that is, action by
which the end is to bring some specific product or object into existence such as a ship
or a brick wall. Carr (1998: 175), drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of
epistemological presuppositions of praxis, explains the concept as follows:
Although 'practice' (praxis) is also action directed towards the achievement of
some end, it differs from poiesis in several crucial respects. In the first place
the end of a practice is not to produce an object or artefact but to realise some
morally worthwhile 'good'. But, secondly, practice is not a neutral instrument
by means of which this 'good' can be produced. The 'good' for the sake of
which a practice is pursued cannot be 'made', it can only be done. 'Practice'
(praxis) is a form of 'doing action' precisely because its end can only be
realised 'through' action and can only exist in the action (discourse) itself.
It is with the above historical understanding of praxis as a form of "doing action" in
mind that I shall now explore logically necessary conditions which may constitute its
general principle. Logically necessary conditions of praxis may include (1)
"educational discourse", in particular how it relates to the theoretical frameworks of
thinking which guide the activities of those involved in the discourse, (2) "reflexive
action" that can change the theory that guides it and (3) ethical activity which can
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promote the moral good. I shall now discuss these "characteristics" of praxis in order
to uncover its general principle.
2.2 EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE
Educational discourse (practice) is a logically necessary condition of praxis. Human
beings doing praxis change not only the world of objects but also themselves and their
social relations from a lower level of "educatedness" to a higher level of
"educatedness" (Gould 1988: 10; Hernandez 1997: 19; Cooper 1998: 180). In this
sense, praxis implies that human beings engage in educational discourse and "attempt
to describe, explain, and change (improve) human behaviour in educational contexts"
(Kelchtermans & Schratz, 1994: 245). I already explained that thoughts or ways of
understanding and seeing the world constitute educational discourse (practice) (Fay
1975: 76). Therefore, to construe educational discourse as an activity according to
different meanings or methodological concerns (Greene 1987; Small 1987) is to know
the "grammar of thinking", "shapes of consciousness" or "forms of rationality"
(Morrow 1995), which can guide praxis. In this chapter I distinguish between
positivist theory, interpretive theory and critical theory as distinctive patterns of
understanding or methodological concerns of knowing. Each of these patterns of
thinking gives different meanings to educational discourse and, hence, praxis.
2.2.1 Positivist theory
Positivism claims that all events we want to explain are "facts in the world", that is, of
the same logical type. For positivist theory there can be no rational argument about
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values - values are subjective like feelings or attitudes. Positivist theory insists that
there is only one proper form of explanation, that is, the deductive-nomological (D-N)
model of explanation: whenever (1) C happens then E occurs, (2) C happened, (3)
therefore E occurred. The nomological statement indicated by (1), that is, C happens
then E occurs, specifies a causal relationship between variables. C is called the
"independent" variable because in the context of this explanation the occurrence of C
is independent of the occurrence of E, and E the "dependent" variable because its
occurrence depends on the occurrence of C. For example, "Whenever a teacher gives
information to a child, the child learns" is a nomological or synthetic statement (it
specifies a relationship between two facts - a teacher giving information to a child
and the child learning) (Morrow 1995).
For positivist theory the object of educational discourse is to try to find nomological
or "scientific" statements, that is hypotheses, and then to set out to try to "falsify"
them (educational discourse proceeds by formulating an hypothesis ("conjecture"),
and then setting out to "test" it to try to refute it). Positivist theory claims that
educational discourse should enable one to gain better control over educational
processes; it refers to "the formal, systematic application of the scientific method to
the study of educational problems . .. namely to explain, predict / or control
educational phenomena" (Gay 1987: 4). It is in this positivist, "scientific" frame that,
according to Marcinkowski (1993: 41), educational discourse can be couched as
"quantitative", characterised by a:
• need to establish clear linkages between variables rooted in hypotheses;
• frequent preoccupation with the establishment of causal relationships;
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• desire to establish that the results of a particular investigation can be generalised
beyond a particular research setting; and
• belief in the importance of the ability to replicate studies and their findings to
avoid potential research bias.
Within a positivist theory, educational discourse in quantitative terms implies that it
must be possible to find nomological statements (with possible key variables)
whereby one can find out how to control education with scientific precision. It is in
this regard that MacMillan and Schumacher (1989: 10) point out that the intentions of
quantitative educational discourse may be generally organised into four interrelated
categories: to describe, to predict, to control, and to explain. The link between
explanation and prediction, and thus explanation and control, provides a haunting and
powerful motive for quantitative educational discourse.
Moreover, in keeping with the positivists' explanation of educational discourse,
"scientific method" within the arena of quantitative educational discourse, following
Marcinkowski (1993: 52), can be associated with different types of methodologies:
• description - surveys, longitudinal and cross-sectional developmental studies,
correlational studies;
• prediction - correlational and multi-correlational statistical analyses; and
• explanation and control - experimental type designs.
However, the main problem in finding hypotheses or nomological statements in
educational discourse is to know what the variables are. Say we wanted to explain
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1. In 80% of cases where a learner is in the classroom with educators she
learns.
2. A learner is in the classroom with an educator.
3. Therefore there is 80% chance that the learner will learn.
why a learner learns successfully (E). Perhaps it is her intelligence, perhaps the
climate in the school, perhaps the quality of her home and community, perhaps her
hard work, perhaps the governance of the schooling system, etc. (here we are
searching for C). But these possibilities are, in a sense, at different levels; they
themselves might be causally linked in various ways, as often experienced by
researchers using experimental methodologies. For this reason, most of the
explanations on offer in educational discourse within a positivist frame do not
conform to the D-N model of explanation. In educational discourse we do not (yet)
know what the possible key variables are; and we cannot generate fruitful
nomological statements or hypotheses unless we know that. Nomological statements
specify a relation between variables. Many theorists have tried and the diversity, and
range, of proposed "theories" of education can be read as so many attempts to suggest
key variables.
Moreover, many explanations in educational discourse are probabilistic or statistical
(showing correlations between various factors) and have such form of reasoning as:
Positivists would argue that such explanations are not real explanations because we
cannot yet explain why a learner is amongst the 80% who learns or amongst the 20%
who do not, in spite of the fact that they all had classroom contact with an educator.
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as with experimental research (educational discourse), there are some
limitations to correlation and prediction studies. While some may think of
relationships in causal terms, these types of studies do not lead to causal
claims. Rather they portray apparent relationships at one or more particular
points in time. We may treat relationship claims as working hypotheses with
respect to causality, though can rarely, if ever, test them using these methods.
A second limitation has to do with the complex rules governing the various
statistical analyses employed in correlational and prediction studies. Whether
out of practicality or for some other reason, it is a fairly common occurrence
that these rules are violated (e.g., a test requiring interval data is used on
ordinal sets).
For positivism the problem is that (1) is not a proper nomological statement
(hypothesis), it is not universal, and it cannot be falsified by one contrary instance. In
the words of Marcinkowski (1993: 60):
In the main, educational discourse based on positivist theory uses a methodology
which sees meanings as separate from people's subjective interpretations,
consciousness and intentions. For this reason, positivist theory does not seem to be a
plausible pattern of thinking to guide educational discourse which involves the human
element. In a different way, it sees no scope for value judgements of people, thus
alienating itself from the realms of ethical and political commitment. Educational
discourse in the positivist tradition draws on a neutral, objective, or statistical
language and, occurs independent of human beings' self-understandings
(Kelchtermans & Schratz 1994: 244). Bearing in mind that praxis involves the
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practices of human beings, to assume that a neutral kind of educational discourse can
exist, is itself an untenable idea.
2.2.2 Interpretive theory
Interpretive theory insists on two central issues: the self-understanding of the
individual forms the basis of all social interpretation (phenomenological or
hermeneutical) and human consciousness is transparent (or that human explanations
and interpretations, as they appear, do not conceal any deeper understanding of
events). On the one hand, Vandenberg (1995: 188-189) explains social interpretation
on a phenomenological level according to three phases: (1) understanding or gaining
insight into the phenomenon; (2) describing phenomena in the realm of transcending,
in conscious existence, that is, "by imagining a conversation with others to give one's
findings an intersubjective testing"; and (3) recontextualising the well-defined
phenomenon by locating it "within the whole educational domain and evaluating its
significance for the development of an integral human life". On the other hand,
Danner (1995: 223) explains social interpretation as "hermeneutic understanding"
which aims to make meaning explicit, to explain, to understand "sense" and to
interpret meaning. Inhis words,
we can say that when we deal with human beings and human products we are
involved in a hermeneutic process. In the educational field it is especially
important to recognise this wide range of hermeneutic potentiality and reality
... (which) must be "understood". Hermeneutics cannot be reduced to
interpretation of texts without misrepresenting its real and full content;
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interpretation of texts is a special, and important, case of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutic understanding happens every time a person encounters another
human being or human artefact (1995: 223).
Both these explanations of social interpretation accord with interpretive theory.
Interpretive theory believes that analysis involves more than observation (as some
positivists believe). The crucial point of analysis is to reach the self-understanding of
the person acting in the situation, analysing and understanding his or her reasons for
their actions (Fay 1975: 74). For example, one person at a distance from another.
person waves her hand. How does one interpret her action? Perhaps she is calling the
other person; or even making a gesture with her hand to show her anger; maybe she is
just stretching her arm. In other words, her actions cannot just be observed and taken
for granted that she is waving at the other person. Her actions have to be explained.
We need to know her reasons for performing such an action; we need to know her
self-understanding.
Interpretive theory rejects the claim that all events we want to explain are of the same
logical type in terms of the view that human actions belong to a different logical
category from all other events in the world. For interpretive theory an understanding
of human beings and society is logically different from an understanding of the
natural world. For this reason, according to interpretive theory we cannot give a D-N
explanation (causal explanation) of human action since the dependent variables (what
is trying to be explained) cannot be identified (Fay 1975: 74).
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Accordingly, in an interpretive tlieory, educational discourse can be described as
"qualitative", characterised by the use of "archival knowledge, narrative knowledge or
observational knowledge". According to Bennett de Marrais (1998: 10), the
qualitative methodologies used according to the interpretive theory of educational
discourse are given in the three statements below.
• Observational knowing tends to privilege ethnography and action research through
participant observation, and the writing of detailed field notes to capture the words
and behaviour of people.
• Archival knowing provides the framework for historical research, reliant primarily
on archival data (journals, diaries, letters, newspapers, photographs, films, etc.)
and may also include interviews and oral histories.
• Narrative knowing usually takes the form of in-depth interviews, oral histories,
autobiography, narratology and phenomenology, but extends top privilege to
participant observations.
Educational discourse involves human practices, which are so difficult to quantify,
difficult to pin down with "prediction"; findings are presented in narrative and rich
hermeneutic or qualitative form. In opposition to positivist theory, interpretive theory
"view(s) the human being as a subject of knowledge principally capable of reflection,
(potential) rationality, discursive communication, and social interaction
(Kelchtermans & Schratz 1994: 244).
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Moreover, the interpretive theory differs distinctly from positivist theory. A human
action such as "acquiring knowledge" cannot simply be identified by mere
observation or discovery. For instance, you open a text with some information about
alligators. What are you doing? Perhaps you are reading the text to explain how
alligators are similar to or different from crocodiles, or consulting the text in order to
write an essay, or moving your eyes over the page without reading it. To know which
of these actions is actually taking place I might need to know something about your
purposes, or the context in which the action takes place. If I determined that what you
are doing is "looking at the pages of the text", I have explained the action by
describing it - a view positivist theory rejects. I have explairied your action in terms
of your reason for doing it. In this way, different types of explanations exist for
different actions theorists want to interpret or explain. On the one hand, positivist
theory, in contrast, insists that there is one absolute or objective form of explanation.
For interpretive theory on the other hand, to know the meaning of a word is to know
how the word is used, and not just to get the "correct image" or "true picture". In
other words, meaning grows out of human experiences. For instance, for analytical
philosophers in education to get to know the meaning of education is to know how the
concept is used and not just what we think it is or what we think it ought to be. I
contend that interpretive theory's concern with explanation, interpretation and
analysis provide educational discourse and, hence, praxis with some tools that break
with discourse as a positivist "science". These tools of analysis and interpretation are
necessary but not sufficient for educational discourse to change or transform the self-
understandings of people.
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2.2.3 Critical theory
By far the most important dimension of critical theory is the fact that it is driven by
the emancipatory interest; that is, its purpose is to contribute to change in people's
understanding of themselves and their practices and thus free them from constraints of
society (Carr 1983, Giroux 1983, Aronowitz & Giroux 1992). A critical educational
theory strives to engender self-reflective enquiry amongst individuals to bring about
the clear articulation of arguments in an atmosphere of openness to overcome
ideological distortions generated within social relations and institutions (Carr &
Kemmis 1986: 162). A critical approach to educational discourse aims to generate
critical action in others and gives rise to conditions to replace one distorted set of
practices with another, hopefully less distorted set of practices (1986: 197).
Critical theory alleges that positivist and interpretive theories, at best, only describe or
explain the social world, and that critical educational theory provides resources both
to criticise and change the social world. For critical theory" ... the truth or falsity of
(its) theories will be partially determined by whether they are in fact translated into
action" (Fay 1975: 95). Critical theory does not produce a "theory"; it develops
theories specific to the particular historical situations with which it is concerned -
theories that have a practical purpose: to help people to change an unsatisfactory
situation (Habermas 1972: 308). In order to explain the type of educational discourse
that can be shaped by critical theory, I draw on two case studies:
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Teachers can teach skills meaningfully in whole language classrooms, and I
wanted to explore how they do it and what children learn from them (i.e. how
their practices changed). It involved a qualitative description of literacy
instruction employing ethnographic data collection techniques and
(quantitative) pre- and post-measures of literacy skills of students receiving
that instruction. I viewed the qualitative and quantitative data as
complementary because both could contribute vital information to the study
problem.
• MacIntyre (1998: 176) describes, for example, how educational discourse in
literacy instruction in whole language classrooms can change the way students
learn. According to MacIntyre (1998: 176) the procedure will be thus:
• Velazquez (1998: 65), reporting on her interpretive ethnographic educational
discourse investigating a Mexican-American migrant community, states that it is
unethical and irresponsible "to try to uncover and interpret the realities of
participants' lives without also supporting the reflective process that leads to
change from oppression and promotes self-determination ... improvement in the
quality of life of the recipient ... the type of research (educational discourse) that
transforms and empowers".
In both cases, educational discourse began with a problem-posing phase characterised
by a process of critical reflection about, and assessment of, the problem in order to
clearly define it. The problem generally derives from experience and the goal is to
initiate change, rather than to create or test theory. The data were quantitatively
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Educational discourse guided by critical theory suggests that the methodologies to be
used depend on an understanding of the basis of the problem. These methodologies
can be both quantitative and qualitative. In this regard, Marcinkowski (1993: 60)
argues that educational discourse can employ lengthy, open-ended interviews for data
collection purposes, and use content analysis procedures for data analysis purposes as
is common in qualitative educational discourse. In addition, both procedures present
findings in the form of quantitative frequency distributions. In this way, critical theory
transcends the quantitative-qualitative educational discourse dichotomy. Yates (1997:
491) argues that quantitative questions "helped frame new qualitative agendas for
(educational) researchers".
acquired, such as the numerical scores written down to assess students' writing
progress, and qualitatively analysed such as to how the social context of migrancy
shaped the experiences of participant adults as learners. However, the research
process did not end after the findings were reported. This type of critical educational
discourse shaped by critical theory uses both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies to effect change and to support the kind of reflection that leads to
change (emancipation) during and after the discourse, and thus blurring the familiar
quantitative / qualitative distinction (Walker & Evers 1988; Evers 1991; Lakomski
1991). In the words of Velazquez (1998: 66) "transformative ... (that is, critical
educational discourse) stimulates critical awareness of power relationships and
empowers researcher and participants with the knowledge to change power
relationships".
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Bryman (1988: 123) argues the quantitative-qualitative educational discourse
dichotomy should be transcended. His view appears reasonably representative of the
views currently held by many within the educational community. Smith and
Heshusius (1986:4) posit that over the last 25-30 years the quantitative-qualitative
debate moved from conflict to détente to cooperation:
A recent trend in the literature concernmg quantitative versus qualitative
approaches to (educational discourse) research indicates two things about the
nature of this debate. First, many educational inquirers now accept the idea
that there are two different, equally legitimate approaches to inquiry. Second,
many inquirers also feel that whatever differences may exist between the two
perspectives, they do not, in the final analysis, really matter very much ...
(Many) educational inquirers now seem to think that the profession has
reached a stage of, if not synthesis, then certainly compatibility and
cooperation between the approaches.
Like Bryman (1988), Firestone (1987), Smith and Heshusius (1986), Evers (1991) and
Lakomski (1991) my position is that the use of critical theory in educational discourse
transcends the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy. In this regard it is also worth
quoting Mouton (1996), McLaren and Giarelli (1995), and Sherman and Webb (1990)
on the complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative educational
discourse framed within critical theory. Mouton (1996: 31) holds the following view:
As far as epistemology is concerned, critical social scientists accept some of
the basic assumptions of both positivism and phenomenology. They accept the
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need for both causal theories based on objective (quantitative) observation and
interpretive (qualitative) descriptions based on intersubjective understanding.
McLaren and Giarelli (1995: 2) have this to say about critical theory:
(It) is, at its center (sic), an effort to join empirical investigation (quantitative
educational discourse), the task of interpretation (qualitative), and a critique of
this reality ... (in order) to improve human existence by viewing knowledge for
its emancipatory or repressive potential.
Sherman and Webb (1990: 11) comment on the complementary relationship between
quantitative and qualitative educational discourse as follows:
(Educational discourse) ... today requires a more comprehensive perspective
in which the considerations that qualitative researchers raise, and the questions
about worth and intent posed by philosophy, are as much a part of the
discussion as are measurement and analysis.
Of what good then, is critical theory for educational discourse, more specifically
praxis? The notion of critical educational discourse, as has been alluded to earlier, is
underscored by the recognition that our actions will change others, and an
understanding that we too must be open to change. Tierney (1994: 101) posits that
educational discourse " ... is meant to be transformative (critical); we do not merely
analyse or study an object to gain greater understanding, but instead struggle to
investigate how individuals and groups might be better able to change their
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situations". Inherent in the process of investigating how our actions will change
others, we are engaged with constructions of knowledge for ourselves and
communicate what we have experienced to others. In this way, we are rational, that is,
we are crafting meaning and understandings of critical, active inquiry within our
educational discourse; we conceptualise what we are doing and write about our
knowing. This view of rationality builds on Taylor's (1985: 139 & 150) view of
rationality as engaging in clear articulation of issues and attuning oneself to the social
world where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon, transformed and
deepened. What this explanation of educational discourse amounts to is, that discourse
framed in a critical frame can be considered a logically necessary condition for
rationality to occur. In a different way, educational discourse in a critical sense
constitutes rationality. And, for the reason that critical educational discourse is a
logically necessary condition of praxis, and such a discourse constitutes rationality,
the latter can be considered the general principle of praxis.
Before moving on to a detailed discussion of rationality, I shall first expand on the
notions of reflexive action and ethical educational activity as logically necessary
conditions which constitute praxis. In addition to critical educational discourse, both
reflexive action and ethical educational activity have strong links with rationality.
2.3 REFLEXIVE ACTION
Schwandt (1997: 135) refers to reflexivity or reflectivity as two different ideas
informing qualitative inquiry: (1) the process of critical self-reflection on one's biases,
theoretical predispositions, preferences, and so on; and (2) critical examination of how
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one's personal and theoretical commitments serve as resources for generating
particular constructions of meaning in particular contexts, meanings one would
probably not have thought about. It is in this sense that I make sense of reflexive
action as a logically necessary condition of praxis which "can itself transform the
'theory' which guides it" (Carr 1998: 180), in this instance, critical educational
discourse. In a different way, reflexive action involves critically examining one's
personal and theoretical dispositions and, at the same time, investigating how one's
personal and theoretical commitments can transform patterns of critical educational
discourse.
But what does it mean for reflexive action to change or transform critical educational
discourse? Reflexive action subjects critical educational discourse to an "infinite"
analysis through which the human experience occurs or is trying to occur without ever
coming to an end. In a different way, reflexive action deconstructs critical educational
discourse in the sense that it aims "to perform the critique of the critique ... but to
think its possibility (for occurring or trying to occur) from another point" (Derrida in
Salusinsky 1987: 20). For Derrida (in Egea-Kuehne 1995: 296) only when critical
educational discourse is "willing to rigorously critique and analyse its own heritage
can it move forth and grow richer". In this sense, reflexive action rethinks or
deconstructs critical educational discourse. In the words of Lather (1991: 156),
reflexive action as deconstruction
... helps us to ask questions about what we have not thought to think, about
what is most densely invested in our discourses / practices, about what has
been muted, repressed, unheard in our liberatory efforts. It helps us to both
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define the politics in our critical practices and move toward understanding the
shortcomings of theories of political transformation.
Deconstruction is a kind of hermeneutics practiced in postpositivism, also referred to
as radical hermeneutics. or the hermeneutics of suspicion (Schwandt 1997: 28-29).
The term "destrucktion" was originally explained by Heidegger (1889-1976),
although Derrida's term "deconstruction" is the most often cited source.
Deconstruction examines "what is left out of a text, what is unnamed, what is
excluded, and what is concealed" (1997: 29).
But how can deconstructive reflexive action help us to recover a vision of critical
educational discourse that might become "muted' or "repressed" if we are not
reflexive of critical educational discourse? My interest is in what Lather (1998: 497)
refers to as a "move towards an experience of the promise that is unforeseeable from
the perspective of our present conceptual frameworks". I contend that critical
educational discourse is not enough and that praxis should be the result of our own
personal perspective that came into play with the data and "imaginative
reconstructions of our world" (Lather 1991: 156).Having an imaginary reconstruction
of something is more than just having a virtue, a state of mind, talent or capacity.
Following Wilson (1998: 143), to have an "imaginary reconstruction" of something is
not like being "excitable or benevolent or open-minded ... (but) it is (to have) a
disposition to address and act on the world by the use of reason ... a certain sense of
being serious". In this sense, to develop an imaginary educational discourse means to
intensify the use of reason on the part of educators to a level of seriousness. I want to
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Reason (as seriousness) ... encourages the imagination to come up with
images, symbols, and metaphors to support ideas through which the
unrepresentable can be thought.
develop this notion of seriousness in the use of reason by drawing on the ideas of
Nuyen (1996). For Nueyn (1996: 97)
On the one hand, seriousness through the use of reason implies that the educator
comes up with "ideas that are ever more challenging to the imagination", "to exceed
everything that can be presented" (1996: 100-101). On the other hand, educators need
"to cultivate (in them) the power of the imagination", that is, to encourage themselves
"to ever more challenging ideas, taking the imagination with it in the process" (1996:
101). This does not mean that imagination should be uncontrolled and "unbounded".
Kant (in Nuyen 1996: 97) insists "that the imagination must be kept in check even
though there is a sense in which it should be unbounded". Of course it can be argued
that critical educational discourse can assist us with the basics of what we more or less
have to know to effect change within our society and ourselves. But my argument for
allowing space for seriousness through the use of reason (rationality) on the part of
educators is what Lyotard (in Nuyen 1996: 102) refers to as "progressing toward the
better" or what Rorty (in Nuyen 1996: 102) calls a "sense of wonder' .
Wilson asserts that no kind of serious educational discourse is possible without a basis
for seriousness (1998: 153). This implies that educators have to encourage themselves
"to soar to ever more challenging ideas, taking the imagination with it in the process"
(Nuyen 1996: 101). To foster imagination within them, educators have to expand their
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self-awareness in order to engender new ways of thinking and acting such as
developing greater empathy and sensitivity to the "unpredictable encounters" that can
be achieved through their use of their faculties of imagination. Hence, developing an
"imaginary" educational discourse lies in the implementation of seriousness or the
need for it through the use of reason which can "exceed" the boundaries of critical
educational discourse to that of imaginary, deconstructive reflexive educational
discourse "that can never end" (Orner, Miller & Ellsworth 1996: 80). In this way,
reflexive deconstructive educational discourse further enacts the power of rationality
(reason) to encourage the imagination of human beings through which the
"unrepresentable can be thought".
2.4 ETHICAL ACTIVITY
In addition to critical and reflexive educational discourse, another logically necessary
condition of praxis, as has been alluded to in chapter one, is to promote "intrinsically
worthwhile ends" or the moral good (Peters 1966: 54). To say that praxis has
"intrinsically worthwhile ends" is to talk about educational discourse as an ethical
activity where, in the words of Peters (l998a: 217):
... truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness,
impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, and for
people as a source of it ... must be accepted as virtues by anyone who is
seriously concerned with answering questions by the use of reason
(rationality).
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In a different way, what makes praxis ethical is its concern with achieving the "good
life" described as engaging in educational discourse in the pursuit of moral
consciousness (Hirst 1998a: 393), in this sense, as an enduring excellence of character
with respect to any given human activity (Evers 1998: 108). An explanation of ethical
discourse has as its basis the notion of rationality which can be related to practices
such as those "worthwhile ends" noted above by Peters (1998a: 217).
We can now justifiably refer to discourses grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical
activities as logically necessary conditions which constitute an understanding of
praxis. And, for the reason that engaging in critical, reflexive and ethical discourses
constitute the meaning of rational practice, one can justifiably consider the general
principle of praxis to be rationality. This leads to a discussion of rationality as the
general principle of praxis. In the next section I elucidate the notions of "truth-telling
and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of
relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, and for people as a source of it" as forms
of rational educational discourse grounded in critical, reflexive and moral spheres of
meaning making.
2.5 PRAXIS AND RATIONALITY
In terms of conceptual analysis, using the understanding that the general principle of a
concept can be expounded upon through clarifying other relational concepts, I shall
now attempt to explain rationality in this way.
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As has been argued for already, it is through rationality that we consider how our
educational discourses shape both ourselves and the communities that we are striving
to participate in and serve; often renewing possibilities for changing others, and
understanding that we too must be open to change. Tierney (1994: 98) argues that
rationality "constructs our beings and roles in relation to others over and over again
through engagement with others in meaning-making". Implicit in this notion of
rationality is an understanding that it is our obligation to clarify our reasons and
rationales for choosing to pursue educational discourse. Also, rationality demands that
we question our intentions for interacting with others in certain ways, methodological
choices, and reasons for focusing on certain topics. I shall now explain rationality as
the general principle of praxis in relation to (1) truth-telling and sincerity, (2) freedom
of thought or liberty, (3) clarity, (4) non-arbitrariness, (5) impartiality, (6) a sense of
relevance, (7) consistency and, (8) respect for evidence and people.
2.5.1 Truth-telling and sincerity
Rationality implies that praxis (critical, reflexive and ethical discourse) has to be
practised in a sincere and truthful way. Sincerity and truthfulness are based on an
understanding that one has to be honest, conscious and willing in one's actions - more
specifically in praxis. Human beings engage in praxis, which makes the latter a form
of public as opposed to a private discourse. This means that people engaging in praxis
have to be sincere, prepared and willing to listen to each other's, at times, conflicting
views and differences. By implication, they should be patient and tolerant towards one
another even if they express diverse views. Even in the wake of conflict and severe
differences of opinion between participants in praxis, the probability of confrontation
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What makes of our discoursing (praxis) together a conversation (form of
engagement) as opposed to a confrontation, is the fact that even the most
resolute defence of each participant's view is regulated by the
courtesy-principle of give and take, of allowing the other his or her rejoinder.
would be ruled out by the willingness of both partners in the educational discourse to
engage with each other. In this regard, it is worth noting Olivier (1990: 104) who
claims the following:
In addition, regarding the notions of willingness and consciousness, participants must
enter the public discourse (praxis) with an attitude of openness. By this I mean that
either should not enter praxis whereby agreement is a prerequisite. One person should
not coerce another into accepting his or her views before embarking upon public
discourse with someone else. Olivier (1990: 103) drawing on Rorty (1980) makes the
point that this would be "a conversation (public discourse) which presupposes no
disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is
never lost as long as the conversation lasts". This he sees as a kind of rational
discourse. Hence, agreement in praxis should be a desired goal, rather than a
prerequisite. In other words, the agreement that can be attained through openness
ought to grow out of the general principle of rationality.
This notion of praxis draws upon the moral virtues of patience and constancy that can
cultivate in people the capacity for tolerance and mutual respect for "reasonable"
differences of opinion. In this way, through engaging in praxis to achieve the "good
life" the idea of rationality is not impeded. In defence of achieving praxis, that is,
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critical, reflexive and ethical discourse, Gutman (1998: 31) claims the following:
A necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition of living well in a society
where people differ in their moral convictions is effective teaching of the
liberal virtue of toleration. A more distinctly democratic virtue that a good
society must also teach effectively is mutual respect for reasonable differences
of moral opinion. Mutual respect demands more than the attitude of live and
let live; it requires willingness and ability to accord due intellectual and moral
regard to reasonable points of view that we cannot deem ourselves as correct.
In the political realm, toleration is a precondition for peaceful competition and
pragmatic compromise; mutual respect is a precondition for democratic
deliberation (praxis) and moral compromise.
Also, sincerity and truth constitute virtues of rationality which, in tum, allows moral
space for intuition, what Taylor (1985: 139) refers to as "love and happiness":
Our research efforts (discourse) ought to enable our readers to reflect on their
own lives and to help us to envision lives for ourselves and our students that
exist within communities of difference and hope.
The phrase "envision lives for ourselves and our students" suggests that human beings
have a responsibility to make educational discourse intuitively positive for
participants, which includes human relationships as well. Dewey posits (1984: 249):
"Intuition in short, signifies the realisation of a pervasive quality such that it regulates
the determination of relevant distinctions or of whatever, whether in the way of
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relations, becomes the accepted object of thought (and praxis)". In another way,
Dewey's concern for intuition in praxis implies that we need to develop a sense of
care in our relations with each other at an individual level and at the same time relate
that intuitive care to societal issues. Dewey and Bentley (1989: 247) felt that the
notion of intuitive care in praxis
ranges from solicitude, through canng for in the sense of fondness, and
through being deeply stirred, over to caring for in the sense of taking care,
looking after, paying attention systematically, or minding.
If we do not care, then we do not engage in praxis; thorough educational discourse
must be care-full. Tierney (1994: 99) framed his use of rationality by linking intuitive
care with a reflexive educational discourse: "Caring, then, is a Way to work on an
individual level and at the same time relate that care to the broader questions about the
structure of society".
2.5.2 Freedom of thought
In pursuit of achieving rationality is an understanding that people ought to have
choices to exercise control over their lives (Jarvis 1998: 95); that is, they practise a
particular kind of liberty (freedom) accepted and supported by all those involved in
the educational discourse (praxis). But what kind of liberty seems to be the most
desirable to make sense of praxis? Berlin's (1969: 131) view of positive liberty seems
to be the most appropriate kind of liberty, one which can ensure the validity of a
critical, reflexive and ethical discourse.
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Central to positive liberty is the notion that human beings are rational, that is, self-
directing and self-determining beings. They are in control of their lives. Reason,
purpose and potential shape their own choices and decisions in life. In a different way,
achieving self-direction through reason is, according to positive liberty, a way of
attaining liberation. When the individual rationally analyses, understands and then
takes appropriate action, such an individual has acquired self-mastery and is liberated.
Berlin (1969:131) explains it as follows:
I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men' s (women's) acts of
will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by
conscious purposes, which are my own, not causes which affect me, as it were
from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being
decided for, self-directed ... This is at least part of what I mean when I say
that I am rational, and that my reason distinguishes me as a human being from
the rest of the world.
But taking appropriate action based on rationality (reason and understanding) does not
mean that one can do only what one wants to do because this could seriously curb the
freedom of others. Here positive liberty undermines the notion of individual freedom
unhampered by the interference of other human beings, that is, negative liberty.
Whereas negative liberty limits the control of others to infringe on the individual
person's freedom, positive liberty is concerned with "what" or "who" should interfere
with the individual's activities. Positive liberty is concerned with the individual's
"higher self' as the source of control, that is, it aims to increase the individual's
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conscious and willing enactment of one's own decisions and actions in life otherwise
a person is not free. It is in the context of Berlin's notion of positive liberty that I
understand the argument by Bowles and Gintis (1987: 4) that "liberty entails freedom
of (individual) thought and association, freedom of political, cultural and religious
expression, and the right to control one's body and express one's preferred spiritual,
aesthetic, and sexual style of life". Hence, praxis appeals to the notion of positive
liberty identified with the idea that human beings are by nature rationally self-
controlling and self-directing. Berlin (1969: 136) emphasises this as follows: " ... the
essence of men (women) is that they are autonomous beings - authors of values, of
ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that
they are willed freely - then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not
autonomous, but natural objects ... ".
2.5.3 Clarity of meaning
The idea of praxis as a process concerned directly with the pursuit of rationality,
following Taylor (1985: 139), implies that one has to communicate clear meanings to
others through educational discourse. In other words, rationality ensures that our
interpretations and knowledge are articulated to others who may be interested in our
perceptions and perspectives in a clear, logically consistent (Taylor 1985: 139) and
unambiguous manner. Consequently, the transforming of our experiences into a
rational form of language heightens the importance of our interpretations and
constructed meanings as we seek to improve our situations and contexts. Hassard
(1993: 5) argues that when we enter rational discourses, we involve ourselves in
dynamic meaning-making within which we are agents of change who suggest
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possibilities for renewal and development. Rationality in the sense that one attunes
oneself contemplatively, critically and reflexively to the social world has shifted
educational discourse from merely "free enquiry" or "curiosity-driven" to problem
solving priorities (Gibbons 1998: 16-17), an issue I shall address in detail in chapter
four.
Moreover, the question needs to be answered: what exactly constitutes a rational or
clear meaning-making style? Clarity in writing style as to how human beings
communicate their findings implies a transparent language written in plain rather than
flowery language. This transparency in Lanham's (1974: 17) words is not just "any
single verbal configuration (such as 'Be clear', 'Avoid jargon', 'Be sincere', and so
on) but a relationship between a reader and a writer". In this way, clarity in
communicating one's findings means that one has to be "attuned to the relationships
between listener and storyteller, between writer and reader, between knowledge and
language" (Zeller & Farmer 1999: 14). Often, "confusing and impenetrable prose"
defeat the meaning-making style characteristic of clear, transparent and narrative
rationality. In addition, in the name of clarity and articulation, a praxiological
language is constituted by a "narrative rationality", which, unlike anecdote and genre
(discourse contrasted with argumentation), builds on the assumption that "all forms of
human communication can be seen fundamentally as stories, as interpretations of
aspects of the world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture and character"
(Fisher 1989: 56-57).
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2.5.4 Non-arbitrariness
Through rationality human beings individually and collectively build their praxis
which rejects arbitrariness. When one engages in praxis one does not do so as a
solitary individual but as a bearer of a particular social identity through shared
experiences which cause one to rationally reject arbitrariness such as bias, one-
sidedness, prejudice, discrimination, intolerance, dogmatism, sexism, racism,
injustice, and so on. In this way, engaging rationally in praxis offers space for
diversity whereby "subordinate groups can develop their voices and articulate their
needs if they have their own spaces rather than if they are absorbed in a consensual
overarching public sphere" (Hernandez 1997: 57). This idea of diversity of identities
through rational educational discourse opens up the possibility for different social
groups to tolerate each other and to work together in the same territory or public
sphere (Torres 1998: 425). In a different way, praxis is an arena of the conflicting
interest groups in a society, rather than of the overarching representation of the
choices of individuals who pursue their separate interests (Gould 1988: 10).
Diversity through rational educational discourse also repudiates the idea that the
hegemonic power of the dominant culture can be imposed on different peoples in the
name of integration (Fletcha 1999: 150). In fact, diversity provides the conditions for
subordinate groups to articulate their needs, and deepens the emancipatory
possibilities of different social groups (including subordinate ones) to free (liberate)
themselves through praxis. In this way, they maintain, promote and develop their own
culture and identity in a process of collective empowerment that allows them to reflect
about their experience and situation within the wider society (Fraser 1990: 57). In
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essence, rational engagement in praxis, in the words of Hernandez (1997: 58),
"constitutes a space in which (different) people come to consciousness, deliberately
transforming not only knowledge about themselves and their reality, but also
transforming their own subjectivities".
Fine (1994: 31) has this to say about rationality and the practice of diversity:
When we listen closely, to each other and our informants, we are surprised,
and our intellectual work is transformed. We keep each other honest to forces
of difference, divergence, and contradiction.
Rationality is strongly linked to critical arguments that emphasise differences among
viewpoints and explanations of social events rather than those types of explanations
that assume the value of only one right, arbitrary (absolute) interpretation. In other
words, rationality in praxis implies that one has to search for other voices, other
interpretations, and other stories. This view of diversity in praxis is vindicated by
McLaren (1991: 10) for whom "all knowledge is relational and can only be
understood within the context of production, its distributions, and the way it is taken
up by different individuals and groups". Put differently, praxis does not comprise a
universal, value-free body of facts, independent of the understandings of people.
Rather, it is produced, located and understood within existing social and cultural
formations (Giroux 1999: 7). According to praxis, "scientific knowledge" and school /
academic knowledge do not just represent an immutable body of unquestioning facts,
unrelated to the diverse and every day life experiences of learners. Any form of
knowledge is context-specific, relevant and "emerge(s) ... out of social conventions
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·.. not only negotiates difference, but takes seriously the imperative to make
knowledge meaningful in order that it might become critical and
transformative (reflexive) - it is crucial that educators expand curricula to
include those elements of popular culture that playa powerful role in shaping
the desires, needs, and identities of students (learners).
and sometimes in opposition to them" (Mclaren 1991: 10). Giroux (1992:17) cogently
claims that praxis
The above shows that praxis grounded in rationality creates unconfined spaces for a
plurality of voices.
2.5.5 Impartiality
A discussion of rational discourse invariably invokes some reference to being
impartial, that is, being unbiased or unprejudiced. In philosophy of education
impartial rational activity usually brings into focus a discussion of objectivity
identified with what Elliot (1998: 126) calls private, public and metaphysical
objectivity. Before moving on to a discussion of Elliot's explanation of objectivity, it
is worth referring to some common uses of this concept. Schwandt (1997: 104-105)
identifies several interrelated senses of this concept:
(1) In traditional social scientific parlance objectivity is often taken to be
synonymous with "methodological", "scientific", "rational", and regarded as a
quality that comes from being procedural, rule following and algorithmic.
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Objectivity III this sense avoids human judgment which IS regarded as
subjective.
(2) Objectivity has also been defined in terms of conditions of accurate
representation of reality, that is, something is objective ifit mirrors, reflects, or
represents social reality.
(3) Objectivity is also associated with a metaphysical and epistemological
separation of subject and object, that is, what is "out there" is independent of
human beings.
(4) It is also used as the quality of being unbiased or unprejudiced.
(5) An "objective" statement or fact is also commonly used as a statement that all
reasonable people would assent to or agree with.
These explanations of objectivity (perhaps with the partial exception of point 5) are
not compatible with the way I intend using the concept in this thesis. This brings me
to a discussion of Elliot's (1998: 126) explanation of objectivity. Private objectivity
stresses the importance of attaining certainty and universal validity, that is, "truth". A
person who is unwilling to accept that reality is not in the minds of people but "out
there" independent of the value judgements of people, is said not to be objective and,
hence, not rational. Elliot (1998: 126) notes that
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'Private' objectivity is predicable primarily of persons, secondarily of
judgements: a person is objective ifhis state of mind inmaking a judgement is
disinterested, i.e. if his judgement is not influenced by irrelevant factors of a
subjective mind, especially the passions and the will.
This kind of private objectivity in relation to rational human activity seems untenable
for the reason that human beings do not exist independent of their subjective "forms
of experience".
Public objectivity breaks with private objectivity in the sense that "truth" is not
universally valid and the source of "truth" lies not with the individual, but with each
particular community or society, referred to by Elliot (1998: 126) as "collective
subjectivity". But does this mean that we would necessarily avoid bias and a situation
where everything goes? Subjectivists believe that there are no universal truths. For
them, all truths would be allowed expression and full consideration. Bernstein (1983:
11-12) sums up the position of public subjectivity with reference to human beings, by
claiming that for subjectivists
. .. there is a nonreducible plurality of such schemes, paradigms (cognitive
frameworks), and practices; there is no substantive overarching framework in
which radically different and alternative schemes are commensurable - no
universal standards that somehow stand outside of and above these competing
alternatives.
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What this means is that concepts must be understood relative to a specific conceptual
scheme or practice. Subjectivists claim that there are no universal truths; for them all
"standards" are relative to the particular context. Both these claims contain within
them universal terms like "no" and "all", reflecting a universal truth. So the
subjectivist argument is paradoxical since subjectivists state that there is no universal
truth. They appeal to the same "standards" they so wish to refute. For this reason
collective subjectivity seemingly does not engender an impartial form of rational
activity.
I shall now give attention to the notion of metaphysical objectivity as opposed to
private and subjective "truth" claims. For Elliot (1998: 139) if we want our discourses
to be objective, we should consider fostering rationality "free from all arbitrary
constraints" through the social, intersubjective construction of meaning. He claims
that
All the participants (in rational discourse) would have the same right, and in
practice an equal chance, to begin a discussion and to keep it going, so that no
opinion or point of view would be denied expression and full consideration.
Each participant would be free to initiate a movement from the existing level
of discourse to a more fundamental level, and to call into question the
conceptual framework originally accepted or presupposed. Each would be free
also to initiate enquiry into the genesis of existing knowledge, and even to
question the existing concept of knowledge (1998: 139-140).
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In a different way, developing objective meanings is a practice of social relation or
intersubjective action whereby individuals in a society or community do not just have
a given set of ideas or goals to which they subscribe. Intersubjective ideas and norms
are not the property of individuals in a society, but are "constitutive of the social
matrix in which individuals find themselves and act" (Taylor 1985: 36). Thus,
intersubjectivity implies that human beings in society have a common discourse
shaped by the right and equal chance to initiate and to question their shared social
practices. This does not mean that human beings in rational discourse have to reach
agreement with one another. To have intersubjective constructions of knowledge
implies that human beings have to nurture and develop those constructions of
meaning which are constituted in the social practices of a community; constructions
of meaning are not conjured up on the basis of what is arbitrarily decided, but
meanings which have developed out of the practices of a community, that is,
meanings which are constituted in a community's social practices, and which, in tum
strengthen that community. In essence, intersubjective practices through metaphysical
objectivity are ways of experiencing rational action through praxis in a society
expressed in the common meanings constitutive of human activities (1985: 36).
2.5.6 A sense of relevance
Rationality through praxis demands that human beings pay close attention to unique
and specific aspects of every context. By implication, rationality means that no single
educational discourse will be useful in the same ways in all situations. In this regard,
Hermes (1998: 158) posits that educational discourse's emphasis should shift from
discourse for discourse's sake to educational discourse "that serves a specific purpose
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the research agenda (educational discourse) and its funding are increasingly
the outcome of a dialogue (praxis) between researchers and users, regulators,
interest groups, etc. Unless that dialogue produces a consensus no research
will be done. Leading edge research (educational discourse) has become a
more participatory exercise involving many actors and experts who move less
according to the dynamics of their original disciplines and more according to
problem interest ... (which) means that academics will be away from the
university, working in teams with experts from a wide range of intellectual
backgrounds, in a variety of organisational settings.
or need of the community within which it is situated". In a different way, rationality
implies that praxis has to be relevant and socially accountable "primarily by
supporting the economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens" (Gibbons et
al 1998: 1). Moreover, rationality also guides praxis by using reflexive and
continually changing procedures of educational discourse that act as a "situated
response" (Hermes 1998: 157).Rationality engenders praxis as a "recursive process",
that is reflexive activity specific to the culture, the problems, and the dynamics of a
particular context. Capper (1993: 10) reminds us that reflexive, that is, different,
divergent and contextual educational discourse is useful in praxis.
Moreover, Taylor (1985: 37) links rationality to being attuned with society and to
socially constructed meanings. In this way, rationality implies that educational
discourse is no longer a self-contained activity carried out in "relative institutional
isolation", but involves "interaction with a variety of other knowledge producers"
(Gibbons 1998: 1). For Gibbons (1998: 37):
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From the above, rationality in educational discourse means that institutions like
universities need to develop structures that "promote and reward group creativity" and
produce knowledge under "continuous negotiation" (Gibbons 1998: ii & 6), a
discussion which I pick up again in chapter four.
2.5.7 Consistency
Rationality through praxis is linked to clearly expressed articulations free from
inconsistency. Taylor (1985: 137) accentuates this notion of rationality through
praxis as follows:
We have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that means,
distinguish and layout the different features of the matter in perspicuous order
(that is, clearly expressed articulations devoid of inconsistencies).
My emphasis is on Taylor's notion of "perspicuous order". He uses this notion as
referring to clearly expressed articulations devoid of inconsistencies. And, when
people engage in praxis they articulate their views and opinions about educational
problems in a consistent and coherent way, their articulations make practices
transparent and illuminating. Hence, when their articulations clarify practices in such
a perspicuous way, they are rational. In a different way, rationality constitutes the
capacity in human beings to articulate expressions in a consistent spirit, where
consistency refers to the articulation of points of views in a non-contradictory manner.
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·.. prevents the state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an
educational good on grounds irrelevant to the legitimate social purpose of that
good (in this instance the good of praxis) (1998: 34).
2.5.8 Respect for evidence and people
The idea of practising rationality through praxis provides an important constraint: the
necessity for praxis to proceed in relation to impartiality, non-arbitrariness and
consistency, even if a person or group introduces a "new vocabulary" which is
incommensurable with another person's view. This shows the necessity of respect for
people and for praxis to proceed, even if one person (or group) justifiably introduces a
viewpoint incommensurable with the prevailing ideas. In this regard, it is worth
noting Olivier (1990: 105), who draws on Rorty's "ethical-pragmatic" approach to
praxis. Olivier claims that praxis should not be one, whereby "any power or institution
(or its agents) ... arbitrarily and irrationally silences, terrorises, eliminates or excludes
certain justifiably interested parties from dialogue (praxis) merely because the latter
introduces a new vocabulary into the discourse - one which is incommensurate with
the prevailing dogma". To exclude people from praxis or by denying them
participation is to show disrespect for them and to "stifle rational deliberation of
competing conceptions of good lives and good societies" (Gutman 1998: 34). Gutman
argues that the idea of respect for people is an important virtue of rationality for the
reason that it
Moreover, being impartial, non-arbitrary and consistent in praxis do not necessarily
result in agreement. It is one thing to be sincere, open and willing to participate in
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praxis, but what makes it irrelevant is precisely the lack of courage and commitment
on the part of one person to accept the point the other person makes. In another way,
praxis is necessarily grounded in commonly accepted rational principles such as the
commitment to follow through on the best judgement, that is, showing respect for
evidence.
2.6SUMMARY
There are no a priori limits as to how rationality should be lived out in praxis. Praxis
constitutes the use of rationality, cultivated by notions of truth-telling and sincerity,
non-arbitrariness, freedom of thought, clarity, a sense of relevance, impartiality,
consistency, respect for evidence and people. In other words, human beings'
acceptance of the forms of rationality is a prerequisite for praxis which, in tum, is
shaped by logically necessary conditions such as critical educational discourse,
reflexive action and ethical human activity. In the next chapter I shall show how the
general principle (that is, rationality) of praxis can be connected logically to the idea
of democratic education. This is necessary for the reason that an understanding of
democratic education holds much promise for reflexive praxis in the forms of
teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service
related to higher education transformation in South Africa.
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CHAPTER3
PRAXIS, RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The general principle of praxis developed thus far engenders an understanding that
educational discourse grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical practices can effect
forms of rationality. Rationality through praxis is linked to sincerity, freedom of
thought, clarity of meaning, impartiality, non-arbitrariness, consistency, a sense of
relevance and respect for evidence and people. The argument in this thesis is that
these forms of rationality can create spaces for achieving democratic education which,
in turn, holds much promise for shaping teaching and learning at a distance, research
and community service in the context of higher education transformation in South
Africa. Any discussion of democratic education presupposes an understanding of the
concept democracy.
3.2 DEMOCRACY
Democracy is a messy system, but it has survived because there is a sphere for
debates and a set of rules (general principles) that people follow even if they do not
benefit from them (Torres 1998: 425). This definition of democracy accentuates three
interrelated aspects central to an understanding of democracy: democracy as a system,
democracy as a sphere for debates and democracy as a set of general principles. The
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first two descriptions of democracy, that is, democracy as a system and democracy as
a sphere for debates can be linked to two broad conceptions of democracy. Firstly,
democracy as a representative system of political decision-making and, secondly,
democracy as a sphere for social and political life in which people enjoy equal
opportunities and are engaged in self-development, self-fulfillment and self-
determination (Carr & Hartnett 1996: 40). Representative democracy basically means
that collective deliberations that concern the whole of the community are taken not
directly by its members, but by people elected for this purpose (Bobbio 1987: 40).
Schumpeter (1940: 269) defines democracy as a representative form of government
whereby decision-making is restricted to elected representatives, electors having
voted without participating any further. Democracy as a sphere for social and
political life is constituted by values of positive liberty (freedom of self-development)
and political equality (Carr & Hartnett 1996: 41).
On the one hand, democracy is seen as a representative system of government. In this
regard Macpherson (1966: 36) identifies three models of a democratic representative
system of political decision-making:
1. Western liberal democracy which was brought into being to serve the need of the
competitive market society - a product of successfully developing capitalist
market societies. Liberal representative democracy created by capitalism (with its
capacity to appropriate wealth) relocates power and domination from the state to
civil society, to private property and the compulsions of the market (Wood 1994:
5). It is a kind of liberal democracy that accentuates the predominance of
individual rights over collective rights, power of the people over any other
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regulatory institution and equal rights for all citizens. Individual (negative) liberty
or the right to private property is to be secured by the state against interference
(Pateman 1979: 24). Steyn, De Klerk and Du Plessis (1999: 5-7) are correct when
they consider equality as not being a "distinctive feature" of a liberal
representative democracy.
2. Non-liberal Communist democracy, whereby a class state was created by the
proletarian revolution. It had the job of holding down the old ruling class while
transforming the whole society in such a way that there would be no more basis
for exploitative classes and no more need for a class state, thus paving the way for
a fully human society.
3. Non-liberal, non-Communist democracy in Third World States, which rejects the
competitive ethos of the market society and sees no need for the competitive
system of political parties. It sees the possibility of a classless society and state
(Macpherson 1966: 35-36).
On the other hand, democracy is described as a sphere of social relationships; social
democracy undermines class distinctions and advocates equality of opportunity for all
citizens (Birch 1993: 46). This notion of social democracy can be extended to that
which postulates radical equality in class, racial, ethnic and gender interactions. Social
democracy is primarily aimed at welfare-oriented reforms within a market-related
capitalist society (Gould 1988: 10). For Pateman (1979: 27) social democracy
emphasises participation on the grounds of equality and liberty; that is, people have
the right to control their own lives, and to become competent at self-management and
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self-governance. She articulates this kind of democracy as a direct or participatory
form of democracy whereby people directly participate in economic, political and
social life.
My emphasis is on democracy as a concept that is constituted by a general principle.
Considering the history of democracy along the lines of both representation and
participation, its general principle needs to be justified in terms of combining
representation and participation. In other words, democracy cannot work through
representation alone; it also requires participation. Bumheim (1985: 5) eliminates the
representation / participation dualism whereby representation is turned into a
participatory process in which all legitimately interested parties have an equal chance
to participate and where people can learn to make informed choices. He claims that
such a general principle of democracy establishes conditions whereby people are
reasonably democratic, tolerant in their social attitudes, and willing to participate in
relevant matters (1985: 157). Such a general principle of democracy rejects
authoritarian, centralised state control which undermines diversity and sets a high
value on rationally co-ordinated and democratically controlled social change (Walker
1998: 22). Whereas centralisation in this instance refers to a unitary governmental
system where the central government makes all decisions "in the nation's capital"
(Buckland & Hofmeyer 1993: 7), rational co-ordination implies a form of functional
decentralisation whereby each individual in society performs one specific function
which is co-ordinated by negotiation among the group, representative of all people
with a legitimate interest in running the group (Walker 1998: 22).
My emphasis is on the general principle of democracy being tied to the idea of
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rational co-ordination amongst people in order to maximise their participation. Such
an understanding of democracy seems incompatible with what Steyn et al. (1999: 5)
refer to as "a true and sound democracy". For them "a true and sound democracy" can
be obtained if freedom (liberty) and equality as cornerstones of such a democracy are
"finely balanced". It seems plausible to argue for liberty and equality to be "finely
balanced" as this would imply that liberty and equality cannot exist independently of
each other in "a true and sound democracy". In this sense, I agree with Steyn et al.
(1999) for the reason that such a "balance" would contribute towards turning
representation into a participatory process in which all legitimately interested parties
have an equal chance to participate and where people can learn to make liberal and
rational choices. However, my concern is with their emphasis on achieving "a true
and sound democracy". Implicit in this view is an assumption that democracy needs to
be "true" or product-based which might not always be congruent with the idea that
democracy should be a process of establishing conditions whereby people are
reasonably democratic, tolerant in their social attitudes, and willing to participate
rationally in relevant matters, as opposed to achieving some universal truth.
However, this criticism of Steyn et al. (1999) is not oblivious of an implicit
assumption in their view that rationality can be linked to the general principle of
democracy (an idea which I refer to again in section 3.3).
What the above explanation illustrates is that general principles of concepts are
constitutive of the social practices in which people find them and make meaning. For
Taylor (1985: 36) discourse (in this instance democracy) and its general principle
constitutes forms of action or modes of social interaction which would not be possible
without the existence of the general principle. The general principle of the discourse
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of democracy opens up new possibilities; possibilities of understanding the actions of
others, including actions one has never seen before, and possibilities of actions never
before performed. In this sense, democracy as discourse "begins where certainty
ends", that is, democracy is reflexive; it liberates thought and practices to that which
offers more choice, freedom and possibilities for emancipatory politics.
Democracy as a reflexive discourse aims to negate and resist privileged
representations and dominant discourses that marginalise minority groups, oppress
women (and men) and non-white peoples, disfigure the environment, and degrade
knowledge and knowledge structures to instruments of social control and legitimation
(Jarvis 1998: 97). Moreover, democracy as a discourse, which embraces reflexivity
(Barber 1994), recognises subversion - a notion that celebrates plurality (diversity)
and dialogism (Jarvis 1998: 98).
Democracy enjoins constant, permanent motion (reflexivity) - a gentle kind of
permanent revolution, a movable feast that affords each generation room for
new appetites and new tastes, and thus allows political and spiritual migration
to new territory... (with) reflexivity the chief mode of (discourse) (Barber
1994: 45-48).
The above understanding of democratic discourse is shaped by a particular general
principle. Hernandez (1997: 28) asserts that the general principle of democratic
discourse organises people into collective social action, creating the conditions for
transformation (which will be dealt with in more detail in sections 3.3.2 and 4.2). Her
conceptualisation of democracy as discourse is worth quoting at length:
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It seems to me that this conceptualisation (of democracy) is the basis for an
empowering theory of action: individuals both get constituted and constitute
themselves and through it (the general principle) they can come together to
build a dynamic unity for social change and transformation ... Also it aims to
critically open up the possibility of transforming experience while creating a
more liberating public (educational) discourse (1997: 28).
I shall now tease out the general principle that constitutes a democratic discourse that
can open up possibilities for transforming social experiences and liberating
educational discourse. As has been explained earlier, the general principle of a
democratic educational discourse, which holds the most radical possibilities for
praxis, can be linked to the notion of rationality, for the reason that praxis (a reflexive
educational discourse) is guided by rationality. I shall show how rationality can
organise a democratic educational discourse and hence, praxis, by focussing on how it
recognises self-determination, equality and diversity and, at the same time, engenders
dialogism and a dynamic unity for transformation in educational discourse. In this
way I hope to show how aspects of democratic educational discourse link
conceptually with the notion of reflexive praxis.
3.3 RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE
Logically necessary conditions of praxis constitute critical educational discourse,
reflexive action and ethical human activity. These conditions shape the guiding
principle of praxis giving rise to clusters of rationality such as (1) sincerity, respect
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But to promote the rational consideration of diversity or plurality through a
democratic educational praxis requires in the first place a respect for diversity,
meaning the rights of individuals or groups to transmit their ways of life. Callan
(1998: 56, 61) argues that an arbitrary "closed-mindedness" or a contempt for
•
and non-arbitrariness, (2) relevance, (3) impartiality and (4) clarity, consistency and
freedom of thought. Based on the various forms of rationality discussed in section 2.5,
I have clustered logically necessary conditions of praxis as mentioned for the purpose
of using these clusters of rationality to chart out the idea of a democratic educational
discourse and hence, praxis. In conclusion the notion of a reflexive democratic
praxis will be discussed.
3.3.1 SINCERITY, RESPECT, NON-ARBITRARINESS AND DIVERSITY
I have argued that rationality allows space for sincerity, respect for non-arbitrariness
and diversity. I shall now explore how these forms of rationality can further guide the
notion of a democratic educational discourse. A democratic educational discourse
does not restrict the rational consideration of diverse ways of public life, including
educational discourse. Gutman (1998: 33) argues that for a democratic society to
reproduce itself consciously
... (i)t must not restrict rational consideration of different ways of life. Instead
it must cultivate the kind of character and the kind of intellect that enables
people to choose rationally (some would say 'autonomously') among different
ways of life.
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1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and
liberties.
2. Fair co-operation has to occur between free and equal citizens who need to
respect each other.
diversity will "tend to bring us into sharp conflict with citizens whose fidelity to
opposing values is equally serious and tenacious". For example, one might find two
different religious groups each considering their conceptions of the good life as better
than the other group's. This difference might erupt into stark confrontation and
conflict.
The question arises: How can sincerity, respect and an attitude of non-arbitrariness
rule out confrontation and conflict and hold a diverse society together? One answer to
this question is found in Rawls' (1971) celebrated theory of justice and fairness. Some
of Rawls' ideas (1971: 10-18) on justice and fairness in relation to a liberal
democratic society can be explained as follows:
The success of Rawls' ideas on justice and fairness as a response to the problem of
working together in a diverse society hinges on the respect people have to show to
each other. Showing respect is to disclose a sincere (conscious and willing) way of
securing "mutually respectful social co-operation" (Callan 1998: 62). Mutual social
co-operation implies that people have to respect each other and be sincere to meet
each other half way, to compromise. When people in a democratic society
compromise they do not merely advance the position of their individual or group
interests but rather, develop a shared willingness to make minimal use of controversial
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Patriotism (shared loyalty) can empower us to resist this kind of failure
(individual and group egoism) to the extent that it gives us a shared group-
interest in compromise. We no longer broach the prospect of compromise with
wholly separate identities so that any gain for you is a loss for me and vice
versa. The achievement of compromise is itself of value to us because it
affirms the unity and continuity of a political (educational) community we
both cherish (1998: 76).
empirical premises. For example, people in a diverse society do little to push toward
controversial understandings of "good education" so long as such a society lacks a
substantial body of uncontroversial understandings of "good education". To avoid
conflict which may bring us nowhere, we need to develop what Callan (1998: 76)
refers to as "a shared group-interest in compromise", a kind of shared loyalty that can
push hard in the direction of fair co-operation between free and equal citizens who
need to respect each other. Callan states the following:
In the context of pursuing respectfully and non-arbitrarily the idea of a democratic
educational discourse in a diverse society we have to develop "a shared group-interest
in compromise" which can prevent us pushing toward convergent interpretations of
education and its concomitant link with knowledge production. Rather, we need to
develop compromising understandings of education and knowledge production that
can advance our shared interests in a diverse society.
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3.3.2 RELEVANCE, EQUALITY AND QUALITY
I have tried to clarify the position that rationality cannot be blind to the notion of
relevance. My concern in this section is with rationality as a sense of relevance that
can give content to the notion of a democratic educational discourse. A democratic
educational discourse "leaves maximum room for citizens deliberately to shape their
society, not in their own image but in an image that they can legitimately identify with
their informed, moral choices" (Gutman 1998: 33). My argument about how to
engender a democratic educational discourse is conducive to the idea that educational
discourse has to be identified with the "informed, moral choices" of people in a
democratic society. I interpret the idea of engendering democratic educational
discourse in relation to the "informed, moral choices" of people as making
educational discourse relevant to the practices to which a democratic society has
consciously agreed. To talk about relevance in a democratic educational discourse is
to bring into play the notions of quality and equality of an education. Do explanations
of equality, if connected with those of quality in terms of treating people according to
"relevant" criteria, result in an understanding that a high quality educational discourse
must logically be one of equality? To address this question of relevance in a
democratic educational discourse, I shall refer to Cooper's (1998: 180) explanation of
the relationship between quality and equality.
I want to examine Cooper's (1998: 180) view that although quality and equality are
mutually related, their relation is one of incompatibility. Quality in education is not
solely product-based but rather, produced through processes. A university may be
very good despite the fact that some of its graduates might not meet the standard
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Now I shall say that one education is of higher quality than another if the
former, through its processes, produces greater educational transformation in
the latter. The more an education of certain duration increases the level of
educatedness, whatever the initial level, the higher quality it is.
required by the country's educational expectations. Nor is it sufficient for high-quality
education that graduates leaving the university are well-educated. They might be well-
educated before going to the university. This means that talking of a high quality
university cannot be made solely on the grounds of its products, in this instance,
graduates. My understanding of quality education is linked to the notion of processes,
defined here as what Cooper (1998: 181) refers to as educational transformation, that
is, "the change in a person's level of educatedness resulting from a certain education".
One graduate's level of educatedness may have increased more by a certain university
education than another graduate's, despite the latter being better educated at a
different university in the first place. In this way, the graduate whose level of
educatedness has been transformed more than that of a better educated graduate, has
attained the higher quality university education. Cooper (1998: 181) claims the
following:
Does equality in education mean that people are not excluded from education on the
grounds that they are poor? Such a view of equality is untenable for the reason that
some students who passed a matriculation examination, for example, might be unable
to exercise their right to go to a university, which they are entitled to do in terms of
equality. But due to lack of funds they are unable to receive the treatment of attending
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a university. I want to examine Cooper's (1998: 180) explanation of equality which
differs substantially from the above seemingly untenable principle of equality:
The principle is this: only those inequalities are permissible from which
everyone, in particular the worst off, benefits more that he (she) would in their
absence. For example, only those income differentials are justified which
result in even the poorest doing better than they would without such
differentials. Since we are concerned with educational equality, and with
intrinsic educational benefits, the formula would read: only those inequalities
in an educational system are justified which result in even the worst off getting
a better education than they would be otherwise. Put in terms of educational
transformation only those inequalities in rates of educational transformation
are justified which result in even the least transformed being more transformed
than in the absence of the inequalities.
To come back to the example mentioned earlier about the level of educatedness of a
particular graduate which has been transformed more than that of a better educated
graduate and, hence attained the higher quality university education, I want to
interpret the same situation in relation to equality in education. Let us consider the
following situations to find out (following Cooper's explanation) whether equality
and quality in education co-exist:
1. Say the graduate whose educatedness has been transformed better, attended a
university where she is not amongst the least transformed being more transformed.
In the presence of certain inequalities, according to the above explanation of
equality, this graduate has not achieved equality despite having received a higher
quality of education.
2. Assume the same graduate is amongst the least transformed being more
transformed in the presence of a lack of educational resources. However, her level
of educatedness has been transformed less than what it was when she attended a
different university. She is said to have achieved equality in education but not a
higher quality education.
3. Two different universities justify the presence of inequalities in terms of
educational transformation. At the first university the least educationally
transformed becomes more transformed. At the second university students receive
a higher quality education than those at the first university due the presence of
more educational resources. Comparatively students at the first university
achieved equality in education but not a higher quality education. Their level of
educatedness has not been transformed to a better level than those of students at
the second university.
In short, in terms of Cooper's argument, the demands for equality cannot be satisfied
with demands for quality. In a different way, "egalitarian demands are appropriate
only where they conflict with quality" (Cooper 1998: 186). But it is here that I want to
depart from Cooper's incompatibility thesis for the reason that such an antithetical
position on equality and quality might not necessarily advance democratic
transformation in South African higher education.
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Historically in developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom,
tension between equality and quality seems to have been present almost from the
beginning (Berdahl, Moodie & Spitzberg 1991: 66). Several periods can be identified
in which either concern for equality or quality has been predominant. From the mid-
19th century to World War II the major thrust of higher education started in the
direction of equal access to institutions for students who were not previously
considered "college material" with the curriculum being opened to include the natural
sciences and modem languages, the mechanical arts and culture. By the end of 19th
century renewed emphasis was placed on quality in contrast to equal access whereby
quality was defined in terms of those institutions whose programmes and graduates
measured up to the "best" institutions (determined by success rates of students) (1991:
59). The post-war decade (1947-1958) in the United States was concerned with equal
access for returning veterans who enrolled mostly for programmes of relevance to
resolving national problems. The period from 1958 to 1968 became the period of the
most rapid expansion with a primary emphasis on quality such as strengthening
research in the natural sciences to meet the challenges of the cold war and the
beginning of the space age. Yet, equal access was provided to a far wider range of
students than ever before (1991: 61).
Between 1968 and 1980 attention in higher education was focussed on consolidating
and extending equality gains with an emphasis on diversity and non-traditional modes
of educational delivery which, in turn, raised questions of quality control. Between
1981 and 1988 a re-emphasis was placed on quality identified with programme or
institutional effectiveness, effective utilisation of resources, governance structures and
a concern with preserving an exclusive (elitist) limited range of academic traditions.
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(1991: 67). What is significant about the concern with equality and quality in the
history of higher education in the United States, is the complementary way in which
the two notions unfolded. In other words, while concern for equality should persist,
concern with quality should not be decreased.
Moreover, in South Africa, Steyn (1998: 108) has argued that
. .. quality and equality in education should be part of the process of
transforming South African society into a ... democracy, but overemphasising
one or the other may have devastating results. A delicate balancing of the two
seems to me of the utmost importance.
It is this argument for a complementary view between equality and quality that I want
to extend. It is my contention that in order to achieve a democratic educational
discourse one invariably has to identify relevant conditions of equality at the expense
of an elitist conception of quality (to be discussed in section 4.3.4) as to initiate
transformation in people's level of educatedness in the South African higher
education system. In other words, unlike Cooper's incompatibility thesis of equality
and quality, extending the argument of Steyn (1998: 108), I want to talk of
"balancing" equality and quality in higher education. By this I mean that equality and
quality although seemingly incompatible need not to be understood as antithetical, but
rather as periods in higher education transformation during which a concern with
equality needs to be predominant and others in which a concern with quality needs to
be predominant. It is my contention that higher education transformation in South
Africa is at a time where equality has to be in the ascendancy from the beginning at
Citizens of different ethnic, national and cultural backgrounds can participate
in an investigation of one another's acknowledged prejudices (in particular
their feelings about the sort of life they want to lead) with the aim of arriving
at compromise to which all participants can acquiesce without resentment and
which aims at the optimal satisfaction of the conflicting prejudices of all
participants.
the expense of a purely elitist conception of quality. However, this does not mean that
a concern for quality should be lost (this discussion will again be raised in section
4.3.4).
3.3.3 IMPARTIALITY AND DlALOGISM
If we want our educational discourses to be impartial or unprejudiced, we need to
accept the universality of prejudice whenever we are talking about issues involving
the good life, that is, practising rationality. Jones (1998: 151) argues, "in a pluralist
context respecting people of other cultures involves seeing oneself and those others as
prejudiced members of different forms of life". But recognising the prejudices of
others through rational consideration is to achieve a democratic educational discourse
whereby people in a diverse society consciously agree to act "collectively" (Gutman
1998: 34). In a different way they agree to intersubjectively hold a sort of dialogism.
Dialogism in this sense creates the possibility whereby, in the words of Jones (1998:
150),
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Dialogism for the sake of compromise opens up the possibility for individuals or
different groups to interrelate among themselves aimed at revealing their preferred
perspectives. Talking together in different voices, aimed at addressing the differences
of opinion which emerge through dialogism, participants have an opportunity to
acquire a better understanding of each other. They also develop a greater self-
understanding whereby they bring their prejudices to the fore and express them to
others (Hernandez 1997: 19; Jones 1998: 150). This dialogism seems to be grounded
in a notion of positive liberty, which rests on the principle that freedom entails a sense
of belonging together in a particular society with which the individual shares
"permanent characteristics". Berlin (1969:158) regards this "solidarity" with the
group or community as a desire "for union, closer understanding, integration of
interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice". This view is
corroborated by Apple (1979: 10) for whom solidarity and common interest come into
being only through communicative (dialogic) organisational practices.
What makes dialogism a rational discourse through which people can achieve
compromise? Dialogism allows individuals and groups to live their differences
(pluriculturalism) and at the same time creates the opportunity to exchange and share
new forms of living and new cultural hybrids with others (interculturalism) (Fletcha
1999: 150). In other words, dialogism extends and radicalises democratic discourse
whereby it is possible for different human beings to share and live together in
solidarity, in the sense that individuals want their actions to be directed by the
community of which they are members. Jones (1998: 150) adequately summarises this
sort of dialogism:
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This is not the usual debate about truth and who is right or wrong. It is an
attempt to understand others and ourselves as people from different
backgrounds and is the basis for a compromise aimed at allowing us to live
together as a functioning and unified social unit rather than as a collection of
warring factions living in geographical proximity.
Of course, the alternative to working towards solidarity by way of educational
discourse for dialogism in the sense outlined would be to accept a move towards
"fragmentation of society in groups" which is neither desirable nor defensible. A
pessimist who argues that dialogism in our educational discourse would not work is
not rationally considering how conflict can be avoided and how tolerance and
compromise towards different prejudices can be encouraged. Maintaining an
unjustifiable partiality for one's own prejudices without encouraging dialogism is
itself a violation of the notion of impartiality. Jones (1998: 152) states the following:
A violation of the principle of impartiality is simply the first step towards the
gross violations of the principle of respect for persons which racist practices
constitute, because they involve imposing the views of a dominant group on
another without acknowledging the members of the subordinate group as
potential or actual autonomous agents, beings of praxis or centres of practical
reason.
For an educational discourse to be worthwhile, dialogism and its recognition for the
universality of prejudices should constantly be asserted. We cannot hope to succeed in
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achieving a democratic educational discourse if we do not rationally consider
dialogism as a commitment to collective action.
3.3.4 CLARITY, CONSISTENCY, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SELF-
DETERMINATION
Democratic educational discourse obligates people to cultivate in themselves the
capacity for critical reflection (rationality) by securing freedom of thought through
clearly expressed and unambiguous articulations of "differing ways of life" (Gutman
1998: 33). The desire for freedom of thought that Callan (1998) refers to as "a desire
for self-rule within a life" brings into focus a tendency to conceive the self-
determination or autonomy of human beings in ways that can shape a democratic
educational discourse. What is it about rational self-determination (autonomy) that
can commit people to a democratic educational discourse? Peters (1998b: 5-6)
identifies three conditions of autonomy on which I shall draw to answer this question:
1. Autonomy suggests that people accept or make rules for themselves.
2. Autonomy is associated with rationality whereby people subject rules to reflection
and criticism in the light of principles such as impartiality and respect for persons.
3. Autonomy as "strength of will" inclines people to adhere in determination to the
implementation of rules in the face of counter-inclinations.
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The first two conditions, those of rational articulation and critical investigation of
rules, have been alluded to on several occasions thus far, and will be partially ignored.
Reflection and criticism in a democratic educational discourse can be used "to foster
in future citizens the ability to defend their personal and political commitments, and
revise those that are indefensible" (Gutman 1998: 35). However, the close connection
between autonomy and "strength of will" is by far a necessary condition to exist in
order to give application to a democratic educational discourse. For example, in South
Africa many formal changes have occurred in line with the new Constitution, Bill of
Rights and several policy instruments including the Higher Education Act of 1997,
South African Schools Act, the National Qualifications Framework (NQF),
Curriculum 2005 and the Norms and Standards for Teacher Education. These policy
instruments confirm the removal of inequalities of access to a better education
irrespective of race, gender, language, religion or culture. Sedibe (1998) argues that
"substantial ground on policy transformation has been covered and the process is
rapidly moving towards implementation". However, the changing impact these new
policies and laws will have on universities and schools should be viewed in
conjunction with the "strength of will" of educators to ensure South Africa's
democratic education system. In other words, policy will have to take account of both
the contexts and the "strength of will" of educators and other role players to ensure its
implementation and hence, will be enabling a democratic educational discourse. Put
differently, the implementation of educational policy in universities depends on the
"strength of will" of educators in holding steadfast in conduct against counter-
inclinations and to stick to principles in the face of ridicule, ostracism, punishment
and bribes (Peters 1998b: 6).
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In essence, people in a society must be determined to chart out the democratic
educational discourse. To use Gutman's (1998: 34) words, a democratic educational
discourse needs to be lived from the "inside". People must show the commitment to
make praxis work.
3.4SUMMARY
I have argued that a democratic educational discourse can be achieved if guided by
interrelated clusters, referred to by Walker (1998: 22) as "touchstones" of rationality.
These "touchstones" of rationality that can shape a democratic educational discourse
can be summarised as follows:
1. developing "a shared group-interest in compromise" which can assist people in a
diverse society to develop compromising understandings of education and
knowledge production that can advance shared interests;
2. identifying relevant conditions of equality to initiate and of quality to enhance
transformation in people's level of educatedness;
3. asserting dialogism and recogmsmg the universality of prejudices as a
commitment to collective action; and
4. implementing educational discourse through "strength of will" whereby people
show determination to chart out their praxis.
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"Touchstones" of rationality constitute the notion of a democratic educational
discourse. Rationality has been identified as the general principle of praxis. Since
rationality is guided by logically necessary conditions such as critical educational
discourse, reflexive action and ethical human activity, one can justifiably link these
conditions of rationality to the notion of democratic educational discourse. This is so
for the reason that democratic educational discourse engenders "touchstones" of
rationality grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical human action. In essence, the
notions of critical practice, reflexive activity, ethical behaviour and democratic
education can be couched under the idea of praxis, more specifically a reflexive
(including critical and ethical activity) democratic praxis. In the next chapter I shall
attempt to show how rationality as the general principle of a reflexive democratic
praxis can contribute towards shaping higher education transformation in South
Africa.
CHAPTER4
IDGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND MODES OF
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall use "touchstones" of rationality to show how the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis can be used to make sense of and to shape higher
education transformation in South Africa. First, I shall give an overview of the South
African higher education policy framework, in particular its concern with issues of
equality, development, accountability and quality which can be linked to
"touchstones" of a reflexive democratic praxis. Thereafter, I shall attempt to show
how notions of equal access, relevance and dialogism (as "touchstones" of a reflexive
democratic praxis) can contribute towards initiating equality and development and
enhancing accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South
Africa. Before I address these issues, I shall briefly expound on the notion of
transformation in higher education
4.2 TRANSFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION
Transformation is a form of change of one form into another (Harvey & Knight 1996:
10). It is with such an understanding of transformation in mind that I agree with Van
Niekerk (1998: 65) when he states that "transformation is not its own goal; the goal is
an improved, more just and more equitable society". When one transforms society
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from, say, the inequities of the present to a "more just and equitable society", one
responds to a future one wishes to achieve through an ongoing process of rethinking -
a process of change from one form to another. In support of this view of
transformation, Carrim (1998: 301) states the following in relation to South African
education:
The system of apartheid seriously affected the nature of educational provision
and order in South Africa. It ensured that South Africans were schooled in
segregated environments. This meant that every level of schooling was cast in
a racial mould; educational budget provisions, the structure of educational
bureaucracies, the composition of staff and pupils in schools (and
universities), the kind of curriculum followed, and the ethos prevalent in
schools. Transforming education in South Africa, therefore, entails erecting
changes on all of these levels. This requires no less than an overhaul of the
past educational order, a redefinition of the culture prevalent in schools
throughout the country and a shift in mentality, from being racist,
undemocratic and authoritarian to being non-racial, democratic and enabling
(my emphasis).
In the realm of higher education, change can be understood as a shift in the level of
knowledge acquired, produced, implemented and questioned on the part of educators
and learners - processes of coming to know, understand, implement, reflect. This
makes transforming higher education more than just a process of producing "skilled
acolytes" but also about
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... producing people who can lead, who can produce new knowledge, who can
see new problems and imagine new ways of approaching old problems. Higher
education has a role to prepare people to go beyond the present and be able to
respond to a future which cannot be imagined (Harvey & Knight 1996: 10).
Transformation in higher education involves a process of new knowledge production,
reflexive action, which means seeing new problems and imagining new ways of
approaching old problems and, deconstruction and reconstruction or constant
exploring beneath surface appearances "to respond to a future that cannot be
imagined". In this regard, Esterhuyse (1996: 79) is correct when he refers to
transformation as a process where no "correct" projection can be made into the future
in the light of present and past socio-political developments.
So transformation in higher education is not merely adding to students' knowledge
base, skills and potential. At its core transformation refers to the ongoing change in
the way educators and students approach the acquisition of knowledge and skills and
relate them to a broader context (Harvey & Knight 1996: 12). By implication,
transformation is about empowering those involved in the higher education process, to
develop the critical ability of students and educators to the extent that they become
self-determined (rational) and reflexive.
However, just as reflexivity involves being rational, so too higher education can be
shaped by transformative conditions which effect changes in the experiences of
educators and students. Makgoba (1996: 183-184) states that transformative
conditions which impact mostly on the experiences of educators and students at
The legacy of unjustifiable inequalities generated by the apartheid system which
characterised the higher education system in South Africa, in response to which the
African National Congress published its discussion document on education and
higher education institutions embrace notions of equal access, development,
accountability and quality.
In order to further justify the relationship between transformative conditions and
notions of equal access, development, accountability and quality, it is worth referring
to Bitzer's (1998: 8-12) analysis of international and national contextual trends that
can facilitate transformation in higher education. He identifies massification and
greater heterogeneity in the student population, increased emphasis on learning rather
than teaching, multi-disciplinarity and modularisation of learning programmes,
changing demands on leadership skills as well as efficient control of public funds and
quality assurance as some of the conditions which facilitate transformation in the
higher education sector. It is my contention that such trends or conditions of
transformation embody notions of equal access, development, accountability and
quality. It is with such an understanding of transformation in mind that I shall address
issues related to higher education policy changes, in particular how these changes link
up with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.
4.3 THE HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY FRAMEWORK AND
CONDITIONS OF EQUALITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND
QUALITY
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training in January 1994, is broadly summarised by Bunting (1994: 224-227) through
the following characteristics:
1. Uneven access to higher education institutions which offered White South
Africans a greater chance than Black South Africans of gaining admission to
universities and technikons.
2. Inequitable success rates of students (outputs) of previously administered House
of Assembly (White) universities have been significantly better than those of
other groupings of universities under the management of House of Delegates
(Indians), House of Representatives (Coloureds) and the Department of Education
and Training (Blacks).
3. Unequal employment opportunities for those who are not White. In 1994 Whites
held nearly 90% of permanent academic posts in all South African universities
and technikons.
4. Under-representation of women in certain professional programmes and in senior
academic and administrative ranks of higher education institutions.
5. Unequal staffing resources in terms of student-lecturer ratio and better
qualifications which favoured historically White universities (HWUs), and
inequitable financing which had a bias towards HWUs.
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6. Lack of responsiveness (relevance) and "democratic accountability" of higher
education institutions to the needs of the majority of South Africans.
A major challenge emerged for the government of national unity in 1994 to put
educational policies into place that would help unwind the legacy of apartheid, and
which would result in the establishment of a higher education system that would
address the imperatives of transformative conditions such as equal access,
development, accountability and quality. Morrow (1998: 387) makes the point that
higher education institutions should not be exonerated from having perpetuated
"patterns of injustice" propounded by the apartheid state. In his words,
... the Apartheid state can be seen as having made explicit what was merely
implicit in colonialism. It imposed on society its own racially inspired
definition of the groups which make up society and systematically
consolidated those definitions in ramifying legislation. As part of that project
the unequal dignity, status and privileges of the officially defined groups were
reinforced in such a way that their advantages and disadvantages would be
carried forward into the future. The gross and blatantly unjustifiable
inequalities which this ideological regime spawned became more and more
difficult either to ignore or to hide and the edifice, with all its rationalizations,
collapsed. One way of putting this point is to say that Apartheid over-rode
major and significant interest groups in society; many voices were excluded
from collective decision making by being marginalized, ignored, silenced or
"eliminated". But this political strategy could not last for ever. Eventually the
mounting pressures of excluded interest groups destroyed the whole
oppressive regime ... In a way educational institutions, and particularly higher
education institutions, can be seen as the epitome of this pattern of injustice.
Such institutions are major distributors of benefits in society, especially those
benefits which stretch forward into the future. Universities, in particular, are
bastions of privilege and as soon as one presses the questions of who is paying
for them and who their beneficiaries are, then their key role in the maintenance
and perpetuation of an unjust society becomes clear (1998: 387, my emphasis).
After the demise of the dominance of the apartheid education model for several
decades, the higher education system in South Africa has undergone major
restructuring. The current higher education policy framework is guided by the 1996
report of the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) which provided the
framework for its reconstruction and laid the foundation for the 1997 Education White
Paper 3 on Higher Education and the subsequent Higher Education Act (1997). This
framework is heavily informed by international financing, quality assurance,
governance and national qualifications models from the United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand (Subotzky 1999: 15).
The preamble of the Higher Education Act of 1997 is mainly concerned with issues of
equality, development, accountability and quality. It states that the purposes of the Act
are to:
1. Establish a single co-ordinated higher education system which promotes co-
operative governance and provides for programme-based higher education.
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2. Restructure and transform programmes and institutions to respond better to the
human resource, economic and development needs of the Republic.
3. Redress past discrimination and ensure representation and equal access.
4. Provide optimal opportunities for learning and the creation of knowledge.
5. Promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom.
6. Respect freedom of religion, belief and opinion.
7. Respect and encourage democracy, academic freedom, freedom of speech and
expression, creativity, scholarship and research.
8. Pursue excellence, promote the full realisation of the potential of every student
and employee, tolerance of ideas and appreciation of diversity.
9. Respond to the needs of the Republic and of the communities served by the
institutions.
10.Contribute to the advancement of all forms of knowledge and scholarship, in
keeping with international standards of academic quality.
1. The goal of equality motivated the struggle against apartheid and continues to be
an extremely persistent and pervasive demand.
II. Enjoy freedom and autonomy in relation with the State within the context of
public accountability and the national need for advanced skills and scientific
knowledge.
4.3.1 Initiating transformation through equality
Some of the features listed in the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997) which
can be subsumed under equality arose as a result of the unequal racial and ethnic
division of the higher education system due to apartheid discrimination and because
of the inequalities in access which characterised it. Optimal educational opportunity
(No.3) and the full realisation of the potential for all (No.4) are indications of the
emphasis on equality that would be facilitated through establishing a single co-
ordinated higher education system (No.1). Wolpe (1993: 6-7) puts forward the
following arguments for an emphasis on equality to be achieved in the South African
higher education system:
2. There is no guarantee, given the circumstances under which the transition is
occurring in South Africa, that economic development will also entail
redistribution and a secular trend towards 'general' equality.
Given the influence Wolpe had on higher education policy debates in South Africa,
the Higher Education Act (1997) provides a policy framework for equal access as
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crucial to redressing past discrimination and ensunng representation and
participation. But it might be argued that ensuring equal access construes a violation
of the principle of equality since not all citizens can gain access into the higher
education system. For example, one might find that students who were exposed to
scarce resources at school level did not obtain a matriculation exemption that would
give them access to graduate studies. Equality in such a context of scarce resources
does not imply equal access. In such a context the university may decide to "lower"
its entry requirements to allow students who obtained a school leaving certificate
without exemption an equal opportunity to "compete fairly" for a university
qualification. In this regard Bunting (1994: 2442) claims that 'the rules of access'
have to be made fairer in order to take account of the schooling problems faced by
Black matriculants. He refers to such a situation of equality in the context of scarce
resources as "a function of equality of opportunity". In his words,
... (i)f a resource is scarce, then equity (equality) can exist in a society
provided that all citizens have been able to compete fairly for a share of the
resource. The guarantors of a 'fair competition' would in most circumstances
be transparent competition rules and 'level playing fields' - i.e. rules which
are accessible and open to all, and 'life chances' which are equal. If the
playing fields in a society were not level, then on such a liberal view of
equality of opportunity, redress or affirmative action steps would be justified
(1994: 243).
The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997) contains several references
which suggest that the policy framework is committed to equality as promoting equal
1. The Ministry of Education's commitment to changing the composition of the
student body will be effected through the targeted redistribution of the public
subsidy to higher education. The relative proportion of public funding used to
support academically able but disadvantaged students must be increased.
opportunities as far as access to higher education is concerned. Some of these
references include the statements below.
2. Ensuring equal access must be complemented by a concern for equity goals and
plans for achieving them, using indicative targets for distributing publicly
subsidised places rather than firm quotas.
3. Ensuring equal access must be complemented by a concern for equality of
outcomes. Increased access must not lead to a 'revolving door' syndrome for
students, with high failure and drop-out rates. In this respect, the Ministry is
committed to ensuring that public funds earmarked for achieving redress and
equity must be linked to measurable progress toward improving quality and
reducing the high drop-out and repetition rates.
What the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education alludes to is that
opportunities are not equal and "measures" will have to be taken to increase the
representation of disadvantaged groups in the higher education sector. In essence, the
above points raised regarding the initiation of equality in higher education seems to be
consistent with equal access, resulting in the least transformed becoming more
transformed (at times at the expense of quality), articulated as constituting a
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touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis. This means that for a higher education
system to be equitable it needs to be committed to initiating equal opportunities as far
as access to higher education is concerned. In this way, the idea of equality in higher
education transformation can be connected logically to a reflexive democratic praxis.
Moreover, initiating equality in terms of equal access is itself to be concerned with
what Howe (1998: 214) refers to as an "enabling good" whereby individuals acquire
the knowledge and skill associated with educational transformation; the least
transformed becoming more transformed. Such an understanding of equality is not
necessarily one that involves justifying taking away certain individuals' resources in
order to promote the welfare of others, in this instance, removing resources from
advantaged students to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged. Equal access is used
as an enabling function to ensure "that individuals ... are free to pursue any form of
(higher) education they freely choose" (1998: 203). Equality as an "enabling good"
functions according to what Frankel (1971: 203) refers to as a context in which "the
primary desideratum is developmental, educational, the evoking of potentialities" in
disadvantaged students. And, bearing in mind that a reflexive democratic praxis aims
to initiate equal access aimed at "the evoking of potentialities" in disadvantaged
students, its connection with equality as an "enabling good" seems justifiable.
4.3.2 Accent on development
The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 12) stresses the importance
of development as creating conditions to facilitate transformation of the higher
education system
·.. to enable it to contribute to the common good of society through the
production, acquisition and application of knowledge, the building of human
capacity, and the provision of lifelong learning opportunities.
Thus one finds the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997) accentuates
restructuring and transforming programmes at higher education institutions as
imperative to respond to the human resource, economic and development needs of the
South African society. What is significant to note is that the Education White Paper 3
on Higher Education (1997: 21) also gives an equal priority to equality and
development despite Bunting's (1994) claim that a tension exists between the two
concepts. On the one hand, equality is clearly linked to an equal opportunities model
which emphasises the issue of ensuring that the composition of the student body at
higher education institutions reflects the democratic realities of the broader society,
"even if this is at the cost of removing members of the advantaged group from that
sector of society" (Bunting 1994: 243). On the other hand, Bunting (1994) argues that
the focus of development on, in this sense, "production, acquisition and application of
knowledge, the building of human capacity, and the provision of lifelong learning
opportunities" seems inconsistent with an equal opportunities model since not all
citizens would have access to, for example, lifelong learning opportunities. His
argument is that unlimited rights of access to knowledge production, capacity
enhancement and lifelong learning opportunities would be denied in an equal
opportunities model (1994: 244). My contention is that Bunting's view on the
apparent inconsistency between equal opportunities and development does not hold
water. This is so for the reason that Bunting assumes that advantaged students in the
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• ensurmg that the composition of the student body progressively reflects the
demographic realities of the broader society. A major focus of any expansion and
higher education sector would not gain access to development as if the latter is
exclusively earmarked for disadvantaged students in higher education. In any case the
production, application and acquisition of knowledge, capacity enhancement and
lifelong learning opportunities cannot be reserved only for disadvantaged students as
this would not be compatible with achieving "the common good" of the whole South
African society. However, correcting the inequalities of the past (and perhaps present)
concerning access to and development of disadvantaged students in higher education,
equality and development should at least be "progressively" tilted towards increased
participation on the part of the disadvantaged. Development in this sense is subject to
the condition that disadvantaged students in the first place have to gain access to
higher education institutions. In other words, development of disadvantaged students
to contribute to the "common good of society" contains already in some sense the
possibilities of its subsequent development through knowledge use, capacity
enhancement and opportunities for lifelong learning if the condition of access is
satisfied. Hamlyn (1998: 144) supports this view by claiming that development is
constituted by "conditions that merely make possible the actualisation of the
potentiality that was already there; they are not so much independent and direct causes
of what happens".
In this regard the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 21)
accentuates that the "twin goals" of equal (educational) opportunity and development
can be achieved through:
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equality strategy must be on increasing the participation and success rates of black
students in general, and of African, Coloured and women students in particular,
especially in programmes and levels inwhich they are underrepresented;
• expanding career-oriented programmes at all levels, but in particular, in shorter
cycle (one and two year) programmes at certificate and diploma levels, and in
science, engineering and technology programmes;
• expanding enrolments in postgraduate programmes at the masters and doctoral
levels, to address the high level skills necessary for social and economic
development and to provide for the needs of the academic labour market; and
• expanding the range of programmes and increasing enrolments based on open
learning and distance education, especially for young and older adults, with
particular emphasis on women.
What all the above amounts to is that development, being subject to the condition that
disadvantaged students in the first place have to gain equal access to higher education
institutions, can be linked to the idea of a reflexive democratic discourse. This is so
for the reason that development presupposes the notion of gaining equal access, the
latter regarded as a touchstone of a reflexive democratic discourse.
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4.3.3 Accent on accountability
To be accountable is to be under an obligation to provide a justification for what is
being done (Morrow 1989: 5). Of course the notion of accountability has several
nuances (Vroeijenstijn 1995), but a central characteristic of accountability is that of
providing a justification of "rendering an account" as expressed by Middlehurst and
Woodhouse (1995: 260):
(Accountability involves) that of 'rendering an account' of what one is doing
in relation to goals that have been set or legitimate expectations that others
may have of one's products, services or processes, in terms that can be
understood by those who have a need or right to understand the 'account'. For
this reason, accountability is usually, if not always, linked to public
information and to judgements about the fitness, soundness, or level of
satisfaction achieved.
What the above explanation of accountability implores is that a higher education
system must be able to justify its policies in terms of defensible standards of higher
education policy, what Middlehurst and Woodhouse (1995) refer to as "judgements
about the fitness, soundness, or level of satisfaction achieved". The idea of public
accountability (No. II) prioritised in the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997)
is expressed in the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 13)
compatible with the notion of accountability as justification:
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The principle of public accountability implies that institutions are answerable
for their actions and decisions not only to their own governing bodies and the
institutional community but also to the broader society. Firstly it requires that
institutions receiving public funds should be able to report how, and how well,
money has been spent. Secondly it requires that institutions should
demonstrate the results they achieve with the resources at their disposal.
Thirdly, it requires that institutions should demonstrate how they have met
national policy goals and priorities.
The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education prioritises the relationship
between accountability, institutional efficiency and output or performance indicators
related to student learning and the relevance of learning programmes to "national
policy goals and priorities". On the one hand, accountability as efficiency is based on
the ability of a higher education institution to work to clear objectives and to achieve
value for money such as to develop rolling academic and institutional plans,
improvements in institutional management, the introduction of arrangements for staff
development, appraisal and providing high quality teaching and learning. On the other
hand, accountability is based upon the ability of the institution to deliver what it
promised through its mission statement, programme objectives in relation to
improving student learning experience and developing flexibility to be able to respond
to future change (Harvey & Knight 1996: 73). This idea of accountability in higher
education seems consistent with a touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis, that is,
relevance. This means that higher education policy has been developed according to
compromising understandings which are responsive to the interests of society. For
higher education policy to be publicly accountable, educationists need "to be
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answerable for their actions and decisions not only to their own governing bodies and
the institutional community but also to the broader society" and of relevance to
"national policy goals and priorities". In this way, the idea of public accountability
seems to be logically connected to a reflexive democratic praxis.
4.3.4 Enhancing transformation through quality
The transformation of the higher education system in South Africa from its apartheid
legacy has been facilitated by the National Commission on Higher Education report of
1996, as well as several policy documents in particular the Education White Paper 3
and the Higher Education Act of 1997, the latter currently informing the main thrust
of higher education policy analysis in this chapter. In the first chapter it has been
mentioned that important mechanisms in the formation of higher education
transformation have been established which include a National Qualifications
Framework (NQF), a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), a Council on
Higher Education (CHE) and, in the course of 1999 under the CHEs Higher Education
Quality Committee (HEQC), a Quality Assurance (QA) system which suggests that
the South African government prioritises the achievement of quality in the
transformation of higher education. The Education White Paper 3 (1997: 28) stresses
that
. .. the Higher Education Act will provide for the co-ordination of quality
assurance in higher education ... . The functions of HEQC will include
programme accreditation, institutional auditing and quality promotion. It
should operate within an agreed framework underpinned by:
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• the formulation of criteria and procedures In consultation with higher
education institutions;
• a formative notion of quality assurance, focussed on improvement and
development rather than punitive sanction; and
• a mix of institutional self-evaluation and external independent assessment.
My emphasis is on the notion of "quality assurance focussed on improvement and
development" rather than an elitist concept of quality as the obverse or reverse side of
equality. As has been argued for thus far, the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis
favours egalitarian issues of improvement and development at the expense of an elitist
notion of quality. To consider demands for quality in terms of "improvement and
development" is to be concerned with the predominance of egalitarian demands where
they conflict with an elitist concept of quality. In other words, achieving the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis depends on a complementary understanding of equality
and quality whereby the former needs to be in the ascendancy to kick-start the
transformation process. However, to show how quality in terms of improvement and
development can enhance the transformation process in higher education, I shall refer
once again to the Education White Paper 3 of 1997, in particular to the challenges it
poses for higher education transformation in South Africa.
Quality in terms of higher education transformation has been defined as an increase in
the level of educatedness of people whatever the initial level of their educatedness.
4.3.4.1 Quality as exceptional
However, as has been alluded to earlier, an increase in the level of educatedness of
people whatever their initial level of educatedness is not a sufficient explanation of
what quality means, particularly in terms of higher education transformation. Harvey
and Green (1993) explain quality in terms of higher education according to five
distinct and interrelated ways of thinking: quality as exceptional, as perfection
(consistency), as fitness for purpose, as value for money and as transformation.
Quality as exceptional can be associated with three variations: with the notion of
exclusivity or high class (Pfeffer & Coote 1991), excellence or elitism attainable in
limited circumstances (Ball 1985) and a product which has passed a set of quality
checks or standards (Walsh 1991). In the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 12) the
Ministry of Education considers "ideals of excellence" and the maintenance,
application and evaluation of services and products against set academic and
educational standards, with "a view to improvement, renewal or progress". Such a
view of quality in higher education can enhance transformation, particularly with "a
view to improvement".
4.3.4.2 Quality as perfection
Quality as consistency is aimed at both zero defects whereby faults do not occur
(Harrington 1988: 10) and the fact that things are "done right first time" (Crosby
1984: 13). Such a view of quality does not favour transformation in higher education
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for the reason that people are not fallible and invariably make mistakes as they
formulate their institutions' aims, mission and programmes of study.
4.3.4.3 Quality as fitness for purpose
Quality as fitness for purpose can be related to meeting customer requirements, which
pose a problem for higher education in the sense that the customer, the student for
example, is not necessarily in a position to specify his or her requirements (Harvey &
Knight 1996). But, fitness for purpose as a means of higher education institutions'
responsiveness to the needs of students, employers, government and society fits well
with the transformation process. In this regard, the Education White Paper 3 (1997:
10) links transformation in higher education to "responsiveness to societal interests
and needs", an idea which is also grounded in the notion of accountability:
Successful policy must restructure the higher education system and its
institutions to meet the needs of an increasingly technologically oriented
economy. It must also deliver the requisite research, the highly trained people
and the knowledge to equip a developing society with the capacity to address
national needs and to participate in a rapidly changing and competitive global
context.
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4.3.4.4 Quality as value for money
Quality as value for money ("return on investment") in the higher education
transformation process seems to be compatible with principles of effectiveness and
efficiency as articulated in the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 10):
An effective system or institution functions in such a way that it leads to
desired outcomes or achieves desired objectives. An efficient system or
institution is one which works well, without unnecessary duplication or waste,
and within the bounds of affordability and sustainability. It does things
correctly in terms of optimal use of available means.
4.3.4.5 Quality as transformation
In contrast to equality which is aimed at initiating transformation, quality as
transformation is inextricably linked to improvement and development of processes of
change at higher education institutions, that is, enhancing the transformation
processes in the higher education sector. This makes quality as transformation
complementary to equality, in particular equal access. On the basis of the
complementary relationship between equality and quality, quality as transformation
must clearly focus on enhancing the transformation processes at institutions. Harvey
and Knight (1996: 109) identify four ways in which quality as transformation can
enhance change in the higher education sector. I shall relate these four ways to the
quality assurance framework proposed by the HEQC, below.
• Setting the parameters within which the quality improvement process
takes place.
• Establishing a non-exploitative, suspicion-free context In which a
culture of quality improvement can flourish.
• Establishing and ensuring a process of internal quality monitoring
referred to by the Education White Paper 3 as institutional self-
evaluation.
• Enabling the consistent gathering of relevant evidence to inform
analysis and reflection.
• Disseminating good practice through an effective and open system of
communication, which is emphasised by the Education White Paper 3
as consultation.
• Encouraging and facilitating team working amongst academic and
academic-related colleagues.
1. Continuous quality improvement (CQI) reflects a considered view of academic
management compatible with "new collegialism" or dialogism (a touchstone
of a reflexive democratic praxis) that emphasises the importance of sincerity
and trust, ownership (autonomy), personal commitment (strength of will) and
independence in the management of change (Middlehurst & Gordon 1995).
Management of change according to Harvey and Knight (1996: 110)
comprises seven strategic functions in respect of continuous quality
improvement which in my view embrace several touchstones of a reflexive
democratic praxis:
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• Delegating responsibility for quality improvement to the units that are
going to deliver continuous improvement at the staff-student interface.
2. Bottom-up empowerment is an approach to quality improvement which
requires identifiable teams of academics taking responsibility in working
together to identify quality targets, setting agendas for action and reporting
clearly on intentions and outcomes. It is in such a context that the Education
White Paper 3 (1997: 10) emphasises "co-operation and partnerships in
governance", once again accentuating dialogism (a touchstone of a reflexive
democratic praxis):
Successful policy must reconceptualise the relationship between higher
education and the state, civil society, and stakeholders, and among
institutions. It must also create an enabling institutional environment
and culture that is sensitive to and affirms diversity, promotes
reconciliation and respect for human life, protects the dignity of
individuals from racial and sexual harassment, and rejects all other
forms of violent behaviour.
3. Top-down auditing should operate at two levels: internal audit (institutional
auditing according to the Education White Paper 3) conducted within an
institution on a frequent, comprehensive basis and an external audit referred to
by the Education White Paper 3 as external independent assessment) on a
periodic or irregular basis conducted by a national or regional agency, in the
require clarification of claims made in the auditing report;
require evidence of unsupported claims;
undertake an audit trail of the way the quality assurance process
operates;
• observe teaching;
South African instance, by the HEQC. Harvey and Knight (1996: 115)
proposes that internal auditors would probably:
External auditing aims to assess the quality of provision and the adequacy of
quality procedures and relate them to the institution's self-critical appraisal.
This involves:
The basis for enhancing transformation through quality in the form of external
auditing is not unrelated to equal student access, improved teaching and
learning through distance education, research and community service,
increased student progression, and the greater responsiveness to social and
economic needs. In this regard the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 55)
•
•
•
• examine output from scholarship and research activities; and
• talk to students and other stakeholders.
• assessing whether institutions fulfil their missions;
exploring this might be done better; and
suggesting modifications to the mission in the light of changed
national circumstances of local requirements (1996: 115).
•
•
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stresses that public funding will be conditional on institutions developing
plans for their future development and providing evidence of the progress they
are making to realise these goals.
4. Quality assurance has to be efficient, non-burdensome, rational and effective.
Producing a quality institutional report such as those submitted by higher
education institutions for programme accreditation or three-year rolling
institutional plans, should not "become over bureaucratised (which may) ...
possibly fossilise an informal and dynamic process" (Harvey & Knight 199:
117). On the efficiency and effectiveness of programme accreditation and
three year rolling plans submissions, the Education White Paper (1997: 20)
stresses that each higher education institution needs to clarify
... its institutional mission based on appropriate programme choices
and combinations, as the body of learners diversifies, as the teaching,
research and management profiles become more representative of our
people, as quality promotion and quality assurance processes take hold,
as the institutional landscape changes, as centres of excellence are
recognised and promoted across the system (which would cause) the
distinction between historically advantaged and historically
disadvantaged (to become) ... less and less relevant.
In essence, quality as efficiency and effectiveness in institutional planning and
development seems to be aimed at complementing the predominance of
equality with that of quality through transformation so that "the distinction
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between historically advantaged and historically disadvantaged (students)
becomes less and less relevant".
In sum, quality as transformation, in particular improvement and development, seems
to be an appropriate way to enhance higher education transformation at South African
institutions. This is so primarily as a result of the function of quality as transformation
to be tilted towards enhancing transformation rather than initiating transformation. In
this way, equality through equal access and quality through transformation do not
stand in opposition to each other, but rather constitute complementary processes in
shaping higher education transformation. Also, quality as transformation is a process
which relies heavily on dialogism, mentioned in my explanation of quality as
invoking "new collegialism", "team working", "consultation", "co-operation",
"commitment", "partnerships", and so on. These nuances of dialogism connect
logically with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. Moreover, asserting dialogism
in enhancing higher education transformation through quality is itself a commitment
to collective action whereby people through "strength of will" show determination to
chart out a reflexive democratic praxis.
Thus, first, initiating equality in the transformation process through equal access and
development opportunities for disadvantaged students reinforces the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis. Second, the idea of accountability seems to be logically
connected to a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that for higher education
policy to be publicly accountable, it needs to be answerable to institutional
communities and the broader society, and it needs to be of relevance to "national
policy goals and priorities". Finally, enhancing the transformation of the higher
education sector through quality assurance measures invoking a spirit of dialogism is
compatible with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. And for the reason that
access, relevance and dialogism are considered "touchstones" of rationality (the
general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis), one can now justifiably refer to a
reflexive democratic praxis as that "doing action" which can engender equality,
development, accountability and quality in higher education transformation. It is with
such an understanding of a reflexive democratic praxis in mind that I shall in the next
chapter attempt to show how notions of equal access, relevance and dialogism can
shape what I consider three interrelated practices, namely teaching and learning
through distance education, research and community service. All this is situated
within the move towards initiating equality and development and, enhancing
accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South Africa.
4.4 HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION
A reflexive democratic praxis as has been argued for is shaped by the general
principle of rationality which, in tum, is constituted by "touchstones" - equal access,
relevance and dialogism - that can contribute towards transforming higher education
institutions. But rationality itself is guided by critical, reflexive, ethical and
democratic forms of educational discourse, understood here as praxis to achieve some
morally worthwhile good. Like any other concept, praxis occurs in particular contexts
of meaning making or what has now become common to refer to as "modes of
knowledge production". Therefore to understand how a reflexive democratic praxis
can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community
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• In the economy: knowledge in the form of data, plans, blueprints, patents,
programmes and theories become immediately productive in the sense that it
decreasingly requires labour and machines as intermediaries before it produces
value.
service related to higher education, I first need to expound on current debates about
knowledge production.
Muller (1999: 3) explains the increasing salience of knowledge as a form of symbolic
capital increasingly being organised as the central form of productive capital as
follows.
• In politics and civil society: knowledge of all sorts is increasingly sought by
groups, communities, as well as individuals as they conduct themselves and
pursue their interests in the bewildering complexity of modem civic life.
Recent examples would include contests around desirability of mineral
extraction, land rights claims, abortion, the environment, and so on.
• In private life: knowledge becomes the tool with which individuals negotiate
the complexities of everyday life, from taxation (tax counselors) to unfair
labour practices (shop stewards and human resource personnel); from
relationships (marriage counselors) and diet (nutritional knowledge) to health
and consumption (consumer information agencies).
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By implication the work of knowledge producers and reconfigurers becomes central
to the life of all citizens (1999: 4). I shall now examine two different ways in which
knowledge production can be mapped out.
4.4.1 "Modes" of knowledge production and higher education
As a preliminary I shall briefly refer to the nature of knowledge itself, a concept
central to the discussion of a reflexive democratic praxis at higher education level.
Following Hirst's (1998b: 255) explanation of the nature of knowledge, I deduce that
to acquire knowledge is to become mindful of organised, rational (meaningful) human
experience of the world in "a way otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have a
mind in the fuller sense". What does Hirst mean by structured and rational human
experience? Hirst (1998b: 260) contends that structured and rational human
experience "involves the use of symbols and the making of judgments in ways that
cannot (always) be expressed in words and can only be learnt in a tradition". These
traditions or modes of knowledge include: (1) distinct subdivisible disciplines such as
mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the
fine arts, philosophy and, (2) theoretical and practical fields of knowledge (such as
geography and politics) which are not themselves disciplines or subdivisions of any
discipline and are formed by building together around practical pursuits and rooted in
more than one discipline. It is with such an understanding (that notion which can be
explained in terms of a general principle) in mind that I shall examine these two
traditions of knowledge production, that is, structured, organised and rational human
experience.
·.. a complex of ideas, methods, values, norms - that has grown up to control
the diffusion of the Newtonian model to more and more fields of inquiry and
ensure its compliance with what is considered sound scientific practice. Mode
1 is meant to summarise in a single phrase the cognitive and social norms,
which must be followed in the production, legitimation and diffusion of
knowledge of this kind. For many, Mode 1 is identical with what is meant by
science. Its cognitive and social norms determine what shall count as
significant problems, who shall be allowed to practise science and what
constitutes good science. Forms of practice which adhere to these rules are by
definition scientific while those that violate them are not (1994: 3).
Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott and Trow (1994) distinguish
between two modes (traditions) of knowledge production, namely, "Mode 1" and
"Mode 2". "Mode 1" knowledge production refers to
"Mode 2" in contrast to "Mode 1" knowledge production is articulated by Gibbons et
al. (1994: vii) as follows:
Our view is that while Mode 2 may not be replacing Mode 1, Mode 2 is different
from Mode 1 - in nearly every respect. The new mode operates within a context
of application in that problems are not set within a disciplinary framework. It is
transdisciplinary rather than mono- or multi-disciplinary. It is carried out in non-
hierarchical, heterogeneously organised forms which are essentially transient. It is
not being institutionalised primarily within university structures. Mode 2 involves
the close interaction of many actors throughout the process of knowledge
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production and this means that knowledge production is becoming more and more
socially accountable. One consequence of these changes is that Mode 2 makes use
of a wider range of criteria in judging quality control. Overall, the process of
knowledge production is becoming more reflexive and affects at the deepest levels
what shall count as "good science".
The constitutive features which distinguish "Mode 2" from "Mode 1" knowledge
production as stated above can be considered in more detail in terms of five
categories: knowledge in the context of application (socially distributed knowledge),
transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and organisational diversity, social accountability
and reflexivity, and quality control.
4.4.1.1 Knowledge in the context of application
"Mode 1" problem solving is conducted within a disciplinary context, whereas "Mode
2" problem solving is performed in specific contexts of application. In these contexts
of application, knowledge is negotiated whereby people (educators, students, parents,
communities, academics and other groups) make sense of their own worlds, to
determine their own interests, both individual and collective, and connect their
experiences to relevant social issues.
4.4.1.2 Transdisciplinarity
"Mode 2" transdisciplinary knowledge arises in "a continuous linking and re-linking,
in specific (disciplinary) c1usterings and configurations of knowledge" and therefore it
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(a) transdisciplinary mode consists in a continuous linking and re-linking, in
specific clusterings and configurations of knowledge which is brought together
on a temporary basis in specific contexts of application. Thus it is strongly
oriented towards and driven by problem solving. lts theoretical
methodological core, while cross-cutting through well-established disciplinary
cores, is often locally driven and locally constituted, thus, any such core is
highly sensitive to further local mutations depending on the context of
application.
is "generated in the context of application". Gibbons et al. (1994: 29) argue that
Emerging clusters of trans disciplinary knowledge according to Gibbons et al. (1994:
29) include cultural studies, urban studies, women's studies, and so on, which are not
developed first and applied later (Kraak 1999: 4). It is in this regard that I think
McLaren (1991: 10) makes sense when he claims that "all knowledge is relational and
can only be understood within the context of production, its distributions, and the way
it is taken up by different individuals and groups". Put differently, knowledge does
not comprise a universal, value-free body of facts, independent of the understandings
of people. Rather, it is produced, located and understood within existing social and
cultural formations (Giroux 1999: 17). Hence, Gibbons et al. (1994: 11) explains
transdisciplinarity as "problem solving capability on the move".
4.4.1.3 Heterogeneity and organisational diversity
"Mode 2" knowledge is organisationally diverse and heterogenous unlike "Mode 1"
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which is homogenous, that is, disciplinary knowledge is rigidly institutionalised.
Organisational diversity arises because "Mode 2" is the outcome of "sites of
knowledge production". Located at these sites are temporary teams of knowledge
producers with diverse backgrounds such as academics, production engineers, skilled
craftspersons and social scientists, researchers and so on (Kraak 1999: 14). In other
words, in addition to the traditional university, other diverse sites of knowledge
production may include government and industrial laboratories and research centres,
think-tanks, consultancies and civil society organisations. Gibbons et al. (1994: 6)
refer to such transient clusters of temporary teams and networks as new organisational
forms of "Mode 2" knowledge production:
(Teams of knowledge producers) dissolve when a problem is solved or
redefined. Members may then reassemble in different groups involving
different people, often in different loci, around different problems ... Though
problems may be transient and groups short-lived, the organisation and
communication patterns persists as a matrix from which further groups and
networks, dedicated to different problems, will be formed.
4.4.1.4 Social accountability and reflexivity
"Mode 2" knowledge is produced through engaging people critically and reflexively
in action for the reason that "the issue on which research is based cannot be answered
in scientific and technical terms alone" (Gibbons et al. 1994: 7). Teams of diverse
workers constitute a collaborative group of critical inquiry that links the need for
greater social accountability to the acknowledgement of other viewpoints. They are
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different, yet they intersubjectively share and negotiate patterns of meaning in order to
broaden the conditions for the production of socially relevant knowledge. They
become more reflexive and sensitive to the broad social implications of their work in
varying contexts. In this way, people are self-critical, yet remain socially engaged,
that is, in "constant dialogue" with others (educators, researchers, planners,
community groups, and so on) and other viewpoints to address the most pressing
social (educational) and political problems of their time (Giroux 1992: 20).
4.4.1.5 Quality control
In "Mode 1" the main criterion for judging the quality of knowledge produced is
"peer review". In "Mode 2" additional role players, whether from the university,
research councils, government departments or industry, bring "external criteria" to the
review process. This combination between "peer review" and external merit
judgements in "Mode 2" knowledge production raise questions about social
acceptability, cost-effectiveness, widening of knowledge applicability in a market-
oriented society and about what constitutes "good science". In assessing the quality of
knowledge produced Gibbons et al. (1994: 8) claim the following:
So, the peer review process is one in which quality and control mutually reinforce
one another. It has both cognitive and social dimensions, in that there is
professional control over what problems and techniques are deemed important to
work on as well as who is qualified to pursue their solution. In disciplinary
science, peer review operates to channel individuals to work on problems judged
to be central to the advance of the discipline. These problems are defined largely
in terms of criteria which reflect the intellectual interests and preoccupations of
the discipline and its gatekeepers ... (In "Mode 2") since it is no longer limited
strictly to the judgement of disciplinary peers, the fear is that control will be
weaker and result in lower quality work. Although the quality control process in
Mode 2 is more broadly based, it does not follow that because a wider range of
expertise is brought to bear on a problem it will necessarily be of lower quality. It
is of a more composite, multidimensional kind.
Hence, in "Mode I" knowledge production is sanctioned by a community of
specialists, whereas in transdisciplinary "Mode 2" different criteria are applied in
quality control allowing for experimental planning to deal with uncertainties,
continuous evaluation, and sensitivity to changes in social, economic and technical
environments.
In sum, Gibbons et al. (1994: 6) see the shift to "Mode 2" knowledge production
coherently in terms of knowledge in the context of application (socially distributed
knowledge), transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and organisational diversity, social
accountability and reflexivity, and quality control. The two modes of knowledge
production are related in two ways: Firstly, "Mode 2" is viewed as an outgrowth of
"Mode 1", existing parallel to it without replacing it. Secondly, each mode represents
distinct ways of knowledge production but also interacts in complementary ways.
Drawing on Muller's (1999: 9) critique of the replacement of "Mode 1" by "Mode 2",
I infer that "Mode 1" is orthodox, disciplinary knowledge production which is not
going to disappear but rather which is affected by the "degree and emergence of Mode
2". Instead "Mode 2" knowledge production depends upon a sound "Mode 1"
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disciplinary base (Muller 1999: 9). In this regard he claims that
... (t)he most effective examples of Mode 2 (supplementing Mode 1) are
research projects which configure disciplinary specialists within an
organisational format that produces a knowledge outcome that could not be
produced by one disciplinary input ... (which) should not mean that all higher
education courses (including community service activities) should now
become interdisciplinary, or practical, or skills-based ... (Muller 1999: 10)
In the light of the above explanation of the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge
production, I shall now examine some of the implications of knowledge in the context
of application (socially distributed knowledge), transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and
organisational diversity, social accountability and reflexivity, and quality control for a
reflexive democratic praxis.
4.4.2 Implications of the shift towards "Mode 2" for a reflexive democratic
praxis
Earlier, I argued that a reflexive democratic praxis can be considered "doing action"
which can engender equality, development, accountability and quality related to
higher education transformation. Before I move on to a discussion as to how a
reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning through distance
education, research and community service in higher education, I shall briefly look at
how the emerging shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production strengthens the idea
of a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that "Mode 2" knowledge production is
Before I examine the notion of "promoting the quality of life of its citizens", I first
need to elucidate the idea of knowledge for its own sake in relation to the role of
universities. Rohrs (1995: 15) articulates the view that the university's chief aim is to
unleash forms of speculative inquiry which "lay bare the meaning of the idea and in
so doing to stimulate thinking about its appropriateness and usefulness for the present
day" (my emphasis). In other words, the attitude and way of life in the university
should first be determined by "an emphasis on philosophising as a basic attitude of the
academic mind", that is, emphasising the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. In
a form of knowledge which in my view does not happen independently of emergent
trends in teaching and learning through distance education, research and community
service. My contention is that the notions of access, relevance and dialogism
("touchstones" of rationality) unfold in the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge
production, which in tum reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.
First, the shift from "Mode I" to "Mode 2" knowledge production, that is, knowledge
produced in the context of application characterised by transdisciplinarity,
heterogeneity, organisational diversity and increased social accountability and
reflexivity accompanied by new forms of quality control, has the effect whereby
universities in particular will have to adjust from being adept producers of mainly
disciplinary knowledge to being creative reconfigurers of knowledge in solving
increasingly complex problems (Subotzky 1999: 17). Gibbons (1998: 1) claims that
the pursuit of knowledge only for its own sake seems to have been supplanted by the
view that universities "are meant to serve society, primarily by supporting the
economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens".
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The attitude and way of life in the university should be determined by "a spirit
of scholarship as a principle"; this should bring about, through the medium of
philosophical thinking, that lucidity which can exert a real influence on life. In
spite of all its independence the university cannot remain a "closed world"; it
must rather, as a kind of national academic institution, renew the whole of
public life by recalling the practical knowledge necessary in public life to the
idea of knowledge and scholarship and to the ethical foundations of both.
turn, the attainment of "profound specialised knowledge" can be extended to the
domain of practical knowledge necessary in real or public life (1995: 21). In this way,
the idea of pursuing knowledge for its own sake through "philosophical reflexion" can
be used for the benefit of society. It is in this regard that I agree with Young (1999:
11) when he claims that "some sense of 'learning for its own sake' is essential; always
having to search for the uses of knowledge can be a constraint on learning as it can be
on research". Hence, without rejecting the idea of a university as an institution
striving for intellectual concentration and profundity, university intellectuals can
combine their pursuit of knowledge for its own sake with their civic responsibilities.
In this regard Rohrs (1995: 21) posits the following:
In this way, universities and their academics and / or intellectuals can serve society
through supporting the economy and "promoting the quality of life of its citizens".
My emphasis is on the idea of "promoting the quality of life of its citizens". To my
mind "citizens" include those who attend, do not attend, might / can attend or want to
attend higher education institutions. In other words promoting quality of "citizens"
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• Higher education institutions will no longer remain the supreme provider of both
new knowledge and skills for the reason they must compete with other public and
private institutions.
brings into play the notion of access of students, particularly from the disadvantaged
sector, to universities. As I have argued previously, students first need to gain equal
access to higher education institutions before one can talk of enhancing their quality
and that of the institutions they attend. Bearing in mind that the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis is inextricably linked to initiating equal access and enhancing
quality in a complementary way, the notion of "promoting quality of citizens" within
the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production reinforces the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis. In fact, "Mode 2" knowledge production allows space for a more
diverse student population at higher education institutions due to increased access to
students from the historically disadvantaged sector in terms of class, race and / or
gender factors. Hence, promoting quality through access makes the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis unavoidable.
Second, the shift towards "Mode 2" offers challenges to higher education institutions
summarised by Scott (1995) as follows.
• Socially distributed knowledge emerges as an important source of knowledge in
accredited learning programmes and research as academics and the public come to
disregard the distinction between disciplinary academic knowledge and relevant
knowledge.
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• Programmes of learning will increasingly become modularised to ensure greater
flexibility to society's diverse needs.
My interest is in "Mode 2" shaping learning programmes to be more flexible,
transdisciplinary and relevant to competitive market forces. And, considering that a
reflexive democratic praxis invokes the notion of relevance, the shift to "Mode 2"
knowledge production further reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.
Third, "Mode 2" knowledge production not only makes it possible for different kinds
of knowledge (scientific, technological and industrial) to co-exist, but also increases
the level of co-operation between people located in different institutions. For example,
research scientists, business people, patent lawyers, production engineers, and so on,
develop dialogical partnerships through which they become jointly responsible for
effectiveness of student learning, curriculum development, research and community
development. In this way, the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production lends
itself to what constitutes a reflexive democratic praxis, for the reason that the latter
constantly asserts its bias towards dialogism as a commitment to collective action,
referred to by Gibbons (1998: 54) as the notion of partnership.
In essence, the shift to "Mode 2" knowledge production and its implications for
higher education reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. This is so
primarily because "touchstones" of rationality are harnessed in the context of the
emergent mode of knowledge production ("Mode 2"). I am not suggesting that a
reflexive democratic praxis can operate better if "Mode 2" replaces "Mode I"
knowledge production. In other words, my argument was not for elitist, disciplinary
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To meet both national and community needs a different organisation of
knowledge production than Mode 1 is required. The elements of that
organisation lie not necessarily in the wholesale abandonment of Mode 1, but
rather in the developing of linkages between Mode 1 and Mode 2.
knowledge to be replaced by more democratic and diverse forms of knowledge.
Instead, my contention is that a reflexive democratic praxis could operate better if
practised in a context of meaning making whereby "Mode 2" complements "Mode 1"
knowledge production. This is so for the reason that "Mode 2" competence depends
on a prior disciplinary "Mode I" competence. Gibbons (1998: 54) explains below the
complementary link between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2" knowledge production.
4.5SUMMARY
I used some of the "touchstones" of rationality to show how the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis can contribute towards achieving higher education transformation
in South Africa. I argued that the South African higher education policy framework
concerns itself with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality. The
achievement of these transformative goals can be linked to the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis.
In the next chapter I shall attempt to show how a reflexive democratic praxis can
shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community
service in the context of the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production related to
higher education transformation.
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CHAPTERS
TEACIDNG AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION,
RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall attempt to address the question as to how a reflexive democratic
praxis in terms of the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production can shape
teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service
related to higher education transformation. Thus far, I have argued that the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis is constituted by rationality. Rationality comprises
"touchstones" of which equal access, relevance and dialogism can be considered as
appropriate to guide notions of teaching and learning through distance education,
research and community service related to higher education transformation and the
concomitant shift towards a new mode of knowledge production. In this section I shall
attempt to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards organising
higher education focussing on teaching and learning through distance education,
research (incorporating research-based teaching) and community service. It is my
contention that a more nuanced understanding of these aspects of higher education has
the potential to initiate equal access and development on the one hand, and to
enhance accountability and quality on the other hand.
I shall attempt to show how a reflexive democratic praxis can facilitate access,
relevance and dialogism in teaching and learning through distance education at higher
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education institutions. To my mind, by far the most significant challenge that higher
education institutions face in providing equal access to masses of disadvantaged
students, is the design, development, production and delivery of learner-centred,
quality and cost-effective distance education course materials. El-Khawas (1999: 9)
notes three challenging trends which higher education institutions face in deciding
how they must serve adult learners in a changing environment: (1) the decisions by
many countries to rely on distance education to accommodate growing higher
education provision; (2) unprecedented expansion taking place in the feasible uses of
information and communication technology; and (3) a stronger degree of market
competition with respect to the adult learner. These trends, likely to have an
overlapping effect, indicate that the future holds a new competitive market for serving
adult learners (1999: 9).
It is my contention that a reflexive democratic praxis offers us space not only to
provide distance education (overlapping of course with information and
communication technology) to initiate equal access but also to enhance the quality
(in terms of the relevance of distance education course materials) and dialogical
relationships between educators and learners in the context of teaching and learning at
a distance.
The question however remams: Why is distance education such a significant
challenge which higher education institutions face? A discussion of distance
education invariably brings into focus the notion of lifelong learning. Higher
education and lifelong learning permeate almost all models of the university for the
future (Duke 1999: 25). The term "lifelong learning" grew out of OECD
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), UNESCO (United
Nations Educational and Scientific Cultural Organisation) and similar European-based
intergovernmental agencies at the end of the 1960s in a time of social and economic
optimism (1999: 21). Lifelong learning challenges notions that learning should be
confined to the classroom and "that learning is essentially a pre-experience formative
process controlled purposefully by society if not the State (199: 22). It signals the shift
from elite (or simply academic) higher education to the massification of higher
education concerned with the role of universities to provide equal access to students
(where the rite of passage of the privileged remains recognisable, but of less
significance in comparison with the disadvantaged) and to engage with society in the
construction and application of new knowledge and skills (1999: 25). Teichler (1999:
38) claims that higher education is fairly well-prepared to meet the demands of
"lifelong self-learners" since it fosters questioning, critical and reflective thinking
(reflexivity) and provides primarily the foundations of knowledge for future
professional tasks. Foundations of knowledge usually assume the form of
programmes, for example, degree programme, non-degree programmes, individual
lectures, short courses, or certified advanced programmes at various stages of higher
education (preparatory, advanced, refresher or continuing programmes) (1999: 39).
Through lifelong learning people of all ages who are past the normal age of initial
full-time education can expect to have their broad learning needs met. According to
Davies (1995: 287) these "adult learners" can be categorised as follows: (1)
"Deferrers" or students qualifying for higher education when they were young but not
transferring to higher education shortly after completion of secondary education; (2)
"Second chancers" or students initially not qualifying for entry to higher education
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but turning after some period to higher education (possibly after making use of
second-chance provisions for the acquisition of entry qualification or through special
admission arrangements for adults); and (3) "Returners" or persons having graduated
from higher education and enrolling again after some period (i.e. for professional
refresher courses, advanced academic or professional programmes). Moreover,
lifelong learning is broader than recurrent adult and non-formal education, because it
embraces all learning from that of young people in pre-primary schooling through to
adults (Wagner 1999: 56). However the focus of this thesis is on lifelong learning for
"adult learners".
There is nothing new about lifelong learning taking place in the home. Distance
education universities have multiplied worldwide in recent decades. According to
Duke (1999: 30) "lifelong learning implies approaching universal participation in
post-school education with recurrency throughout life ... (offering) a strong set of
alternative learning opportunities to meet more of the diverse needs of different client
groups to learn at their own time, place and pace" (my italics). In a different way, the
challenge of lifelong learning offers higher education institutions a space for
alternative, flexible learning through distance education (Davies 1995: 287). I shall
now look at distance education as a "mode of delivery" for lifelong learning provision
(Teichler 1999: 39) in more detail, in particular how it links up with concepts
embedded in lifelong learning, that is, teaching and learning.
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5.2 TEACIllNG AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION
I first need to make a few preliminary remarks about the concepts teaching and
learning. To teach, in the standard sense, is to submit one's reasons to the learner who,
in tum, submits them to evaluation and criticism (Scheffler 1998: 259). To send one's
daughter to driving school is not, in itself, to teach her how to drive. So to have taught
someone how to drive is more than to have sent someone to driving school; it is also
to have succeeded in getting someone to do something and to have succeeded in
making someone exercise criticism and judgment. Scheffler (1998: 261) makes the
point that "teaching is engaged in, it is directed toward a goal, the attainment of which
normally involves attention and effort, and provides a relevant definition of success".
Here "a relevant definition of success" can be explained as trying to get someone to
drive, which should be tied to a goal striven for that mayor may not be attained. The
desire to drive has been activated according to someone's "reasoned persuasion and
freely given consent" (1998: 260). In other words, teaching is an activity involving an
attempt to get someone to learn something, and it does not preclude the learner from
asking questions such as "How?" and "Why"? If I relate such an explanation of
teaching and learning to higher education, then one cannot simply argue that offering
disadvantaged students equal access to universities is in itself to teach them. Teaching
requires educators to reveal their reasons to students, for example, through distance
education course materials, and by doing so, to submit them to students' critical
reflection and reasoned judgments. In this way the idea of a reflexive democratic
praxis can be invoked in both students and educators.
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More specifically, Kember (1998: 8-9) categorises several conceptions of teaching:
conceptual change / intellectual development, facilitating understanding, student
interaction, transmitting structured knowledge and imparting information. These
categories hold much promise for teaching and learning through distance education
couched under the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis.
• Conceptual change / intellectual development involves establishing an
interpersonal relationship conducive to learning (Dunkin 1990), facilitating
understanding through engagement with content and process (Ramsden 1992)
and supporting student learning (Samuelowicz & Bain 1992).
• Facilitating understanding offers learners opportunities to explore ways of
understanding (Dall'Alba 1991) and to develop independence in learning
(Dunkin 1990).
• Student interaction is aimed at motivating and encouraging active student
learning (Martin & Balla 1991).
• Transmitting structured knowledge helps students to acquire teachers'
knowledge (Prosser, Trigwell & Taylor 1994) and to organise content and / or
procedures (Ramsden 1992).
• Imparting information involves transmitting and presenting information
(Dall'Alba 1991).
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Regarding learning, Entwistle (1998: 74) distinguishes two approaches to learning:
deep approach and surface approach. On the one hand, a surface approach to learning
expects learners to cope with the course requirements. Learners study without
reflecting on either the purpose or strategy of the course, treating the course as
unrelated "bits of knowledge" which have to be memorised routinely. Students
(learners) find it difficult to make sense of new ideas presented. On the other hand, in
a deep approach to learning, students relate ideas to previous knowledge and
experience, looking for patterns and underlying principles. They examine logic and
argument critically, checking evidence and relating it to conclusions. They are
actively interested in the course content.
To my mind, the above categories of teaching seem to be compatible with a deep
approach to learning. A deep approach to learning seems reconcilable with the idea of
a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that the main aim of praxis is to
encourage learners in "bringing an understanding to mind" (Entwistle 1998: 74). In
this regard, learning is concerned with insight into the subject, as well as new ways of
thinking about the world. In a different way, teaching should facilitate learners in
actively developing and constructing meaning and their own understandings of what
is being learned (Tang 1998: 103). This idea of teaching is averse to all learning that
smacks of rote learning only. It rejects the technicist view of higher education that has
been dominant in South Africa for some time that epistemological issues are value-
free and not socially constructed. Such a technicist view of teaching focussed on the
transmission of knowledge from one person to another, thus emphasising the passive
acquisition and regurgitation of knowledge (Usher, Bryant & Johnstone 1997: 10).
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In addition, teaching and learning at higher education institutions is driven by both
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Ward 1995: 31). To improve teaching and learning
for its own sake is the guiding principle, which may represent intrinsic motivation.
Most active and voluntary participants in the process of improving their teaching at
universities and colleges in the developed countries such as the United States, Britain,
Australia and European countries were doing so in order "to get better" (1995: 31).
Rewards of promotion, tenure and salary increases are considered extrinsic reward
structures, which may encourage educators to improve "teaching" (O'Connell 1983:
668). What I want to illustrate with this explanation is that any process of
development (in this case improving teaching and learning) is driven by internal or
external motivations. In other words, what we do is driven by our reason for acting in
a particular way. In this case, our reason for acting depends on what we consider as
quality teaching and learning.
Ramsden (1992: 9) posits that the "key to improving teaching is changing the way in
which the process of education is conceived by its practitioners". The question arises:
How should distance education be conceived in order to improve teaching? Research
has shown that in order to improve teaching we need to focus on learning (Angelo
1994: 4; Knapper 1995: 70). Ramsden (1992: 6) accentuates this link between
teaching and learning as follows: "To teach is to make an assumption about what and
how the student learns; therefore to teach well implies learning about students'
learning". I shall now dip into a brief historical interlude of what distance education
means and how it can be shaped by "touchstones" of a reflexive democratic praxis.
• First generation correspondence study / single media characterised by printed
materials and study guides sent by mail from lecturers / tutors at correspondence
colleges to students. Students were given assignments, essays, letters or a reading
list with a set of sample questions which correspondence tutors marked.
5.2.1 Evolutionary trends in distance education
Like all concepts distance education has a history. And to understand why the concept
is used the way it is used, one has to make reference to its historical context. Moore
and Kearsley (1996: 19-20) classify the development of distance education according
to three generations:
• Second generation multimedia distance education characterised by the use of
"one-way" media (predominantly print, television and radio broadcasting,
teleconferencing and cassettes) with the "two-way" communication still being
provided by correspondence tutors, or face to face tutorials. During this generation
the first open universities appeared (The University of South Africa - Unisa,
1946, the British Open University, 1969, Korea National Open University, 1972,
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia - Spain, 1972, Universitas
Terbuka - Indonesia, 1984, Indira Ghandi National Open University, 1985).
• Third generation distance education and tele-education emerged in the 1990s
based on the use of electronic information technologies such as
telecommunications, computer confereneing networks and audio and video
conferencing.
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It denotes the forms of study not led by teachers in the classrooms but
supported by tutors and an organisation at a distance from the student.
This description of distance education emphasises its outward delivery modes and
does not give us the distinctive meaning of distance education, that is, that which
makes distance education what it is. To explain what is meant by the distinctive
meaning of distance education, considering the different terms used to denote it -
such as "correspondence study", "independent study", "external study" and "home
study" (Keegan 1990: 29), I draw on Steward's (1981: 1) description of distance
education:
From the above, I deduce that the meaning which distinguishes distance education
from other forms of education is that the former occurs at a distance between teacher
and student. Literatures on distance education reveal many "definitions" on what may
constitute distance education:
• Distance education may be defined as the family of instructional methods in
which the teaching behaviours are executed apart from the learning behaviours,
including those that in a contiguous situation would be performed in the learner's
presence, so that communication between the teacher and learner must be
facilitated by print, electronic, mechanical or other devices (Moore 1973: 664).
• The term "distance education" covers the various forms of study at all levels
which are not under the continuous, immediate supervision of tutors present with
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their students in lecture rooms or on the same premises, but which, nevertheless,
benefit from the planning, guidance and tuition of a tutorial organisation
(Holmberg 1977: 9).
• Distance education (Fernunterricht) is a method of imparting knowledge, skills
and attitudes which is rationalised by the application of division of labour and
organisational principles as well as by the extensive use of technical media,
especially for the purpose of reproducing high quality teaching material which
makes it possible to instruct great numbers of students at the same time wherever
the live. It is an industrialised form of teaching and learning (Peters 1993: 206).
Distance education theorists like Moore (1973), Holmberg (1977) and Peters (1993)
concur that the separation of teaching and learning activities is central to what
distance education is (Keegan 1990: 37). The idea of separation between teacher and
student (educator and learner) is inherent in the work of Holmberg (1989) and Moore
(1991). For Holmberg (1989: 43) the separation between learner and educator is
grounded in a "two-way" communication process and a guided personal didactic
conversation between both participants.
Moreover, Moore (1990: 12) views distance education as "a family of transactions
between teachers and learners". For him, these "transactions" include two dimensions:
First, dialogue and structure, and second, learner autonomy (Moore, 1990: 10-11).
The idea of "dialogue and structure" (what I consider as dialogism) as one dimension
grows out of the works of Wedemeyer (1971). Dialogue refers to the extent to which
the learner and educator respond to each other in relation to the content of subject-
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matter studied, educational philosophy of educator, personalities of educator and
learner, environmental factors and medium of communication. Structure expresses the
responsiveness or relevance of educational objectives, teaching methodologies, and
evaluation measures of the distance education programme to the needs of the learner
(Wedemeyer in Moore, 1990: 10). For purposes of this thesis, I focus on the notion of
dialogue for the reason that in a dialogical relationship between educator and learner
at a distance, the educator needs to adapt the distance education programme to the
individual needs of the learner.
Second, learner autonomy describes the extent to which in a distance education
programme the learner determines objectives, implementation procedures, and
resources and evaluation (Moore 1990: 13). In other words, autonomy depicts the
extent to which learners exercise responsibility over the learning process. The upshot
of this "transaction" between educator and learner is that teaching and learning cannot
be improved if the self-understanding of both educator and learner is not invoked in
the teaching / learning process.
Dialogue and learner autonomy are central to the quality, that is, relevance of teaching
and learning at a distance. I shall describe some of the notions of dialogue and learner
autonomy to make sense of the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis leading to
improved teaching and learning. In chapter two I have already expounded on the
notion of dialogism as a logically necessary condition for rationality, the general
principle of a reflexive democratic praxis. I now need to say more about dialogism for
the reason that, in getting distance education course materials to focus on access and
relevance, the idea of dialogism becomes unavoidable.
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5.2.2 Dialogue
To say that dialogue is "determined" by content of subject-matter, educational
philosophy, personalities, environmental factors, medium of communication and
learners' individual needs, does not clarify the meaning of dialogue. Dialogue is often
mistakenly equated with discussion. Following Schein (1993), discussion often leads
to dialectics, which results in a debate and resolution that is usually accomplished by
beating down the opposition (1993: 42). Instead, dialogue is a
creative process in which entirely new ways of thinking and acting will
emerge. Dialogue is a space of deep thinking, where there is nothing to
prove, where well-worn ways of thinking and being can be let go of. In
a dialogue there is nothing to be solved and nothing to be defended
(Isaacs in Qualters 1995: 50).
Two important philosophical aspects constitute the notion of dialogue. Firstly, if
nothing in a dialogue needs to be "solved" and "defended", then the potential of
confrontation is ruled out. In this way, the possibility for politeness and mutual trust is
enhanced in order to arrive at new ways of thinking and acting. Secondly, dialogue as
a "creative process" implies that the procedure lends itself to an ever-evolving process
of deep thinking and the free flow of meaning, "where there is nothing to prove". A
notion of dialogue between educator and learner as espoused above can bring about an
improvement of the teaching / learning process at a distance in the following ways:
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• Mutual trust and politeness in the dialogue between educator and learner at
a distance implies that educators have to expand their self-awareness in
order to engender new ways of thinking and acting such as developing
greater empathy and sensitivity to the concerns of learner needs.
• The dialogical process of a free flow of meaning between educator and
learner underscores both agents' commitment to co-operative learning. The
educator and learner at a distance establish a level of intimacy and comfort
in order to acquire a sense of each other's perspectives and interests.
Hence, improving the relevance and quality of teaching and learning at a
distance lies in the implementation of a dialogical process. This dialogism is
underscored by an acquisition of educators' self-awareness to engender
empathy and sensitivity to the concerns of learners, as well as a sense of each
other's perspectives regarding learning styles, teaching methods, academic
preparation and student resources.
5.2.3 Learner Autonomy
I want to explain the idea of learner responsibility towards the learning process, that
is, a matter of exercising learner autonomy. Moore (1993: 20) makes a claim for
learner autonomy whereby learners engage intellectually with the content, interact
with the course developer in the forms of the conversational writing styles in the study
guides, give feedback on in-text activities or assignments, and include a variety of
media. When learners interact responsibly and intellectually in the learning process,
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they exercise a great deal of "self-direction" (Moore 1990: 11), what Dearden (1998:
272) refers to as "finding out as opposed to (just) being told".
Moreover, I want to extend Moore's view of learner autonomy being associated with
"self-direction". I contend that "self-direction" should also include an element of
critical reflection whereby learners become aware of the assumptions which underlie
the learning process, reflect on them, and then question whether or not they are valid
(Qualters 1995: 49). In this way, learners' assumptions can be transformed to "new
ways of thinking and acting" (1995: 49).
Moreover, critical reflection demands that both educators and learners at a distance
"take the risk to challenge ideas and explore new conceptions and perspectives"
(Anderson & Garrison 1995: 197). Therefore, the process of improving the quality of
teaching and learning at a distance should be subjected to the integration of
"information acquisition, critical reflection and critical discourse" (1995: 198). In this
way, the idea is challenged that distance education programmes should only stress the
importance of pre-packaged self-instructional materials without encouraging learners
to reflect critically about their learning and to pursue an interactive social distance
education discourse (1995: 138-139).
It is with this in mind that Anderson and Garrison (1995: 197) state the following:
Distance education models which are based upon one-way media such
as educational television, computer managed instruction, or text books,
cannot be expected to facilitate a community of inquiry and, thus, will
be less likely to provide opportunities to think critically. While some
introductory and well-defmed courses will emphasise the presentation
of basic information ... some opportunity should be provided to support
critical discourse and the development of a community of inquiry.
In essence, a teaching / learning environment which creates space for learner
autonomy to prevail where the critical self-awareness of both educator and learner is
invoked has the potential to promote and attain quality. In this way, a reflexive
democratic praxis can be associated with the idea of learner autonomy for the reason
that both practices consider achieving quality and relevance as paramount to the
teaching and learning process.
This leads to a discussion as to how a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute
towards producing distance education course materials, which allow space for access,
relevance and dialogism at higher education institutions.
The prevailing milieu of many higher education institutions fosters isolation and
independence and not interaction and team-orientation (Kinsella 1995: 110). This
means that higher education practitioners (academics, educators, researchers,
scientists, course material developers, etc.) too often work alone in their offices and
struggle independently with course design decisions and dilemmas. Novice and
veteran higher education practitioners may even feel that to actively seek advice on
course design and development is admitting a lack of competence and a potential
threat to their professional status. The unfortunate result of this highly personal and
subjective notion of distance education is that critical decisions about teaching and
163
learning stem from "solitary reflection rather than mutually enriching dialogue with
informed, trusted, and respected ... (distance education) practitioners" (Kinsella 1995:
110). For this reason it is imperative for higher education institutions to create
structures for continuous collegial support as to facilitate pedagogical improvement. It
is here that a reflexive democratic praxis may be considered helpful to engender a
spirit of dialogism in distance education course materials design, development,
production and delivery.
Dialogism as has been explained in this chapter and chapter two refers to a "non-
judgemental" process of dialogue and collaborative interaction between colleagues (in
this instance, distance education practitioners). This dialogue can occur in dyadic,
tryadie or team partnerships in "an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidentiality and
support, where colleagues feel it safe to experiment, fail, reflect, solicit help, revise,
and return to the classroom (or course design process) to try again" (Kinsella 1995:
112-113).
Central to a dialogical partnership related to improving teaching and learning at a
distance, and hence, reinforcing a reflexive democratic praxis, are three stages: pre-
design planning period with the establishment of design criteria; designing of course
materials; and post-design evaluating period. Before I examine these stages of course
design, I shall briefly explain what I understand by course design, which has become
known as instructional design or instructional systems design.
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5.2.4 Instructional systems design
According to Johnson (1989: 3) instructional design (ID) involves organising and
"using tools of the mind and tools of learning, to improve the conduct of education
and training ... (it) involves thinking creatively about teaching and learning".
Moreover, Johnson (1989: 4) claims that ID "provides a set of tools that allow us to
maximise individual learning potential ... (and) to meet learner needs". Kember and
Murphy (1995: 4) hold that ID not only transmits knowledge and knowledge
structures, but also is aimed at accomplishing conceptual change in learners.
ID is "a creative, flexible, dynamic process; it is not rule-dependent, but fluid and
responsive (relevant) ... an evolving (adaptable) discipline" (Johnson 1989: 14). That
ID is a creative, flexible, dynamic process suggests that its foundations are not derived
from any single discipline, but rather "call on a wide range of perspectives on learning
and human behaviour as well as how that information can be creatively combined
within a broader social and organisational context" (Johnson 1989: 6). Other common
"definitions" of ID include
• a process by means of which the best instructional methods are selected to teach
given outcomes under set conditions (Reigeluth 1983: 23);
• the process of specifying conditions for learning with the purpose to create
strategies and products at the macro level, such as programmes and curricula, and
at the micro level, such as lessons and modules (Seels 1995: xi); and
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• a set of procedures to guide authors in the evaluation, analysis, design, production,
and implementation oflearning environments (Tennyson 1995: 113).
What is common to all these explanations is the understanding that ID is a strategy or
procedure which uses certain tools to improve teaching and learning.
Historically, the fields of behavioural, developmental, social and cognitive
psychology contributed to a set of learning theories for ID. For behavioural
psychologists in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, controlling the learning environment
through reinforcement, contingency management and behaviour modification became
central to many learning theories. Behavioural psychology has influenced ID by
contending that learning is a change of behaviour (Johnson 1989: 6). Although
behaviourism has provided some guidance for complex mental tasks such as
synthesis, analysis and evaluation, it considered the learner and learning as passive
(Johnson 1989: 6). Developmental psychologists like Piaget regarded learning as
active and thus posed a direct challenge to the behaviourists. In the words of Kember
and Murphy (1995: 100), "learners are not empty vessels waiting to be filled with
knowledge. Rather, they approach each learning task with a set of personal beliefs,
motivations, and conceptions about the subject area and about knowledge itself'.
In addition, Gardner (in Johnson 1989: 8) holds the view that multiple intelligences
that call on different skills need to be considered in ID. Also Sternberg (in Johnson
1989) proposes that a "triarchie theory of human intelligence" be considered in ID
practices. For Sternberg, the contextual subtheory specifies how intelligent behaviour
adapts to and guides an existing environment; experiential subtheory proposes that
learning is influenced by the degree to which prior experiences can be applied to new
situations; and componential subtheory suggests that underlying cognitive structures
determine learning and intelligence.
During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the domain of ID became underscored by
instructional systems design (lSD), that is, a systematic process of practising ID.
Tennyson (1995: 113) identifies four generations ofISD which have evolved over the
past few decades. Firstly, phase one uses the non-adaptive linear method of design to
offer generic solutions to all situations. Four distinct, consecutive steps were used,
such as preparing behavioural objectives, designing a pretest, producing the
instructional programme and designing a post-test. First generation lSD uses a
formative evaluation loop between the four components. During first generation lSD,
the design of instruction was in the hands of the educator or subject content expert.
Secondly, in second generation lSD, the use of systems theory is expanded to that of
employing a flowchart to control and manage instructional design. And, although
ISD-2 is focused on the development of the product, it remains difficult to adapt to
specific problem situations. Second generation lSD uses the sequential flowchart
procedure of:
• establishing goals, objectives and preparing pre- and post-tests;
• analysing the target audience;
• reviewing and selecting existing materials;
• preparing the instructional product;
• selecting instructional delivery; and
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• implementing instruction.
Moreover, in second generation lSD, summative evaluation (final report on the
quality and effectiveness of the product) supplements formative evaluation (the
evaluation of the course design and development process while it is being carried out)
after the process with behavioural theory as its learning foundation.
Thirdly, the proponents of third generation lSD use an iterative procedure within four
linear phases to take into account specific application needs and constraints. The four
phases associated with third generation lSD are as follows:
• assessment, which involves analysing the needs/problems of situation, student
profiles, constraints, resources, and risks and to develop a project plan;
• design means preparing and evaluating goals / objectives, learners, a delivery
strategy and prototype;
• producing materials for instruction and management; and
• implementing a quality instructional and management system.
In third generation lSD, a feasibility evaluation (determining the scope of a possible
lSD effort) is done in the initial assessment phase to help determine the level of
resource need and allocation as well as being employed in deciding how to proceed:
that is, to adopt or adapt existing products, or to develop new products. In addition to
formative and summative evaluation done during the design and production phases
respectively, a maintenance evaluation (an on-going assessment of a product to
evaluate continued employment) is done during the implementation phase. In
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addition, the extension of lSD into a complex process of multiple steps and layers has
shifted the design to "highly trained technicians" who, unlike most subject content
experts, can do more than just following a static set of procedures. In third generation
lSD both the subject content expert and technician participate in authoring. By the
1980s cognitive psychology became the preferred learning theory for third generation
lSD.
In fourth generation lSD (which in my view embraces nuances of a reflexive
democratic praxis), a dynamic and flexible system relevant to the demands of a given
situation. The implementation of a given system design implies the use of processes
for a specific designing situation (Gagné, Briggs & Wager 1988: 12). As lSD had
developed over decades, the relatively simple linear method of design evolved into the
flowchart method, followed by a linear set of phases and eventually the more
complex, recursive and dynamic process of instructional systems design.
Fourth generation lSD employs technologies from the field of system dynamics. It
uses what is referred to as a problem solving approach. Instead of using a rigid set of
abstract or expert controlled procedures, ISD-4 proposes "systems of explicit rules
dynamically controlled by contextual or situational problem solving evaluations"
(Tennyson 1995: 121). Unlike the first three generations oflSD where the problem is
assumed to be understood at the start and where instructional design can then proceed
along a defined plan, ISD-4 allows for adjustments to the process as variables and
conditions change over time. It would not be necessary with ISD-4 to start with
written objectives, for example. This lSD model uses two main components: a
situational evaluation and a knowledge base component containing several lSD tools.
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• learner characteristics such as educational background, age, ability, need for
motivation, present_skill levels, number of learners, geographic location,
accessibility to resources and culture; and
learner differences in cognitive style, aptitude, learning style, perception, language
ability, and so on (Tennyson 1995:124).
I shall now discuss various tools (lSD strategies) which have been used in these four
generations of lSD under the following headings: (1) analysing your learners, (2)
proposing your distance education package, (3) establishing your lSD team, (4)
designing / structuring your course, (5) using access devices, (6) delivering your
package, and (7) evaluating your programme. In this way, I hope to clarify how lSD
can engender access, relevance and dialogism ("touchstones" which constitute a
reflexive democratic praxis) in course materials design, development, production and
delivery.
1. Analysing your learners: The development of distance education materials is
underscored by educators' sensitivity to the concerns of learners, that is, ensuring
relevance and access. Parer (1994: 243) claims "we need to approach open and
distance learning with a clear philosophy and pedagogy that places the learner in
the centre of the process". When analysing the learner population, educators
(course developers) gain information about the following:
•
Profiling the perceived learner population can be done through reflecting on
previous experiences of learners, consulting colleagues or student services
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bureaux, meeting prospective learners and negotiating with them as to what they
would want from the course, and sending a questionnaire to prospective or past
learners in order to elicit information from them (Rowntree 1994: 43). Analysing
one's learners is premised on the recognition that interaction between teacher and
learner is important and that the teacher, through analysing the learners would be
in a position to envisage the knowledge and content to be learnt (Pratt 1992).
2. Proposing your distance education package: After the learner analysis has been
completed, educators need to propose a solution plan such as whether to buy and
use existing distance education materials, modify existing materials, or develop
new materials. They also need to estimate the costs and resource requirements of
each option (Tennyson 1995: 124). Whether one intends using any of the options
mentioned, one still needs to decide on the nature of the distance education course
materials, that is, the distance education package. Distance education packages
can generally be categorised into three types:
• Wrap-around packages: Distance education course materials are developed
around existing educational resources, for example, textbooks. The "wrap-
around" course materials support and provide a medium for communicating
the envisaged subject content to learners. Such a distance education package
can be developed in less time than stand-alone packages, but not always at a
lower cost for learners, particularly if international textbooks are prescribed.
Also, texts may not always be contextually relevant.
• Stand-alone packages: All course materials are provided to learners which
include only study guides which may be supported by video cassettes, audio
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cassettes, interactive satellite communication or face-to-face tutorial sessions,
as well as textbooks. These packages are very time-consuming and expensive
to develop. However, course developers have more control to adapt the
specified learning content to the needs of learners.
• Hybrid packages: These distance education packages integrate both elements
of "wrap-around" and "stand-alone" packages. For example, a course may
comprise a study guide wrapped around a prescribed textbook, supported by a
reader and interactive satellite tutorial sessions (Rowntree 1994: 44).
3. Establishing your lSD team: Course development for distance education requires
team orientation and not isolation and independence (Kinsella 1995: 110).
Establishing a team to develop distance education course materials involves a non-
judgmental process of dialogism (open communication and collaborative
interaction) between distance education practitioners. As has already been
mentioned, this dialogue can occur in dyadic, tryadie or team partnerships in an
atmosphere of mutual trust, confidentiality and support, where distance education
practitioners feel it safe to experiment, fail, reflect, solicit help, revise, and return
to the course development process to try again (Kinsella 1995: 112-113).
Moreover, teamwork also encourages the habit of self-initiated reflection on the
part of colleagues about their professional practices (Costa & Garmston 1994: 25).
Self-initiated reflection implies that course developers accept that their practices,
and the motives for those practices, should be critically reviewed and analysed,
and then pursue ways to actively improve or change their practices (Killen 1995:
125). In this way, teamwork allows for the challenging of ideas and improving
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shared practices between course developers of the same and different institutions;
a matter of practising a reflexive democratic praxis.
The emphasis team orientation places on "internal" values such as "trust",
"confidentiality", "support" and "reflection", suggests that it may be considered a
source of intrinsic motivation for participating in course development. Hence,
course developers bonded through teamwork are inner motivated persons whose
professional values move them to seek the rewards intrinsic to materials
development regardless of the institutional policies that support that effort
(O'Connell 1983: 662). Moreover, team-orientation does not merely mean
interaction. One may find that a team comprises the most talented academics,
writers, editors, academic development specialists and multimedia experts. These
course developers co-operate and participate in the course design process. This
brings us to a brief discussion of the various role players that may constitute a
course development team, discussed below.
• Course co-ordinator: Possesses expertise in the field of distance education. The
co-ordinator is often mandated by the faculty / department to organise and manage
the course or programme to be developed. The co-ordinator facilitates negotiation
between course developers regarding content, didactical approach, mode of media,
learner evaluation procedure, intended purpose and goal articulation of the course,
time schedules and estimated costs for design, development, production and
delivery of materials.
• Academic author(s): These role players possess specialist knowledge of the course
to be developed. They generate the academic learning material in accordance with
the negotiated course development plan.
• Critical reader(s): These role players mayor may not have specialist knowledge
of the course to be developed. They are not involved in the development of the
course materials. They specifically scrutinise the developed materials for
coherence, learnability and learner accessibility. Critical readers may also
unbiasedly evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion,
that is, performing a summative product evaluation.
• Editor(s): Editors are integral members of the team. Their roles are not only
confined to language editing, but includes looking at issues such as cultural
sensitivity, sexism, racism, bias, readability and learner accessibility, especially in
relation to second language users.
• Instructional designer(s): Conceptualise learning opportunities for a specific
course and in collaboration with mainstream academic authors embark on a
continuous, recursive and ever-evolving process of course design within the
parameters of a negotiated "mind-map" which incorporates educational
framework of thinking, student intake, resources, curriculum structure and aims.
The instructional designers do this in addition to an agreed-upon course outline,
that is, units of content, time allocation to content, sequencing, continuity, pacing
and methodology for each unit, assessment methods and feedback procedures
(Luckett 1996: 40). Their roles are crucial in leading all role players to establish
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collegial trust and open communication to facilitate the improvement of the
quality of course materials.
• Graphic designers: They are primarily responsible for the formatting, style sheet,
page layout and display characteristics, for example, graphics, text, colour, icons,
marginal notes, etc. of the DE course materials.
Ideally an lSD team comprises members who are multi-skilled. For example, an
instructional designer can also be a person with specialist subject knowledge of
the developed course.
In essence, establishing an lSD team seems to be reconcilable with the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that teamwork or dialogism is
considered a "touchstone" of its general principle.
4. Structuring your course: Structuring your course involves a design phase
whereby course developers:
• define the organisation or sequence of the knowledge through course, module
(section), theme (topic) and units (sub-topics or lessons);
• establish authoring activities, for example, using initial outlines and concluding
summaries, headings arid subheadings, expounding on concepts, defining key
vocabulary, addressing the target group, using proper syntax, structuring
paragraphs, generating visual interest through good page layout, using access
devices (table of contents, course map, glossary and index, including self-
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assessment activities, promoting independent learning through guidance and
feedback, using graphic aids such as pictures, maps, graphs and charts);
• specify goals and objectives of what learners should be able to do after completing
a course or module or theme or unit in terms of verbal information, intellectual
skills, contextual skills, cognitive strategies and creative strategies;
• identify and determine learner entry knowledge, that is, background knowledge,
prerequisite knowledge and prior knowledge; and
• define the learning environment in terms of available resources, learner workload
and possible constraints.
Gagné, Briggs and Wager (1988) developed a set of instructional procedures that
could be used to structure, for example, a unit of a distance education course:
• gaining learners' attention through the use of good layout, accessible writing
style, graphics and stimulating questions;
• specifying the objectives of the course materials;
• integrating learners' prior learning experiences with newly developed activities;
• stimulating learner interest by introducing problem-oriented activities in the text;
• providing advice and coaching to learners through the use of self-evaluation
exercises and progress checks; and
• assessing learner performance through pretests, post-tests and retention tests.
Hence, there exists a logical relationship between the significance and utility of
instructional procedures (strategies) adopted by academics / educators and the fact
that learning should be student-focussed (Trigwell et al. 1994; Gow & Kember
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1993). This notion of using instructional procedures to make distance education
course materials relevant to and accessible for learners is compatible with a
reflexive democratic praxis.
5. Using instructional devices: Instructional devices are invariably used in
distance education texts to make the course materials accessible and learnable for
learners, referred to as "good" teaching in distance education. Using access or
instructional devices adequately in distance education texts is what distinguishes
distance education from contact forms of teaching. Some of the main instructional
devices used in distance education texts include objectives, advance organisers,
graphics, pretests, overviews and self-directed activities in the text.
• Objectives are interspersed throughout the text and provide a means to orientate
learners towards the intended goals of the course, direct learners to what should be
learned, and provide criteria for learner assessment (Gagné, Briggs & Wager
1988).
• Advance organisers are concepts, ideas and learning experiences used to initiate
learners in "advance" into higher cognitive learning tasks than the information to
be learned (Ausubel 1960). Introducing in "advance" higher cognitive learning
tasks in distance education texts provides learners with a frame of reference as to
what they do not know and what learning and skills need to be acquired.
Graphics such as diagrams, charts and visuals can be used by learners to establish•
links between relevant concepts to be learned in the text.
• Pretests are administered before learning tasks are introduced in the text to
increase learners' awareness of what is expected of them, and to orientate them
178
towards studying the distance education course material (Hartley & Davies 1976:
248).
• Overviews (summaries) guide learners through the distance education text. They
are at the same cognitive level of the material to be learned and facilitate learners'
access to the course material (Marland & Store 1982).
• Self-directed activities in the text can be included with the aim to contribute to
learners' understanding and development, as well as assisting them to complete
assignments (Lockwood 1995: 202).
6. Delivering your package: During the situational analysis and design phases
consideration needs to be given to selecting appropriate media to make distance
education course materials available to learners. Print, audio / video, radio /
television, teleconferencing, video conferencing, computers, face-to-face tutorials
and interactive satellite communications or combinations of these different types
of media can be used to make distance education available to learners. Careful
consideration should be given to factors such as learner accessibility, costs, time
of delivery and organisational efficiency in selecting the type of media to be used.
Often, learning materials have been well-designed, but failure in the delivery
system to deliver them on time to the students prevented the latter from obtaining
them when needed (Robinson 1994: 185). This failure of quality can be attributed
to
a combination of poor records system, lack of specified time for dispatching
materials after receipt of registration information, lack of a monitoring system
and unclear designation of responsibility for checking performance ... the late
production of the materials, created by late hand over by writers ... infrequent
communication and lack of co-ordination between the staff teaching the course
(1994: 186).
7. Evaluating the distance education programme: Participants need to conduct their
own course evaluations on the basis of a two-fold collaborative approach,
discussed earlier.
• Through a process of formative evaluation course teams should solicit statements
from colleagues or conduct focus group interviews with students regarding course
outlines, teaching methods, and other steps taken to improve course materials.
Student piloting in particular is necessary to improve the quality and contextual
relevance of distance education course materials. This needs to be an ongoing,
collaborative process of interaction and monitoring based on trust between course
developers in relation to producing quality course materials.
• An unbiased summative evaluation procedure of course materials (evaluating the
efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion, that is, product evaluation)
also needs to be pursued by administration and management involved in
improving learning at a distance as to ensure quality distance education.
Researchers who have not been directly engaged with the design and development
of the distance education materials can complete the evaluation of the final
product (Holmberg 1989: 173).
What the above explanation of lSD indicates is that if distance education course
materials are developed according to dynamic and flexible procedures, such materials
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1. Pre-design planning: In a reflexive democratic praxis during the pre-planning
period, relationships between course developers are shaped in relation to an
educational vision in terms of which course design, development, production and
delivery processes are negotiated. Now bearing in mind that the improvement of
teaching and learning at a distance is underscored by teachers' sensitivity to the
concerns of their students such a vision can be made explicit as follows.
can provide greater access, relevance and dialogical space for students engaged in
learning through distance education at higher education institutions. In this way, lSD
can be considered as reconcilable with the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis. To
further show how a reflexive democratic praxis can shape distance education course
material design, development, production and delivery, I refer briefly to three stages
of development.
• Course developers, as has been mentioned earlier, profile the perceived
target (learner) population. This can be done through reflecting on
previous experience of learners, consulting colleagues or student services
bureaux, meeting prospective learners and negotiating with them as to
what they would want from the course, and sending a questionnaire to
prospective or past learners in order to elicit information from them
(Rowntree 1994: 43).
• Dialogical research of content, didactical approach, mode of media and
learner evaluation procedure on the part of course developers and
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prospective learners. Course developers reflect together on the intended
purpose and goal articulation of the course.
• Negotiation between course developers regarding time schedules and
estimated costs for design, development, production and delivery of
materials.
2. Designing the course: A reflexive democratic praxis demands that all participants
(mainstream academic staff, instructional designers and other consultants /
advisors) design "bits of courses" collaboratively in groups. In doing so, they have
to consider the different steps which are involved in the design, sequencing of
these steps, and the evaluation of each other's course design (Luckett 1996: 39)
following the agreed-upon criteria of "quality" course materials which encourage
the development of critical reflection on the part of learners. As colleagues, the
course developers embark on a continuous, recursive and ever-evolving process of
course design within the parameters of a negotiated "mind-map" which
incorporates educational framework of thinking, student intake, resources,
curriculum structure and aims. This is done in addition to an agreed-upon course
outline, that is, units of content, time allocation to content, sequencing, continuity,
pacing and methodology for each unit, assessment methods and feedback
procedures (1996: 40). Dialogical course designing, as exemplified above, leads
participants to establish collegial trust and open communication to facilitate the
development of course materials - a practice which is attuned to a reflexive
democratic praxis.
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3. Post-design evaluating period: According to a reflexive democratic praxis
participants need to conduct their own course evaluations on the basis of a
dialogical approach. Through a process of formative evaluation (the evaluation of
the course design and development process while it is being carried out) course
teams, through a process of soliciting statements from colleagues regarding course
outlines, teaching methods, and other steps taken to improve teaching and
learning, can modify and improve their course materials. This needs to be an
ongoing, collaborative process of interaction and monitoring based on trust
between course developers in relation to producing quality course materials.
Moreover, an unbiased summative evaluation procedure of course materials
(evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion, that is,
product evaluation) also needs to be pursued by administration and management
involved in improving teaching and learning at a distance as to enhance quality.
In essence, a reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning with
reference to distance education in such a way that results in distance education course
materials becoming more leamer-centred, relevant and of better quality. Also,
distance education seems to be an appropriate form of teaching and learning which
can address issues of equal access, development, accountability and quality in the
sense that lSD offers a procedure to develop course materials which are accessible,
relevant, accountable and of quality.
It is my contention that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards initiating
equal access and development, as well as enhancing accountability and quality
through the use of lSD procedures that can effect leamer-centred, flexible distance
The use of well-designed learning resources, with which students can interact
at an appropriate pace, enables academic staff to shift their emphasis away
from lecturing towards curriculum and course design, tutor training,
assessment, quality assurance and promotion .... If implemented successfully,
this approach should enable academic staff to lead and direct well-designed
learning environments for larger and more heterogenous groups of students.
education materials. In this regard the National Commission on Higher Education
(NCHE 1996: 23) report states the following regarding distance education:
In the Glossary of the NCHE (1996: 273) report, the following definition of distance
education course materials, more specifically resource-based learning, is given:
The increasing use of a variety of media, methods and mechanisms to meet the
different needs of learners in a rapidly changing educational situation, with
diminishing dependence on face-to-face communication, and growing reliance
on well-designed interactive study material, the implementation of computer-
based and audio-visual instruments and programmes, and diversification in the
manner and location of educational guidance and support offered to learners
by teachers (a notion signaling the increasing collapse of the traditional sharp
distinction between contact and distance education).
Implicit in the above definitions of resource-based learning is the general principle
which opens up possibilities such as the use of "well-designed interactive study
materials" and other educational resources "to meet the different and divergent needs
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A flexible, leamer-centred approach to (higher) education, seeking to increase
access to educational opportunities by removing all unnecessary barriers to
learning ... involves using the full spectrum of available resources to ensure
of learners in a rapidly changing educational situation". My claim is that
"diversification" and "variety" in the provision of educational resources and support
offered to learners by educators, as well as academic staff "shifting their emphasis
away from lecturing towards curriculum and course design, tutor training, assessment,
quality assurance and promotion" to cater for "heterogenous groups", fall in line with
the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis. These significant shifts in
higher education policy towards providing "good" teaching and learning not only
offer the key to what is meant by resource-based learning, but also focus the concern
of higher education towards meeting the imperatives of equal access, development,
accountability and quality. In other words, egalitarian and quality-based practices
such as having a diverse approach to higher education, providing learner support for
heterogenous groups, enhancing quality, using a variety of educational resources,
meeting diverse educational needs, preparing for the widest possible range of learners,
can initiate access and development, as well as enhancing accountability and quality
in relation to teaching and learning in the higher education sphere.
Examples of a reflexive democratic praxis are designing flexible courses to meet the
requirements of different and divergent needs, removing barriers that prevent access
to courses, and using a leamer-centred approach to increase the dialogue between
educator and learner at a distance. The NCHE (1996: 272) report defines such an
approach to teaching and learning as follows:
184
185
quality and cost-effectiveness in meeting diverse educational needs, including
preparation of the widest possible range of learners for lifelong learning.
Unfortunately, not all practices at higher institutions in South Africa meet the criteria.
The NCHE (1996: 120-121) report points out that although the extent of the distance
education infrastructure in South Africa is impressive, efficacy, relevance and cost-
effectiveness leave much to be desired. The NCHE enumerates (1) low throughput
and completion rates in science and technology programmes, (2) ineffective single
mode correspondence-type distance education, (3) inadequate tutorial and learner
support structures at regional and national centres and, (4) subsidy arrangements
which do not encourage leamer-centred education. Consequently, the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis that can organise teaching and learning in ways which
provide access, development, accountability and quality seems to be plausible in a
context of higher education transformation in South Africa.
Finally, it is not in the interest of this thesis to investigate problems such as ineffective
distance education which hampers student access to quality course materials, the lack
of a leamer-centred philosophy in courses, a lack of embedded student support within
study guides, etc. which occur at higher education institutions. I shall refer briefly to
the provision of distance education in South Africa in order (drawing on 1996
statistics originally compiled by the South African Institute for Distance Education,
SAIDE) to give some idea as to the number of institutions faced with the enormous
challenge of bringing distance education in line with the imperatives of a reflexive
democratic praxis. I acknowledge that many institutions might already be in the
process of transforming their teaching and learning, more specifically distance
• The University of South Africa (Unisa): It became a fully-fledged correspondence
university in 1946. Unisa is currently the largest university in South Africa with
128454 students registered in 1996 - 49,1% African, 38% White, 3,9% Coloured
and 9% Asian - with 3040 employees (1393 teaching and research staff and 2066
non-teaching). In 1996 most of Unisa's students followed study programmes in
Arts, with 29 862 in language; 13 090 in humanities; 48 505 in social science; 40
797 in economic and management sciences; and 5 969 in science and technology.
Courses are mostly print-orientated and offered through study guides (mostly
stand alone and wrap-around guides which accompany textbooks) and tutorial
letters, while audio cassettes are distributed for many subjects. Student support
structures in the form of learning - with the exception of the Eastern Cape - and
satellite centres are established in the Western Cape, Northern Province,
Kwazulu/Natal, Northern Province and the Eastern Cape. Unisa also has 475
examination centres worldwide.
education programmes. Also, many distance education colleges offering teacher
education have since been incorporated into technikons or other institutions.
Notwithstanding these developments, I shall briefly summarise distance education
under the following categories:
• Technikon South Africa (TSA): Established in 1980 as a facility of Technikon
Witwatersrand it became an autonomous institution in 1993. In 1996 it had 85039
students, 360 academic and 917 non-academic staff members. Of its 1996 student
enrolment, 48.9% were enrolled in Law, 31.4% in Business, 11.6% in Social
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Sciences, 4.4% in Science and Technology, 2.4% in Language, and l.3% in
Education.
• Technical College of South Africa (Technisa): Technisa is a technical college for
distance education and offers courses in engineering, business and social fields of
learning. In 1996 it had 8 650 students, 42 academic and 40 administrative staff.
lts main campus is in Randburg with satellites in Pretoria and Cape Town.
• Vista University: Initially enacted in 1981under the Department of Education and
Training to investigate the university needs of urban Africans, it began its first
academic year in 1983 to provide education for people in urban areas. In 1996 the
university operated through seven contact tuition campuses at Mamelodi,
Bloemfontein, Sebokeng, Soweto, Port Elizabeth, the East Rand, and Welkom. lt
had 19 341 registered students in 1996 for degree, diploma and certificate
programmes in Education, Arts, Economic and Management Sciences, Law and
Science. In addition the university has the Vista University Distance Education
Campus (VUDEC) in Pretoria that focuses solely on upgrading underqualified
teachers through distance education. In 1996 the university had a total of 1 689
staff members.
• Private Distance Education Colleges: The Private Distance Education Colleges
are financed privately. They offer secondary school courses, vocational /
professional courses and non-vocational/hobby courses. There are four main
colleges: Damelin Correspondence College, INTEC College, Rapid Results
College and South African National Private Colleges with an enrolment of well in
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excess of 100 000 students and which own Lyceum, Success and Mentor
Colleges.
• Residential Universities and Technikons: Several residential universities and
technikons are increasingly offering distance education in addition to their
traditional "contact" study programmes. Some of these institutions include the
University of the Western Cape, University of Natal, the Medical University of
South Africa (MEDUNSA), Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher
Education, Rand Afrikaans University, University of Cape Town, University of
the Free State, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Pretoria, University
of Stellenbosch, Peninsula Technikon, Mangosuthu Technikon, Technikon
Northern Gauteng, Eastern Cape Technikon and ML Sultan Technikon.
In essence, teaching and learning through distance education creates possibilities for
higher education institutions to engage students in personal and collective interaction
with learning tasks embedded in particular learning contexts. These possibilities of
teaching and learning not only drive the distance education course materials, how
students learn, and how educators teach through materials design and development,
they also have a great impact on initiating equal access and development and,
enhancing accountability and quality. Initiating access and development through
teaching at a distance may contribute to increasing the level of students' learning, that
is, ways of experiencing and understanding the world around them. Enhancing
accountability and quality has necessarily to do with students experiencing something
in a new way, becoming aware of other ways of experiencing and arriving at "a fuller,
richer" understanding of these ways of experiencing (Marton 1998: 198). In this way,
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teaching and learning through distance education seems compatible with the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis.
5.3 RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE
A reflexive democratic praxis within the context of the emergent "Mode 2" form of
knowledge production and higher education transformation places an increasing
demand on the roles universities need to chart out to meet the imperatives of equality,
development, accountability and quality. Before I move on to a discussion of the roles
of academics at universities in relation to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis, I
shall first offer a few remarks about a "Mode I" research university. Research in this
instance refers to developing or producing knowledge which contributes to our
individual and collective understanding of the world and new ways of seeing things in
the world (including seeing our own experiences) (Marton 1998: 184-185). In a
different way, research is seen as ways of experiencing and understanding the world
around us "oriented towards the knowledge to be gained or the object about which
knowledge is to be gained" (1998: 196). The research university is anchored in the
traditional arts and science disciplines and has a programme of instruction that
"moves from the basic principles of these disciplines to the most specialised levels"
(Cummings 1998: 1). Knowledge production at the research university is formal and
coded according to canonical rules and procedures of academic disciplines often
isolated from real-world problems (Gibbons 1998: 56). Some more typical
characteristics of the "Mode 1" research university can be summarised as follows.
• Instruction is conveyed in year long traditional disciplinary courses taught by
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personnel with life-long appointments.
• Research organisation is layered on top of the academic teaching programme.
• Decentralised choice of research agenda whereby individual personnel determine
their research objectives and then seek grants from public sources to fund their
work (Cummings 1998: 1-2).
• Conventional norms of academic freedom, critical reflection, peer-review
evaluation, rewards and curiosity-driven research exist (Subotzky 1999: 6).
The research university with its life-long appointment of most of its personnel relies
on public and state-supported funding. However, the decline in economic growth led
to the reduction of subsidies to public research universities. This impetus together
with wastes in university budgets, deceptive practices in overhead accounting,
inadequate instruction provided by graduate assistants while full-time professors
spend their time on personal projects, brings into question the legitimacy of the
traditional research university (Cummings 1998: 1). This brings me to a discussion of
the roles of academics at higher education institutions, in particular universities.
5.3.1 The role of academics
The roles of academics are numerous. Gordon (1997: 67) enumerates a range of roles
which can be assumed by academics: teacher, scholar, practitioner, demonstrator,
writer, model, discoverer, inventor, investigator, designer, architect, explorer, expert,
learner, developer, collaborator, transformer, facilitator, enabler, evaluator, critic,
assessor, setter, guide, colleague, supervisor, mentor, listener, adviser, coach,
counsellor, negotiator, mediator, juggler, manager, leader and entrepreneur. These
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diverse functions of academics can be unified into those of research, teaching,
integration and application (Boyer 1990) or collegial, managerial, negotiating and
developmental (Gordon 1997:67). Combining the views of Boyer (1990) and Gordon
(1997), with a reasonable degree of generality these roles of academics can be
narrowed down into four core functions: research, teaching, management and service
(Gordon 1997):
• Usually academics as researchers have acquired higher degrees and / or developed
research interests (1997: 74). These academics "systematically trained in research
in their own higher degrees studies" (Kogan, Moses & El Khawas 1994) cultivate
their research through various developmental initiatives, university teaching
qualifications and teachingjournals.
• Generally academics are expected to perform several managerial roles
individually, in teams, and in collaboration with those responsible for education
provision for cohorts of students. In all probability most academics acquire
additional managerial roles such as supervisors of research students, managers of
research projects, curriculum developers, members of committees, chairs of
committees, consultants, etc. (Gordon 1997: 73).
• Literature on effective teaching and learning abounds. Colling (1994:2) suggests
that an effective teacher in higher education demonstrates subject expertise,
awareness of developments in the teaching of their subject, understanding of how
students learn, the systematic use of a wide variety of teaching methods, a
capacity to reflect upon his / her practice, a willingness to develop himself /
1. A project to empower communities to address the current problem
surrounding the perpetual plight of street children.
herself, effective planning of teaching sessions and courses / materials, skills in
course review and evaluation of student learning, expertise in a variety of
assessment methods, awareness of diversity of student population, understanding
of equitable practice and ability in providing examples of learning for students.
Additional perspectives on the effective teacher in higher education are that they
act as "creators and facilitators of high technology learning materials" (Williams
& Fry 1994: 48), "reflective practitioners" (Martin & Ramsden 1994), and
educational developers within departments / programmes (Gibbs 1996).
• Service roles can include activities within the institution and for the institution, as
well as those for the discipline or profession and for the external community,
usually learners from formal, non-formal and informal education settings, policy
analysts, teacher educators and trainers in business and industry (Gordon 1997:
74). These service activities can take the form of "rudimentary research projects"
in the community. Several such projects in the South African context are
described below.
2. A project where support is provided to disadvantaged schools focussing on
teachers of mathematics and science and their language abilities in these fields
(as well as the general quality of teaching through the development of
managerial and government capacity in schools).
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3. A programme that aims to establish alternative ways of dealing with strife and
friction within and between communities and to teach children how to resolve
conflict.
4. A problem-centred approach to mathematics teaching and learning aimed to
assist and support educators in their professional development so that
conceptual growth can take place in learners and key mathematical abilities
are developed.
5. A project which makes available a number of tried and .tested educational
activities designed to supplement school curricula in especially the natural
sciences, and to help teachers to use features of the immediate environment to
teach the principles of environmental education.
6. Literacy for life skills project which aims to improve the quality of life of a
community (CENEDUS 1998: 2-6).
The above project roles, which could be occupied by academics, accentuate the view
that community service can co-exist with teaching and research. In all the six projects
mentioned above, project participants at the Centre for Education Development of the
University of Stellenbosch (CENEDUS) cultivate their research through various
education development initiatives as in the roles of managers, consultants, facilitators,
reflective practitioners and developers. In this way, service does not necessarily have
to rank below teaching and research, but can be integrated equally with the latter two
roles. This view is evinced by Kogan et al. (1994: 70) for whom the "core functions
of academic staff are teaching and research, complemented by service to the
institution, to the professions, and to society". The literature in the field of academic
workloads consistently suggests that the main tasks of academics include teaching,
undertaking research and serving the community (BerrellI998: 78).
In essence, community service cannot merely be conceived as "part of good
citizenship" for the reason that many of the academic personnel (like the CENEDUS
staff) are in fact providing service integrated with reasonable research and teaching. In
fact, this integration of service with teaching and research on the part of higher
education practitioners complies with the idea of a lifelong learning perspective
whereby university academics can perform the following functions:
(1) bridge the divide between secondary and higher education. All those secondary
learners who might aspire to study at university level can be encouraged by
academics to do so. Academics could provide them substantial and highly
accessible information about study opportunities, career options and to think about
(on the part of higher education practitioners) adapting programmes, teaching and
learning to student needs and interests; and
(2) foster closer co-operation with the business sector in programmes, teaching and
learning via student projects, part-time educators from business and industry and
learning organised at work sites (Wagner 1999: 61).
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5.3.2 Challenges to higher education institutions
As has been alluded to earlier, the increased pressures on the funding of higher
education together with major challenges could impact upon the preparation and
development of academics at universities not merely to be effective managers,
teachers and researchers, but also providers of efficient community service. Gordon
(1997: 76) posits that the major challenges to higher education systems are likely to
include:
• providing greater flexibility in educational provision;
changing modes and methods of teaching;
equipping students to handle an uncertain employment market;
resolving the tension between research and teaching;
efficiently using new technologies for effective learning;
reconciling the tension between institutional competition and collaboration;
re-articulating and assuring standards in more diverse mass systems of higher
education;
meeting the challenges of providing for life-long learning;
recruiting, motivating, rewarding and developing all employees;
reconciling globalisation and localisation (the international world of knowledge
and/or servant oflocal communities);
addressing equity and ethical issues; and
acting strategically whilst responding tactically to short term fluctuations.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The above-mentioned demands of the future also require that higher education
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• build contextually on learners' existing frames of reference;
• be learner-centred and experiential;
• be value adding;
• develop attitudes of critical inquiry and power of analysis; and
• prepare students for continued learning in a world of technological and cultural
change (CHET 1998: 4).
programmes in South Africa should become diverse and educationally transformative.
These programmes should:
To ensure the above, a changing South African higher education system should be
constituted by a broad range of functions: "the realm of higher knowledge by
sustaining scholarly and scientific practices, the generation of higher knowledge
through research activities across a spectrum from discipline-driven research through
strategic research, applied or applications-driven research to product-related research,
and the dissemination of higher knowledge through systematic programmes of
teaching and training, including continuing education and other forms of community
service" (CHET 1998: 4). Central to such a changing higher education system is the
notion that research, teaching and community service should be integrated in all of its
programmes. The upshot of this is that service at higher education levels should be
integrated with research and teaching. In this way, the university may shift away from
breeding only academics whose teaching and research are far removed from the
education-related developments in their communities. Berrell (1998: 78) argues that
universities' core resource will remain their academics and their teaching and research
expertise, but there needs to be a shift "to a dispersed community of life-long
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learners". In a different way, academics should possess a specialist knowledge base,
autonomy (both teaching and research) and a service orientation (Eraut 1994). Hence
academics should be committed teachers, researchers and service providers.
I want to flesh out the concepts of research and community service more clearly using
"Mode 1" and "Mode 2" forms of knowledge production in order to make the
argument for their integration more plausible. Thereafter a conceptual model of
community service will be developed.
5.3.3 The supplementary relationship between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2"
.Service is a relatively ambiguous concept in the higher education lexicon (Cummings
1998: 1). On the one hand, various parts of universities' administration have come to
describe their work as service, for example, health and social services, student
services, international student services, library services, information technology
services, maintenance services, nursery services and academic development services.
On the other hand, academic personnel in faculties provide services to external
communities which may include running hospitals that help people, legal services,
services to local schools, conducting programmes of continuing education to meet the
needs of working adults, and other community activities such as those which address
the plight of the homeless and street children.
The view of community service articulated in this thesis focuses on the integration of
research at universities and its application in the community. In other words,
community service means that universities should not be disengaged from the real
... (t)he most effective examples of Mode 2 (supplementing Mode 1) are
research projects which configure disciplinary specialists within an
organisational format that produces a knowledge outcome that could not be
produced by one disciplinary input ... (which) should not mean that all higher
education courses (including community service activities) should now
become interdisciplinary, or practical, or skills-based ... (1999: 10).
problems in society, but rather, should open up possibilities, through research, for
greater social relevance - a matter of "Mode 2" supplementing "Mode I".
The question arises: What view of community service can be engendered by the
supplementary relationship between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2" forms of knowledge
production? Drawing once again on Muller's (1999: 9) critique of the replacement of
"Mode 1" by "Mode 2", I infer that "Mode 1" is orthodox, disciplinary knowledge
production which is not going to disappear, but it will rather be affected by the
"degree and emergence of Mode 2". Instead "Mode 2 knowledge production depends
upon a sound Mode 1 disciplinary base" (Muller 1999: 10). In this regard he claims
that
In the light of this, community service initiatives must integrate theoretical,
disciplinary based knowledge with practical, problem-oriented and transdisciplinary
knowledge to become more responsive and relevant to current social, economic,
political and environmental problems. For community service, transdisciplinarity
involves problem-oriented research programmes which develop the necessary basic
(theoretical) skills to apply knowledge in a socially distributed, applications-driven
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"Mode 2" way (Gibbons 1998: 56).
The supplementary relationship between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2" knowledge
production clearly points to the value of linking research and community service. The
literature in the field of such a definition of community service suggests that the
concept should be coupled with academics' roles as teachers and researchers (Berrell
1998: 78; Ladd & Lipsett 1976). Generally teaching (which I consider as a form of
research) includes time spent on lecturing, conducting tutorials or workshops,
developing course material, marking assignments, consulting with students, writing
and marking exams, and attending meetings (Berrell 1998: 78). Research per se
includes time expended in identifying a problem, designing a procedure or instrument
to address the problem, collecting and analysing data, and presenting or publishing the
findings (Berrell 1998: 80). Community service usually takes the form ofproject work
that draws on the considerable experience of academics in research (CENEDUS
1998). In this regard Gibbons (1998:55) argues that the challenge for research
universities is to
. .. use their Mode 1 resources to extend their capabilities by means of
programmes of collaboration in which the sharing of resources is central. This
effort at extension will draw these universities into the distributed knowledge
production system, focus their attention on the needs of their communities,
direct their efforts to understanding of local and national complex systems,
and, in the end, create a new culture of teaching and research - with relevance
built in!
For example, a rudimentary mathematics service project for learners in the foundation
phase relies overwhelmingly on the research findings as well as teaching experience
of its core team. In this way, a link: exists between academics as community service
providers and their roles as researchers with a teaching function using both "Mode 1"
and "Mode 2" knowledge production (CENEDUS 1998: 8). In fact, time devoted to
community service in the mathematics programme co-ordinated and implemented by
CENEDUS, includes conducting workshops for the training of educators, developing
flexible course material, problem resolution and data analyses - all pragmatic
activities which constitute the notions of teaching and research under discussion. In
essence, to pursue community service may invariably integrate key dimensions of
research grounded in problem-oriented and theoretical knowledge, that is, "Mode 2"
and "Mode 1". The value of integrating teaching, research and community service at
universities has the potential "to improve the lives of the underprivileged communities
through provision of practical services, and infusing the curriculum with greater
relevance through a focus on current social, economic, political and environmental
problems" (Subotzky 1999: 19).
However, I am by no means suggesting that "Mode 2" should be predominant over
"Mode 1" knowledge production. My argument is for "Mode 2" supplementing
"Mode 1". The claim that universities should carefully move towards becoming
"service" institutions does not imply that they should abandon their status, what
Morrow (1998: 393) refers to as "constitutive institutions". In other words, the
business of universities should not be to serve primarily as "all-purpose welfare
agencies for society" such as industrial training schools, prisons, hospitals, mental
asylums, armies, art galleries, and so on (Morrow 1998: 393-394). Rather, universities
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should constitute the public space in which the shared interest for higher knowledge
or "Mode 1" academic practice can be pursued in the light of "standards of
excellence" in order to fulfill their function as service institutions through the use of
higher knowledge "deeply embedded in the traditions of disciplined thinking" (1998:
394) supplemented by "Mode 2" socially distributed knowledge which would enhance
their service purpose to the common interest of society.
The question arises: What does the above explanation of the roles of academics and /
or educators at higher education institutions have to do with a reflexive democratic
praxis? A reflexive democratic praxis shapes the practices of higher education
practitioners in such a way whereby they can "adjust from being adept producers of
(mainly disciplinary) knowledge to being creative reconfigurers of knowledge in
solving increasingly complex (social) problems" (Subotzky 1999: 19). In other words,
the roles of academics as researchers and teachers should also shift to that of serving
society, primarily by "supporting the economy and promoting the quality of life of its
citizens" (Gibbons 1998: 1). In this sense the disciplinary-based research roles of
academics have been challenged by a more pragmatic role of community service
provision which calls for the production of socially relevant "Mode 2" based
knowledge. The above-mentioned research based projects also draw upon the
collaborative actions of private donors, local communities, diverse disciplinary based
academics, education department officials, teachers, learners and members of the
corporate sector. This is a central feature of "Mode 2" knowledge production whereby
universities which "intend to practice research at the forefront of many areas, are
going to have to organise themselves ... to become more open, porous institutions,
more aggressive in seeking partnerships and alliances that they are currently"
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(Gibbons 1998: 10). In this way the roles of academics in a climate of "Mode 2"
knowledge production seems to be compatible with the idea of a reflexive democratic
praxis.
5.3.4 A conceptual model of community service
What should a conceptual model of community service guided by the idea of a
reflexive democratic praxis look like? In the context of the afore-mentioned
discussion regarding the inextricable link between research, teaching and service, I
want to propose a conceptual model whereby it is possible to combine a university's
responsibility to protect the free search for knowledge and its implementation
(through teaching), with an active involvement to put research results into practical
use (through service). By transforming research results into practical use through
service initiatives, universities would remain higher education institutions which
acknowledge curiosity and wondering as legitimate reasons for conducting research.
At the same time, it gives teachers and researchers the possibility to try out new ideas
or challenge commonly accepted truths through service functions, that is, giving the
research results a practical and socially relevant implementation.
Implementing the service function of universities would also increase the chances to
receive funding from external sources. The financial constraints faced by South
African higher education institutions necessitate the taking of initiatives to create new
revenue. In this regard, the service function of universities, without interfering in what
teachers and researchers choose to research, can also facilitate finding new sources of
funding. Moreover, "going service" without threatening research and research-based
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teaching, would make universities even more sensitive to the rest of our societal
system whereby academics and researchers would be encouraged to do research on
topics of great interest for the South African nation. In the words of Perold (1998: 2)
"community service in higher education has the potential to contribute to the
reconstruction and development goals of the new government".
A strong community service ethos emerged in South Africa during the 1980s
(Subotzky 1999: 19). Several community service programmes at universities such as
Pretoria, Free State, University of the Western Cape, Natal and Stellenbosch provide
evidence of the integration of teaching and research within a community service
setting (Subotzky 1999: 17). Some faculties at many universities have developed
apparatuses to manage service. However, in line with international trends, the general
lack of an administrative instrument at central level is the main hindrance to enabling
faculties to take up profitable service activities (Tjeldvoll & Holtet 1998: 27).
Universities need apparatuses in their own structures to take care of service functions.
Such a central administrative apparatus would also enable a university to be capable
of taking responsibility for its own financing. To be sensitive to the service needs of
the various sectors of communities, including industry and business, may give new
impulses to stimulate creative thinking in research and teaching within many
universities.
A conceptual model of community service for South African universities should
articulate the role of service as an integral function that cross-cuts the traditional
activities of teaching and research but they should also shift their focus outward to
external communities. Such a conceptual model of service may be constituted by the
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following key elements which link up with nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis:
• Vision: Any university needs to formulate a rationale for service that not only
outlines the increased need for service, but also the potential value for all
concerned and how this activity relates to the mission of the institution. For
example, the service movement at the University of Stellenbosch is in its infancy,
being nurtured at a number of faculties. The Centre for Education Development at
the University of Stellenbosch (CENEDUS) is located in the education faculty.
The Centre's vision statement, adopted in 1998, clearly states that its fundamental
aspiration is to become a centre of excellence for education development:
"CENEDUS provides support for education development through the
implementation and development of leading edge, relevant projects. These include
teaching, research and service to the education community. lts mission is that of
enhancing service by integrating it with teaching and research; responding to and
contributing to educational change; developing contextually sensitive and relevant
material resources and providing training; identifying and creating opportunities
towards optimising the potential of learners and educators; making available
academic expertise; conducting and applying research; fostering collaboration
with other parallel service providers within and outside the university". A
rationale that fits with the particular university setting is the most crucial
constituent element ofa conceptual model for service (Cummings 1998: 2).
• Context: Faculties of education, engineering, business, law, medicine, dentistry
and agriculture seem to have the greatest potential for service in South Africa.
But, there may be untapped possibilities through 'outreach' in other faculties that
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can enrich the teaching and research functions.
• Leadership: Critical in the promotion of service is the commitment of the highest
levels of leadership of an institution in consistently and persistently emphasising
the role of service (Cummings 1998: 4). Public speeches can be bolstered by
incentives such as a Rector's award and competitive grants to induce faculties and
other units to place greater emphasis on service.
• Consensus: Service initiatives designed by administrators external to service
departments within faculties and other units at a university may promote service.
However, these initiatives may lead to ad hoc activities unless they gain the
support of faculties and, even better, encourage service units to design their own
plans. In either instance, the advancement of service at universities depends on an
effective response to those who question the value of this emphasis. Possible
responses are (1) that service tends to enrich the traditional roles of teaching and
research, and (2) that service need not be for everyone nor need it be a daily
preoccupation but rather can be phased in and out as individual agendas change
(Cummings 1998: 4).
• Structural support: Inducing faculties and staff to participate in service activities
are difficult if the prevailing personnel rules do not reward such activities. Thus
supporting change, it is crucial that faculties redefine work loads and tasks so that
involvement in service can be traded off with involvement in teaching and
research. For such trade-offs to be fair, it is necessary to develop a metric by
which service efforts can be measured (Cummings 1998: 2).
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• Finance: Service offices within and independent of faculties at the University of
Stellenbosch generate and retain control over considerable external revenue. Yet
service providers such as CENEDUS still require funding for co-ordinating and
administering service activities partially due to low-level external funding of
projects. It is the challenge of university leaders to decide how much is an
investment in service units and thus can be charged from other sources and how
much needs to be generated as revenues in the short run. Over the long run, it can
be hoped that service will pay for itself as research and teaching does. But to get
from today to the long run there inevitably has to be a certain level of start-up
investment funding (Cummings 1998: 6).
• Partnerships: To achieve the ideal of integrating teaching, research and
community service, universities should engage in partnerships with the greater
community. Braskamp and Wergin (1998: 87) claim, "through partnerships, the
research and instructional (teaching) agenda can be intricately connected to the
communities outside the academy". In this way, through community service
integrated with teaching and research, academic epistemology ("Mode 1"
knowledge) is linked with social responsibility and accountability. Universities
through partnerships shape their social relationship with society, being responsive
while retaining their "core purposes and standards" (1997: 89).
How universities deal with the above conceptual underpinnings of service will
determine the outcome of the service agendas of South African research universities.
Community service in the context of this thesis calls for the co-existence of "Mode 1"
• an over-subscription of humanities and social sciences programmes coupled with
insufficient enrolments in science and technology;
• a dearth of applied and developmental research geared to meeting South African
needs and solving South African problems; and
• the highly variable quality of teaching and research, with scarce resources
invested in programmes of dubious relevance and worth.
and "Mode 2" forms of knowledge production by which universities can directly
serve social development. Most institutions in South Africa identify community
service "as part of the universally recognised function of the modem university,
namely, teaching, research and outreach" (Subotzky 1999:15).
Of course, strong academic environments tend to attract the best researchers and the
best students, and hence have the best results. Also, they have the best chances to
receive funding from external sources. Any academic teaching and research university
wants to be in this desirable position. However, the desire to find better solutions to
practical problems concerning economic and social development in the country may
be an important motivating factor for research, and that research can give substantial
contributions to material wealth accumulation as well as to improve the quality of life.
The National Commission on Higher Education (1996) identified that research and
teaching at higher education institutions are out of balance with national requirements.
Fisher (1998: 58) highlights three such imbalances:
Finally, in tune with the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis, higher education
institutions, in particular universities, should not in any serious meaning move away
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from traditional roles of research and teaching. Rather, they should move towards
integrating aspects of their research and teaching agendas more relevantly with
community service functions. This understanding of community service links strongly
with Byrne's (1999: 75) notion of "The Engaged Institution". For him engagement on
the part of universities is more than outreach or uni-directional extension of the
universities' services to the people or organisations they serve. Engagement includes
the mutual development of goals and the two-way sharing of expertise with elements
of society. South African society with its deep-rooted social, cultural and economic
problems can benefit from universities that can provide research-based community
services. These universities can take careful steps in the direction of service without
harming their status of research institutions of quality.
5.4SUMMARY
I have attempted to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards
organising teaching and learning at a distance, research (incorporating research-based
teaching) and community service. A reflexive democratic praxis creates spaces for
higher education practitioners to design flexible courses to be responsive to different
and divergent needs, removing barriers that prevent access to courses, and using a
leamer-centred approach to increase the dialogism between educator and learner at a
distance. Similarly a reflexive democratic praxis can have the effect whereby
universities in particular move towards integrating aspects of their research and
teaching agendas more relevantly with community service functions. South African
society with its deep-rooted social, cultural and economic problems can benefit from
universities that can provide research-based community services. In this way, higher
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education can take careful steps in the direction of service without harming their
status of research institutions of quality and through which they can initiate equal
access and development on the one hand, and enhance accountability and quality on
the other hand. In the next chapter I shall examine some of the practices related to
community service and distance education in the Faculty of Education at the
University of Stellenbosch in order to illustrate how nuances of a reflexive democratic
praxis already seem to have manifested in the higher education sector in South Africa.
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CHAPTER6
INSTANCES OF HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION: SOME
RESPONSES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The idea of a reflexive democratic praxis involves making teaching and learning
through distance education accessible, relevant and dialogical in order to meet some
of the demands posed by equality, development, accountability and quality in higher
education transformation. What is the University of Stellenboseh's (US) response to
community service and distance education in relation to the emergent shifts in higher
education? I shall identify instances related to community service and distance
education with particular emphasis on the University's Faculty of Education. In this
way, I hope to give further clarity to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis which
holds much promise for initiating equal access and development and enhancing
accountability and quality as far as university community service and distance
education initiatives are concerned.
6.2 COMMUNITY SERVICE
During the Vice-Chancellor's (Prof A H van Wyk) speech at the graduation ceremony
of8 December 1998, he accentuated the University's responsibility to provide
community service to the broader South African society. He also acknowledged the
necessity of an active investment in the University's service function, in particular,
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integrating community service with its teaching and research functions. Moreover,
although the service function has become important for the University as a whole in
contributing to the social, economic and cultural development of South African
communities, he underlined the contentious ("omstrede") and not easily definable
("moeilik definieerbare") role of community service. There are some indications that
service is an important criterion for hiring academic and administrative personnel.
This is a crucial observation. Whatever the positive phrasings about the service
function found in the University's Institutional Plan for the period 1999 to 2001, it is
left to see whether this attitude materialises in job descriptions or when hiring new
personnel.
The US took the position whereby all its faculties initiated mechanisms to implement
research-based projects aimed at addressing the service needs of the South African
community, a matter of being responsive. Some examples follow.
• Personnel in the Faculty of Medicine embarked upon research in ailments and
problems encountered by disadvantaged communities such as malnutrition and
• Several research projects in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences are directly
associated with alleviating the social problems of South African society.
• Through the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences research projects are implemented in
the community aimed at improving the welfare of disadvantaged communities
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such as the marketing of fresh agricultural products in lower income communities
in the environs of Cape Town.
• In the Faculty of the Natural Sciences, the Institute for Mathematics and Science
Teaching (lMSTUS) delivers meaningful in-service training for educators of
mathematics, physical science, biology and computer science.
• CENEDUS, based in the Faculty of Education, is currently focusing the
University's resources at the levels of formal, non-formal and informal education
to assist in changing the lives of community participants (particularly through
services provided to local schools) who have agreed and often have requested to
participate in education-related projects.
• In the Faculty of Engineering, through SUNSTEP (Stellenbosch University
Schools Technology Project), engineers work with schools throughout the country
to promote their technical innovativeness and productivity and to foster awareness
in learners about engineering by encouraging them to build small electronic
devices.
• In the Faculty of Law, legal services are provided to the community in the forms
of promoting "Street Law" and co-ordinating a law clinic (US Institutional Plan
1999 - 2001).
Thus, at the US, through their community service initiatives, the climate has been set
to make accessible the University's potential for even greater social relevance,
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especially against the decline in the quality of life in South African society. In the
absence of clear definitions of what constitutes community service (a point recognised
by the Vice-Chancellor of the US), much has transpired at the University that has
service elements in it. For example, community service ("dienslewering na buite") is
recognised formally as part of the expected and reward role of academics or key
administrative personnel. This suggests that the introduction of community service
into the deliberations on faculty promotion and tenure has already been taken up as a
crucial issue by key leaders of the University's administration. However, for the
reason that decisions regarding the percentage "weighting" which may be allocated to
academic personnel for their community service functions reside solely with faculties,
and not with a central authority, the possibility exists that unequal "weightings" may
be allocated to research, teaching and community service. Often, a lower "weighting"
has been allocated to community service functions in the faculties in comparison to
that of teaching and research (US "Handleiding"). While the evaluation of University
personnel recognises acceptable accomplishments in the more traditional teaching and
research roles, as well as recognised community service, the unequal "weightings"
allocated to the three components is an issue which key leaders of the University's
administration may open up in deliberations surrounding personnel promotion, tenure
and evaluation. In essence, suggestions for modifying personnel evaluation
procedures would signal a significant step towards the seriousness of the University in
articulating its community service position.
Finally, many centres or units within and outside faculties already have developed
apparatuses to handle community services. However, to make the community service
function more visible to its clients and external funders, the University needs an
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apparatus in its own structure to take care of this function. In this way profitable
community service activities within and outside faculties at the University would be
co-ordinated at central level by an administrative and market-orientated instrument.
This initiative would further open up opportunities for the University to give proper
attention to market needs and to generate enormous revenue for its community service
programmes. And, to be more sensitive to market needs may give new impulses and
further stimulate creative thinking within the University. Taking for granted the
qualities of a centralised institutional authority such as an over-arching community
service co-ordinating body, it seems, however, that the University could be even more
sensitive to the societal problems in our country.
Summing up, many leaders at the US seem generally aware of a future where
community services integrated with research and teaching will be increasingly
important for success in the institution's activities. They also have a clear expectation
that centres or units could provide services relevant to the needs of South African
communities. In this sense, community service harnessed at the University embraces
nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis, that is, allowing spaces for access to,
relevance for and partnerships with education communities through the institution's
research-based projects.
6.3 DISTANCE EDUCATION
In this section I shall relate some of the distance education initiatives taken by staff
members in the Faculty of Education to the idea ofa reflexive democratic praxis. This
dissertation focuses on distance education for the reason that the massification of
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higher education in South Africa during the next few years would be significantly
tilted towards this mode of education. Since 14 July 1997 three of the Faculty of
Education's four departments, namely Didactics (together with the Institute for
Mathematics and Science Teaching (IMSTUS), Educational Psychology and
Specialised Education, and Education Policy Studies collaborated with South African
National Private Colleges (NPC) to develop distance education programmes. These
programmes include Further Diplomas in Education (FDEs) in the areas of
Curriculum Studies, Mathematics and Numeracy, Natural Science, Communication,
Literacy and Language Learning, Social and Human Sciences, Life Orientation,
Environmental Education and, Leamer-centred Education Strategies, as well as in
1999, Bachelor of Education (BEd) courses in the fields of Educational Management,
Philosophy of Education, Didactics, Educational Psychology, Environmental
Education, Specialised Education (Adult Basic Education), Comparative Education
and, Historical and Sociological Perspectives in Education. In addition a BEd Access
course is offered in the areas of Didactics, Educational Management, Educational
Psychology and Philosophy of Education. Currently almost 4000 students mostly
from the disadvantaged Black sector of the population are registered for these courses.
It is expected that the first group of FDE students will be awarded the qualification at
the end of the year 2000 and the first BEd group will hopefully graduate in March
2001. Between 30 and 40 academics including contract staff are responsible for the
authoring of the study guides.
I shall now discuss the design, development, production and delivery of the Faculty's
distance education programmes in order to establish whether distance education in the
Faculty embraces nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis. For each of the courses
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mentioned, an author and co-authors have been assigned. After the academic authors
have completed their first drafts of the distance education course materials, one or two
critical readers made suggestions to improve the materials' quality. These drafts are
sent to NPC for instructional design, language editing and graphic design. After NPC
completed the ID process they returned the study guides to the authors who in tum,
validated the course materials. At this stage, frequent collaboration occurred between
the instructional designers from NPC and the academic authors from the Faculty. The
instructional designers and academic authors were particularly interested in the
learner-centredness (accessibility), relevance and dialogical (conversational) style of
the texts. These distance education texts were aimed at producing critical students
involved in seeking reasons, attempting to be well-informed, using and
acknowledging credible sources, considering alternatives and other points of view,
withholding judgment until they have sufficient evidence and seeking to be as precise
as possible (Norris 1989) - a matter of ensuring that a reflexive democratic praxis
guides their (students) learning.
However, the course development process did not occur without certain limitations.
Some of the course materials developed under NPC / Faculty initiatives, used flexible
and dynamic ISD-4 principles (as articulated earlier in the chapter), many of the
course materials seemingly used procedures trapped in the domains of first generation
lSD, second generation lSD and third generation lSD. Of course, instructional design
"tools" associated with first generation lSD, second generation lSD and third
generation lSD (refer to section 5.2.4) can be used (and has been used by the NPC /
Faculty course development team). However, in the main, the instructional design
"tools" which can bring about quality distance education course materials ought to be
located in fourth generation lSD. This makes sense if one considers that a complex,
dynamic and flexible approach to instructional system design has been argued for in
this thesis and which links conceptually with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.
My contention is that the NPC / Faculty of Education materials development process
did not always effectively implement fourth generation lSD "tools". Some of the
weaknesses highlighted in discussions and interviews with academics include issues
such as unclear course maps which do not match objectives, too lengthy summaries,
lack of critical outcomes learners have to acquire, an emphasis on low-level activities
and a surface approach to learning.
The above weaknesses in the distance education texts suggest that all "tools"
identified in fourth generation lSD were not effectively used to develop a prototype
for designing course materials. This is necessary, since the quality of the prototype
depends on the efficient and effective use of these instructional design "tools". A
crucial aspect, which emerges from the above weaknesses of the materials, is the
materials development team's lack of continuous involvement with the situational
analysis phase. In other words, these texts were written without consistently referring
to the impact the ever changing situational analysis has or would have on the design
and development of the course materials. The process of materials development could
therefore not always have been consistent with recursiveness and dynamism.
Moreover, during the initial design and development phases, student piloting has not
been incorporated into the materials development phases. This suggests that the
materials development team would not have been in a position to ascertain whether
the materials would in fact be "well-designed and interactive", that is, dialogical. By
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implication, the course design and development could not have been recursive,
whereby course developers update the materials in the light of student feedback. This
is a necessary step to ensure that "well-designed, interactive study material" can be
achieved. In other words, the course development team has to embark on a dynamic
and flexible approach to instructional design, that is, recursively improving the
materials after student piloting. This was seemingly not always the case.
Consequently, the following areas need to be addressed as to ensure that the quality of
materials are improved:
• situational analysis, whereby the course development team (academic authors,
moderators, instructional designers, language editors, graphic designers and
critical readers) develop learning experiences and environments in the course
texts with the realisation that learners have a distinctive style, learning style,
orientation, value system and expectation. The information acquired during
this phase can be used to make informed decisions about the planning,
development (for example, the levels and types of self-assessment activities
used to help students access the materials) and implementation of the course;
• analysis-design phase, during which good page layout and access devices such
as course map linked to clear objectives are used, as well as clear goals and
objectives specified of what learners should be able to do after completing a
course unit;
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• design-production phase, whereby attention should be given to the choice and
use of appropriate graphics, icons, diagrams, activities and typesetting
(especially in relation to mathematical notations); and
• Production-implementation-maintenance phase, during which the materials are
amended and refined to meet the criteria of the design specifications as
indicated during the peer evaluation periods.
The fact that át least four main fourth generation lSD "tools", that is, doing a
situational analysis, analysis-design, design-production and production-
implementation and maintenance, have not been used effectively, suggests that a
reflexive democratic praxis has not consistently been pursued. However, it is my
contention that some lSD "tools" have been used which at least exonerates the course
team from operating mostly in the quagmire of the linear and flowchart phases of
instructional systems design. Moreover, the face-to-face group contact sessions which
academics in the Faculty had with several students at five venues in the country,
namely Stellenbosch, Umtata, East London, Durban and Pietersburg, vindicates the
claim that dialogical interaction between students and academics has always been a
priority for the course development team. Useful student feedback received at these
sessions, in my view, could be incorporated into the texts in the next development
phase, which will occur in 2002.
Since the end of 1999 by far the most relevant distance education programme which
has been developed in the Faculty thus far, has been (and continues to be) the Masters
in Philosophy (MPhil): Leadership in Education programme. This programme can be
1. Critical educational discourse: The curriculum content of the MPhil distance
education programme prioritises the improvement of leadership and
management in schools considered as one of Education Minister Kader
Asmal's strategic initiatives according to his "five-year plan for an education
shake-up" (Mothibeli 2000: 23). In this way, the distance education
considered relevant to the changing higher education context in South Africa
primarily for its reliance on information technology - allowing course delivery via
satellite transmission, a virtual mode of delivery. Students, more specifically adult
learners, can use this form of electronic learning to communicate with university
lecturers from multiple locations in order to renew their learning and skills. In fact,
what makes the MPhil programme even more relevant is that employed adults seek to
pursue formal degree study compatible with their initial educational training. In other
words, adult learners have a demand for work-relevant education (El-Khawas 1999:
8).
It is my contention that during the development phase participants used what has been
explained in chapter two and three as logically necessary conditions of rationality (the
general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis). These conditions include: critical
educational discourse whereby participants (mostly academics) engaged in a clear
articulation of issues and attuned themselves to the needs of prospective students who
subsequently registered for the course; reflexive action whereby academics willingly
subjected authored texts to critical scrutiny in order to progress "toward the better";
respect for each other and diversity of views; and dialogism as a commitment towards
collective action.
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programme aims to address the needs of the current education system, what
Minister Asmal refers to as "to make everybody accountable for the
performance of our education system" (2000: 23). What makes the programme
even more critical is its focus on four primary themes which address relevant
issues concerning educational transformation in the country. The four major
themes include: Leadership in Educational Transformation, Leadership in
Educational Research, Leadership in Curriculum Transformation and,
Leadership in Education Management. Moreover, the programme aims to
develop competent educational leaders who should:
• possess the leadership competencies necessary to contribute towards
institutional transformation;
• serve his / her education institution and community III a more
professional manner;
• be empowered to bring about conceptual and pragmatic change in
accordance with a broad understanding of curriculum development,
education efficiency and research;
• create an environment conducive to the development and enhancement
of critical, logical, creative and reflective thinking;
• facilitate appropriate adaptations to learning and teaching strategies for
diverse learning contexts, and simultaneously optimise the quality of
learning experiences;
• create a democratic climate for learning characterised by functional
discipline and an appreciation for and sensitivity to cultural, racial and
gender diversity;
• develop an informed understanding of current legislation with regard to
management of human resources, and acquire a thorough knowledge of
professional organisations and their constitutional commitment to
respect human rights;
• realise the consequences for education of political issues and social
problems such as poverty, poor health and the environment.
• apply principles of educational research in practice; and
• cultivate a school research ethic (Schreuder 2000: x).
Hence, the envisaged outcomes of the MPhil (Leadership in Education)
distance education programme reinforce the notion of a critical educational
discourse and consequently, a reflexive democratic praxis. This is so for the
reason that issues dealing with "transformation", "change", "critical, logical,
creative and reflective thinking", "diverse learning contexts", "quality of
learning experiences", "to respect human rights" and, to address "social
problems" relate to initiating equal access and relevance, as well as enhancing
accountability and quality - outcomes of a reflexive democratic praxis. What
further strengthens the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis is the fact that the
programme currently provides access to most students from the historically
disadvantaged sector of the South African society, as well as tutorial support
via interactive satellite communication to these students at fourteen different
learning centres throughout the country.
2. Reflexive dialogical action: Academic authors in collaboration with critical
readers, language editors, instructional designers and graphic artists developed
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the course materials. Authors willingly subjected their written drafts for
rigorous critical scrutiny in order to improve the quality and learner-
centredness of the texts. Deliberations and negotiations regarding the
coherence, style and appropriateness of the materials were characterised by an
atmosphere of respect for each other and diversity of views. In this way course
team members remained dialogically committed to produce quality distance
education course materials. The idea of dialogism was "imported" into the
study guides in the sense whereby students are required to engage with the
"voices" of the academic authors. Several portfolio activities occur throughout
the study guides in order for students to develop their own rational
understandings of often difficult, yet challenging concepts. In this way the idea
of a reflexive democratic praxis through engaging with the study guides seems
unavoidable.
In essence, through the virtual mode of satellite transmission the lifelong educational
needs of adults are beginning to play an important role in higher education. It is in this
regard that the University of Stellenbosch responded in a creative manner.
6.4 A MOMENT IN MY OWN PRAXIS: REFLEXIVE, DEMOCRATIC OR
BOTH?
At the University of Stellenbosch, during the second semester of the academic year of
1999, I taught a post-graduate course (honours level) in Comparative Education for
students who were mostly in-service teachers, social and / or community workers and
adult basic education practitioners. The course named "Theories, Methodologies and
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Approaches of Comparative Education" comprised a curriculum that included a
diversity of interdisciplinary topics such as frameworks (theories and methods) of
understanding education; educational policy planning, development, analysis and
implementation related to developing countries; globalisation, democracy and
transformation in relation to educational development and its related problems in
South Africa; and contemporary debates surrounding the production of socially
relevant knowledge. All these topics were constituted by possibilities of the processes
of higher education transformation and liberation within the broader South African
society, that is, they were always connected to wider political, economic, social,
historical and power relations that promoted context-specific values and interests.
The course was organised in such a way that it offered students a core body of
knowledge complemented by relevant and critical readings. It also included activities
(classroom presentation / discussions, assignment, seminar and workshop) that would
demand their use of critical reflection and rethinking of knowledge and the production
of their own and shared meanings. Students were not only encouraged to make
analytical summaries of the selected readings to ensure a basic understanding of the
texts, but also to interpret these same texts relevant to their own social and every day
life experiences. They were then challenged to critically appropriate and reconstruct
their understandings and interpretations of these readings with respect to change and
transformation in their society. In a different way, students were engaged critically
and reflexively in classroom activities. The understanding of knowledge which
underlined such an approach to learning in the Comparative Education classroom, is
that knowledge is not complete, predetermined and entirely discipline related, but
rather, continuous and constructed in specific social and historical settings. Boulton-
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Lewis (1998: 202-203) argues that criticalleaming (as I assume students experienced
in the Comparative Education classroom) is shaped by knowledge in the forms of
declarative and procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge consists of factual
knowledge of a discipline and the way it is structured for retrieval such as the
knowledge regarding theories and methods of understanding education. Procedural
knowledge is that which allows the purposeful manipulation of declarative knowledge
to undertake a task, solve problems, make decisions, understand, know "How" and
"Why", and so on. According to Clark and Neave (1992: 1521) the most effective
means of teaching "are those emphasising active student involvement, problem
solving, and application of skills".
Moreover if curricula are to respond to the challenges higher education currently
faces, educators need to begin to take responsibility for enabling their students to deal
reflexively in shaping education as a dynamic activity. By this is meant that education
should see the learner as engaging in experience, reflection, restructuring and
planning, referred to by Schon (1983: 50) as "reflexivity" or "reflection-in-action".
Schon (1983: 50) postulates when reflecting-in-action, "there is some puzzling
phenomenon with which the individual is trying to deal. As he (she) tries to make
sense of it, he (she) also reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in his
(her) action, understandings which he (she) surfaces, criticises, restructures and
embodies in further action". Fostering reflexivity in and on education, the educator
"ideally engages the learner in constant inner dialogue, aiding in the development of
life long learning skills" (Mitchell, Jolly & Mcleod 1998: 296). In this sense,
reflexivity in education means that learners need to direct reflective thinking to
themselves (how are we performing), fact (where to find information), reason (why
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are we doing this?), theory (do the interpretations really help?) and creativity (how
could this be used in other settings?).
I started teaching the course by presenting and expounding on the conceptual
underpinnings of issues about knowledge in the curriculum, in particular the diversity
of ways in which knowledge within the field of education and educational research is
produced. I then focussed on those conceptual thinking patterns that would engender a
critical, reflexive understanding and approach to educational studies. I continuously
related what appeared to be abstract theoretical and methodological perspectives in
education with situational examples where these perspectives were at play and
embodied in every day life situations. This type of teaching strategy was aimed at
fostering the following understandings in students:
• A reduction of the teaching of facts and unnecessary analysis to ensure students
concentrate on transferable skills and the understanding of fundamental concepts
so that they do not need to spend so much time simply absorbing knowledge.
• Lecture is not a very effective method of ensuring that students fully grasp the
kind of concepts that underpin understanding.
• To get students to think, or go beyond the information given with integrative skill
of bringing knowledge, skills, understanding and experience together in problem
solving activities and environment, which in tum, provides students with the
appropriate kind of preparation for lifelong independent learning.
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After the presentation and exposition stages, students as individuals and in
collaborative groups engaged critically in the reading of knowledge and knowledge
formation as constructed and applied in the world. They practised dialogism. Mildren,
Whelan and Chappell-Lawrence (1998: 30) reflect on the advantages of implementing
group work in educational studies, below.
• Talking to students about the ways in which they interact in a team gives them an
insight into their own learning style as well as that of others. This gives them an
appreciation of the value of diversity in a working environment.
• Students, when working in teams from early in their university experience, are
more quickly affiliated with fellow students and the environment of the institution
from the sense of collegiality developed in working in teams.
Introducing group work during university study can facilitate an easier transition to
the workplace. Given the emphasis placed on teamwork in many workplaces, this
better prepares graduates to enter the workplace environment.
I want to come back to my teaching strategy as mentioned earlier, in particular in
getting students to think, or go beyond the information given. The question remains:
What was the general principle that underscored my teaching strategy in the
classroom? The point of this question is that in order to get students to think and then
for them to go beyond the information given, they have to engage, in the first place, in
dialogism. Dialogism in the university classroom requires the establishment of a set of
social relationships different from many traditional classroom relationships and
corresponding significantly with those associated with the idea of a reflexive
democratic praxis. According to Bridges (1998: 285) dialogism requires of those
students and educators engaged to be prepared to examine and to be responsive to the
different opinions they put forward, that is, a readiness to understand and appreciate
each other's different points of view. In other words, dialogism "is an activity of
which the success depends essentially on the reciprocal efforts of those taking part. It
requires social involvement, co-operation, mutual attentiveness and responsiveness,
respect and appreciation of individual divergence, reasonableness, etc." (1998: 305).
These qualities and relations, in my view, lie at the heart of a reflexive democratic
praxis. Again it is worth noting that the lecture could not generate the same kind of
relationships or values between educator and students. There does seem to be some
kind of justification for considering a preference for dialogism in the university
classroom as being attuned to a reflexive democratic praxis. Like Bridges (1998), I am
not alone in seeing some connection between a preference for teaching and learning
by dialogism and the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. Dewey (1940: 10) makes
the point that there exists a relationship between the democratic method of forming
opinions and "dialogism and persuasion in politics ... (and) in schools (or
universities), the places where the essentials of character are supposed to be formed".
Hallworth (1957: 10) indicated the significance of group dialogism is "to establish a
democratic situation for the teacher in training". Fielding (1973: 2) has seen a concern
to equip students for participating in dialogism as a means to democratise changes in
traditional "authoritarian, teacher-dominated classroom methods".
Finally, students reflected through debate and questioning on these issues about
knowledge in selected readings and how such issues relate to their own common
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understandings and ways of seeing the world. My teaching strategy was based on the
understanding that we have to know content (what knowledge is), how we reflect on
how we come to know, and why we have to know - all practices which link
conceptually with a reflexive democratic praxis. This idea of teaching is aimed at
allowing the student to evaluate, challenge and perhaps extend knowledge to a new
area, that is, fostering deep learning (Marton et. a/1997; Samuelowicz & Bain 1992).
My contention is that students will mature intellectually when they are exposed to an
environment that allows and fosters deep learning for the reason that in deep
approaches "students seek personal understanding of the (learning) material" (Clark &
Neave 1992: 1522). According to Rossouw (1994: 29) such an approach to learning
and knowledge at higher education level can be seen as "an open process" of meaning
making whereby knowledge cannot be regarded as "a completed product".
The assessment of the course (content, approach and methodology used) was done at
the end of the course. I conducted a focus group interview with the students on the
lectures, readings, assignment and topics covered in the course with the aim of
improving the content, presentation and the relevance of the topics included in the
curriculum. The general response of the group to the curriculum was, in students'
words, that it was "actual and relevant to political changes and developments
nationally and abroad", "insightful", "stimulating", "contextual and relevant to own
practices", "diverse", "interesting", "engaging", "thought provoking" and
"challenging". They valued the reflexive approach to classroom teaching and learning
because it not only challenged their own assumptions about knowledge and knowing,
but also engaged them critically with the diverse constructions of knowledge through
different readings. They seldom wanted to know my analytical summaries of the texts,
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and instead, mediated their diverse critical perspectives through imaginative
constructions and reconstructions of meanings even unknown to me.
Students liked the facilitating role I performed for the reason that it created conditions
for collaborative inquiry and exchange of ideas, critical and reflexive thinking. This
transformative role opened up possibilities for students to question, reflect on,
challenge and reconstruct knowledge constructs. And, when students challenge and
reconstruct they are interested to understand knowledge, to integrate it with existing
knowledge and to apply it to real world situations (Briggs & Moore 1993). Regarding
the assignment students had individually to produce at the end of the course, they
stated that, although it was "difficult to analyse their readings" rationally and
systematically, the opportunities to reflect, rethink, construct and reconstruct their
own meanings contributed to their ability to "understand educational developments in
a period of change in South Africa in a critical manner". Boulton-Lewis (1998: 204)
would attribute such rational practices to "students who have (developed) deeper
knowledge and more sophisticated levels of reasoning than those with which they
began university study".
Finally I appreciated the students' evaluation of the course content and methodology
since they provided me with more possibilities to interpret, construct and rethink
knowledge and knowing in an ongoing manner. Their positive yet critical feedback
offered me more possibilities to chart out my own future pedagogical practice not
only in relation to the theory and practice of education in the university classroom, but
also to be open to the many educative voices in my own society. In this way my
praxis embraced nuances of reflexivity and democratic education, thus supporting the
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claim that a reflexive democratic praxis is not only possible but also desirable as we
as academics at higher education institutions attempt to attune our practices to the
dictates of transformation - equal access, development, accountability and quality.
This means that our practices have to be consistent with establishing an environment
where students gain access to learning, and where they develop the willingness to
want to learn. In such a transformative environment students are accountable to think
for themselves and try to interpret before being told, that is by becoming aware of
their own understandings, each other's understanding and their educators'
understandings - a matter of students and educators learning from each other. This is
to enhance the quality of higher education. It is worth quoting Marton (1998: 198) in
this regard:
By becoming aware of other ways of experiencing and understanding
phenomena, the collective consciousness of the knowledge organisation, the
university, will grow as knowledge is then framed by our becoming conscious
of how it is formed. I believe this is one way in which quality in higher
education can be raised (my italics).
6.5 CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The University of Stellenbosch through their community service, distance education
and teaching initiatives can engender reflexivity and democratic educational
discourse. In this way, the University can be considered to make reasonable strides in
meeting some of the demands posed by equality, development, accountability and
quality in higher education transformation. Its responsiveness to the needs of, in
particular the disadvantaged sector of the South African population illustrates its
commitment to provide equal access through the distance education programmes. The
University's community service initiatives mostly address abject educational
conditions in disadvantaged communities, as well as establishing dialogical
partnerships with educators, learners, schools, community workers, and so on, to
improve the level of educatedness of people. Hence, the University can be considered
a social context in making the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis work from
"inside" (Gutman 1998: 34).
A reflexive democratic praxis, as has been argued for in this thesis, provides higher
education practitioners with a conceptual frame to organise their discourses in a
reflexive and democratic way which can contribute towards transforming what they
do or intend doing. It offers possibilities for those involved with higher education not
only to democratise their practices, that is, making their representative actions
functional according to participatory processes of teaching and learning through
distance education, research and community service, but also making their actions
reflexive. This means that higher education practitioners can rationally organise their
activities, which would enable them to achieve some worthwhile end; to contribute
towards addressing the demands of equality, development, accountability and quality
in South African higher education.
My argument for a reflexive democratic praxis as the general principle for
transforming higher education in South Africa is by no means comprehensive and
absolutely monolithic in relation to rethinking teaching and learning through distance
education, research and community service. However, it does provide a conceptual
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and enabling space for those serious about higher education transformation in South
Africa to critically examine higher education policy changes in relation to their own
pedagogical practices. Moreover, there will be more nuanced ways in which the idea
of praxis can be linked to notions such as reflexivity and democracy. But it is here
where the challenge for serious higher education practitioners lies: to gain more
clarity about the concepts which can effect educational transformation. Only when
one understands what constitutive meanings underlie concepts such as reflexivity,
democracy and praxis, can one be better positioned to make rational choices about the
different ways in which higher education transformation can be enhanced.
Finally my conceptual analysis of the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis from the
perspective of a university academic is itself an attempt to make sense of the claim
that universities should remain institutions intent on producing higher knowledge
embedded in the tradition of deep disciplinary thinking, in my instance, philosophy of
education, in quest of serving the higher intellectual and common interests of the
South African society. It is my contention that the idea of a reflexive democratic
praxis contains constitutive meanings that may encourage university scholars and
researchers to further pursue matters that can have wider implications for higher
education transformation. But perhaps of equal or more importance is the possibility
that my use of conceptual analysis within a critical educational discourse can benefit
engaging analyses, interpretations and expositions of various ideas related to higher
education transformation on the part of higher education role players.
In summary, I have shown that the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can
contribute towards transforming higher education practices. It is not sufficient to
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assume that higher education policy frameworks can engender transformation within
higher education. We first need to have clarity about particular concepts that guide
transformation in higher education before we can develop possible ways to actuate
change. This chapter involving the response of the University of Stellenbosch is an
attempt to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can work and that it provides space
to clarify and use concepts in the transformation of higher education with specific
reference to transforming teaching and learning through distance education, research
and community service.
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